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ONE PERSON, ONE OFFICE: SEPARATION OF
POWERS OR SEPARATION OF PERSONNEL?
Steven G. Calabres4 and Joan L. Larsent
"The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judici-
ary, in the same hands ... whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elec-
tive, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."'
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INTRODUCTION
The Framers of the American Constitution hated concentrations
of government power. Through checks and balances, separation of
powers, bicameralism, and federalism, they sought to preserve liberty
by making it hard for government to act.2 But while the Framers took
great care to separate government power horizontally and vertically
among different institutions, they took only the most limited steps to
prevent particular individuals from amassing absolute power by jointly
holding office in more than one institution of government at the
same time.3 The Framers barred Members of Congress from holding
federal executive or judicial offices, 4 but the text they wrote allows
joint office holding between: 1) the Executive and Judicial Depart-
ments,5 2) the House of Representatives and the Senate, and 3) the
federal government and the states. Accordingly, it might well be said
that the original American doctrine of separation of powers contem-
plated more a separation of the institutions of government than a sep-
aration of personnel. 6
Two hundred years of American history have added their gloss,
and today we largely understand the separation of powers to include a
one person, one office codicil. Unwritten traditions disfavor plural
office holding of any kind.7 These traditions, together with the In-
compatibility Clause itself, now form a vital part of America's struc-
2 See Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, "If Angels Were to Govern": The Need for
Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DuKE LJ. 449, 456-74 (1991); see also
Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive, Plural
Judiciary, 105 HAuv. L. REv. 1153 (1992); Geoffrey P. Miller, Rights and Structure in Constitu-
tional Theory, 8J. PHIL AND PoL'y 196, 210 (1991).
3 For a thoughtful defense of the separation of powers as primarily a separation of
institutions (or "branches"), see Thomas W. Merrill, The ConstitutionalPrinciple of Separation
of Powers, 1991 Sup. CT. Rnv. 225.
4 "[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either house during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 [hereinafter
referred to as the "Incompatibility Clause"].
5 This Article will use the term "department" in referring to the three institutions of
our national government rather than the more common term "branch." See Calabresi &
Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1156 n.6 (explaining this choice of terminology).
6 It should also be remembered in this context that two of the three great depart-
ments of the national government share powers traditionally thought of as executive and
legislative. Thus, the President shares in the legislative power by virtue of his veto, and the
Congress shares in the executive power by virtue of the Senate's role in ratifying treaties
and confirming nominees. It is accordingly a truism that ours is a government of constitu-
tionally separated and shared powers. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 1, at 322 (James
Madison).
7 We do not mean to suggest that these unwritten traditions are judicially enforcea-
ble or that the text of the Constitution has somehow been "amended" sub silentio. Rather,
we mean only that most Americans now assume that plural office holding is disallowed and
therefore, as a practical matter, it does not generally occur.
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tural "Constitution."8 In our view, the Incompatibility Principle has
become one of the five great distinguishing structural features of our
constitutional system, along with checks and balances, separation of
powers, bicameralism, and federalism.
It is odd, therefore, that scholars to date have largely ignored the
separation-of-powers implications of the Incompatibility Clause itself
and, to a lesser degree, the unwritten incompatibility traditions. We
propose to remedy this defect by describing the history of both com-
ponents of the Incompatibility Principle and weighing their normative
appeal. We consider first the Clause and second the traditions. The
history and normative considerations differ significantly in each case.
We treat them together in this one Article because of what they reveal
about what the American doctrine of separation of powers has
become.
George Mason described the Incompatibility Clause of Article I,
Section 6 of the U.S. Constitution as "the corner-stone on which our
liberties depend."9 "[I]f we strike it out," he said, "we are erecting a
fabric for our destruction." 10 We agree with Mason that the Incom-
patibility Clause plays a vital role in our constitutional scheme,
although ironically not for the reasons Mason thought it would. We
believe the true significance of the Incompatibility Clause is that it has
almost single handedly prevented the emergence of "parliamentary
government"" in this country by strengthening the Presidency and
reinforcing the separation of powers. This is an ironic and unin-
8 The word "Constitution" appears in quotation marks here to indicate that we refer
to something other than the written, judicially enforceable Constitution of 1787, as
amended. Rather, we use "Constitution" here in its British sense, encompassing our un-
written, nonjusticiable fundamental traditions. By the phrase "the structural Constitution,"
we mean to refer to those aspects of the document that literally "constitute" and give shape
to our institutions of government. Such aspects might be distinguished, in part, from the
provisions of the amended Constitution that secure fundamental, individual rights. Com-
pare Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary
Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE LJ. 821, 864-65 (1985) (advocating a different inter-
pretive approach to words appearing in the structural Constitution as opposed to the Bill
of Rights), with Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131
(1991) (advocating a common interpretive approach and pointing out the many structural
aspects of the Bill of Rights).
9 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 381 (Max Farrand ed., rev.
ed. 1987) (June 22, 1787) (emphasis added) [hereinafter REcoRDs].
10 Id.
11 As we explain below, "parliamentary government" in this country would, in prac-
tice, mean government by the congressional committee system. See infra notes 77, 318-37
and accompanying text. Congressional committees are our home-grown version of a hy-
brid legislature-executive. Thus, it might be more accurate to say that the true significance
of the Incompatibility Clause is that it has almost single handedly prevented the emer-
gence of congressional committee government in this country by strengthening the Presidency
and reinforcing the separation of powers. We use the term "parliamentary government"
only because it corresponds to the terminology often used in the political science litera-
ture. Its rosy connotations, however, are probably misleading in the American context as
1048 [Vol. 79:1045
SEPARATION OF PERSONNEL
tended consequence of our first and only constitutional ethics rule, a
provision that was originally supposed to weaken the Presidency not to
strengthen it.
Constitutional scholars have generally ignored the Incompatibil-
ity Clause. It generates no litigation 12 and has succeeded so thor-
oughly in dividing power that we sometimes forget it even exists. Like
bicameralism, its very simplicity makes it a completely successful struc-
tural device.' 3 Accordingly, there is no sustained treatment of the
Clause in the law reviews, 14 and the major texts and treatises on consti-
tutional law mention the Clause only in passing, if they refer to it at
all. 15 In fact, virtually the only discussion of the Clause in the legal
academic literature has come from a group of constitutional reform-
the more accurate phrase "congressional committee government" suggests. Conversation
with Professor Randy Barnett, Boston University School of Law (October 22, 1993).
12 In Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), the
United States Supreme Court held that citizens lack standing to sue to enforce the Incom-
patibility Clause. In that case, an association of military reservists filed suit on behalf of "all
taxpayers... and ... citizens of the United States," alleging that the reserve membership
of 107 Senators and Representatives violated the Clause. Id. at 211. The Court concluded
that the plaintiffs lacked standing on the ground that their complaint raised only a" 'gen-
eralized grievance[ ]' about the conduct of Government," id. at 217, and, thus, did not
present a proper case for judicial resolution, id. at 220-21.
We do not discuss the problem of standing and the Incompatibility Clause in this
Article. Nonetheless, it may be worth pointing out that Schlesinger did not involve a situa-
tion where an Officer of the United States, who was also a Member of Congress, was taking
government action that bore down on the life, liberty, or property rights of a private indi-
vidual. If such a situation were ever to arise, we would have no doubt that the private
individual so affected would have standing to defend against the government action on the
ground that it was unconstitutional because of a violation of the Incompatibility Clause.
Such an individual would be in precisely the same situation as an individual whose federal
case or controversy was unconstitutionally adjudicated by an untenured, non-Article III
judge.
13 Another example of such a device might be the constitutional rule that each state
shall elect two Senators. The rule is so simple and unambiguous that it cannot be made
the subject of litigation or dispute. Rules of this kind are, in effect, self-enforcing.
14 Daniel H. Pollitt does provide some discussion of the Clause in his article, Senatorl
Attorney-General Saxbe and the "Ineligibility Clause" of the Constitution: An Encroachment Upon the
Separation of Powers, 53 N.C. L. REv. 111 (1974). However, as the title implies, that article's
focus is the ineligibility rather than the incompatibility provision of article I, § 6. (For a
recent, thought-provoking discussion of the Ineligibility Clause, see Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, Is Lloyd Bentsen Unconstitutional?, 46 STAN. L. R~a. 907 (1994)). Solomon Slonim like-
wise gives limited treatment to the Clause in his article on the extrajudicial activities of
federaljudges. See Solomon Slonim, Extrajudicial Activities and the Principle of The Separation
of Powers, 49 CONN. B.J. 391, 396-401 (1975). Various articles advocating constitutional
reform also acknowledge the existence of the Incompatibility Clause, but none have en-
gaged in a sustained and critical exploration of the Clause. See generally works cited infra
note 267.
15 See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 124-26 (2d ed. 1988)
(mentioning Incompatibility Clause only in the course of discussing Supreme Court's de-
termination in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974),
that citizens lacked standing to sue for enforcement of the Clause); JOHN E. NoWiAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTruTIONAL LAw § 212(f), at 75 (4th ed. 1991) (same).
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ers led by former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler who, without full
knowledge of the Clause's historical or contemporary purpose in our
system of government, has launched a campaign for its repeal!16 It is
our first project in this Article to rescue the Incompatibility Clause
from its ill-deserved obscurity and to highlight its vital significance to
the separation of powers.
Our second project in this Article is to explore how the Incom-
patibility Principle embodied in the Clause gradually expanded over
time until it eventually came to include a number of unwritten incom-
patibility traditions. Included among these are traditions of: 1) exec-
utivejudicial incompatibility; 2) Senate-House of Representatives
incompatibility; and 3) federal-state incompatibility. We believe these
incompatibility traditions have come to play a vital role in our consti-
tutional scheme by reinforcing the separation of powers as it is now
understood.' 7 Our second task in this Article then is to explore and
critique the process by which the incompatibility norm has expanded
and informed our understanding of the separation of powers.
Ironically, when the Framers first met at Philadelphia they consid-
ered providing for broader incompatibility restrictions, but decided
against doing so. Proposals to constitutionalize executive-judicial and
federal-state incompatibility were made at the Constitutional Conven-
tion and were not approved. Two centuries of experience, however,
suggest that today there exists a heavy presumption of one person,
one office incompatibility. While we do not believe this presumption
has the force of federal law,' 8 it clearly governs social expectations and
behavior much the way the old two term tradition for Presidents did
before adoption of the Twenty-Second Amendment.19 We wish to ex-
plore and critique the process by which the unwritten incompatibility
traditions developed, giving added content to our conception of the
separation of powers. We believe these traditions, like the Incompati-
bility Clause itself, have had the most profound effect on our struc-
tural Constitution.
We begin in Part I of this Article by laying out the British and
colonial antecedents of the Incompatibility Principle. Interestingly,
16 See infra notes 265-87 and accompanying text. But see Thomas 0. Sargentich, The
Limits of the Parliamentary Critique of the Separation of Powers, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 679
(1993) (rebutting, in general terms, the loyd Cutler critique).
17 For a thoughtful defense of executive-judicial incompatibility, see Martin H. Red-
ish, Separation of Powers, Judicial Authority, and the Scope of Article I. The Troubling Cases of
Morrison and Mistretta, 39 DEPAUL L. Rrv. 299 (1989).
18 Not everyone agrees with our originalist-textualist presumption that the unwritten
incompatibility traditions lack the force of federal law. See infra text accompanying notes
379-81. The federal-state incompatibility tradition, at least, has the force of state constitu-
tional law in 47 out of 50 states. See infra note 536. In all of those 47 states, it is a violation
of the state constitution for state officers to hold federal office.
19 See U.S. CONsT. amend. XXII (constitutionalizing two-term limit for Presidents).
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the Principle seems to have been grounded less in separation-of-pow-
ers theory than in the Framers' vivid memory of the British Kings'
practice of "bribing" Members of Parliament (M.P.'s) and judges with
joint appointments to lucrative executive posts. This corrupt practice
was repeated in the colonies, which, after independence, enacted
strict constitutional bans on plural office holding.
The background being laid, Parts II and III then focus on the
Incompatibility Clause itself. Part II, Section A discusses the text of
the Clause and its origins at the Philadelphia Convention. Part II,
Section B evaluates the Clause's success in fulfilling its intended func-
tion as a constitutional ethics rule that would prevent corruption of
Congress by the President. Part II, Section C describes the Clause's
wholly unappreciated and unintended consequence of foreclosing
"parliamentary" government in this country by making the President's
Cabinet and Administration much more independent of Congress.
And then Part III evaluates the normative critique of the Clause ad-
vanced by Lloyd Cutler, concluding that critique is largely unfounded.
We conclude Part III with a ringing endorsement of the normative
appeal of the Incompatibility Clause.
In Part IV, we shift the focus and turn to the separation-of-powers
implications of the unwritten incompatibility traditions. Sections A.1.
and B.1. describe the reasons why the Framers did not constitutional-
ize executive-judicial or federal-state incompatibility.20 Sections A.2.
and B.2. describe the process by which incompatibility traditions in
these two areas grew up over time. And Sections A.3. and B.3. assess
the normative case for and against expanding the Incompatibility
Clause by writing the unwritten incompatibility traditions into the text
of the Constitution. We conclude Part IV with a ringing endorsement
of the normative appeal of constitutionalizing the unwritten incom-
patibility traditions.
Finally, in Part V we offer a few concluding observations regard-
ing the separation-of-powers lessons of the American experiment with
20 In the interest of brevity, we do not discuss the unwritten incompatibility tradition
barring joint office holding in the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. As best we
can tell, it seems never to have occurred to anyone that the Constitution left open this
possibility. We believe the normative case against joint service in the U.S. Senate and
House would be very similar to the normative case we make againstjoint executive-judicial
and federal-state service.
Because of space constraints, we are also unable to discuss a related and important
doctrine of federal administrative law, the separation of functions doctrine within federal
administrative agencies. This doctrine deals with the vital problem of how to separate
agency personnel who perform rulemaking, law enforcement, and adjudicative functions.
The separation of functions doctrine obviously serves "separation-of-personnel" goals
within the context and constraints of the modem administrative state. Conversation with
Professor Susan Paris Koniak, Boston University School of Law (October 22, 1993). An
exhaustive book-length treatment of American incompatibility rules would necessarily have
to deal with this doctrine.
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incompatibility and plural office holding. We reach seven specific
conclusions. First, the last two hundred years have seen a steady
growth in support for the one person, one office principle: As a re-
sult, America has progressed from a separation of powers to a separa-
tion of institutions to a separation of personnel. Second, there is a
close, unappreciated connection between the concerns underlying
ethics rules and the concerns underlying the separation of powers:
Both work in the contexts discussed herein to prevent corruption,
abuse of power, and gross conflicts of interest. Third, a separation of
personnel as well as of institutions, is absolutely vital to the fostering of
competition and to the deconcentration of power: It sets up a com-
petitive, adversarial dialogue out of which good policy is more likely to
emerge. Fourth, incompatibility clauses (and traditions) work to cor-
rect inequalities of bargaining power between government institu-
tions: Such clauses and traditions will always benefit the less powerful
government institution of any two institutions between which an in-
compatibility is set up. Fifth, the Incompatibility Clause thus benefits
the President and weakens Congress, the most dangerous "branch,"
notwithstanding the contrary impression of both the Framers and of
Lloyd Cutler. Sixth, executivejudicial incompatibility benefits the
(least dangerous) judicial "branch," a fact that is widely recognized
and appreciated. Seventh, federal-state incompatibility originally
would have benefitted the federal government but today benefits the
states. This explains why, in 1787, the advocates of states' rights op-
posed federal-state incompatibility, even though today a form of it has
come to be required by the constitutional law of forty-seven out of the
fifty states.
We end by noting that all of these arguments for one person, one
office and for a separation of powers and personnel may be easily
summed up in a single well-known sentence: "Power tends to corrupt
and absolute power corrupts absolutely."21
I
BRrISH AND COLONIAL ANTECEDENTS TO THE
INCOMPATIBILITY PRINCIPLE
When the Framers began work in Philadelphia in the summer of
1787, they were not writing on a blank slate. The backdrop of their
experiences under the English Constitution, the state constitutions,
and the Articles of Confederation shaped all that they were to create.
Knowledge of these British and colonial antecedents is vital, there-
fore, to understanding both the origins of the Incompatibility Princi-
21 Letter from Lord Acton to Bishop Mandell Creighton (Apr. 5, 1887), quoted in GER.
TRUDE HIMMELFARB, LORD ACTON: A STUDY IN CONSCIENCE AND POLITICS 160-61 (1962).
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ple embodied in our constitutional text and the traditions that have
grown up around it.
A. The British Background
The Framers' hatred of plural office holding grew from bitter ex-
perience. English Whigs, who greatly influenced the Framers, had for
years complained about the corrupting effect of plural office holding
and royal patronage on the conduct of politics in seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century England. It was these complaints, rather than ab-
stract theories about the separation of powers, that led the Framers to
ban plural office holding.
The issue arose in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English
politics because the Glorious Revolution of 1688 had shifted power
from the King to Parliament and had, thus, impaired the royal prerog-
ative. But, the English Kings held onto power by exploiting their sta-
tus as the sole "fountain of honors, offices, and privileges."22
Eighteenth-century English monarchs retained the power to create of-
fices and titles of nobility and to confer them on individuals without
parliamentary approval. It should come as no surprise that they used
this power to great political effect.
The King's patronage power gave him two key tools through
which he could control Parliament. First, by promoting influential
Members of Parliament (M.P.s) to ministerial office, the King could
win their backing in Parliament for his programs. Second, by dan-
gling the prospect of a lucrative office, pension, or title of nobility, the
King could induce even non-office holding M.P.s to support him in
hopes of benefiting from the royal largesse.23
It would be hard to overstate the effect that the King's unscrupu-
lous use of patronage (and the system of "royal influence") had on the
conduct of politics in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England.
At a time when "political offices and emoluments were the major
sources of social distinction and financial security,"24 the allure of of-
fice was strong. A whole generation of young men went to Parliament
with the express purpose of making their fortunes by obtaining an
office.2 5 One historian describes the Parliament of the day as being
22 GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 143
(1969).
23 SIR DAVID L. KEIR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF MODERN BRITAIN SINCE 1485, at
283 (9th ed. 1969); Margaret A. Banks, Drafting the American Constitution-Attitudes in the
Philadelphia Convention Towards the British System of Government 10 AM.J. LEGAL HIsr. 15, 31
(1966).
24 WOOD, supra note 22, at 144.
25 L.B. NAMmR, THE STRUCrURE OF POLITIcs AT THE ACCESSION OF GEORGE III 1-61
(1929). Namier recounts that, for most, a "seat in the House was not their ultimate goal,
but a means to ulterior aims." Id. at 4. Yet, despite his biting descriptions of these political
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filled with "parties, cliques, and factions of men, prowling and hunt-
ing for office in packs." 26
The unsurprising effect of this political gamesmanship was that
representatives in Parliament routinely disregarded the wishes of the
voters who elected them, instead casting their votes in favor of the
King's often-abusive proposals.27 As a result, parliamentary corrup-
tion was the "obsessive concern" 28 of both the left and the right in
eighteenth century England, and the opposition literature from both
ends of the political spectrum hurled invective at the corrupting sys-
tem of royal influence.
29
The King's power over the Judiciary was no less infamous. Royal
judges had traditionally held their posts durante beneplacito ("at the
King's pleasure"), and the British Kings had often used their removal
power to purge the bench of those judges who, in the name of "law,"
would dare to defy the King's exercise of the royal prerogative.30 The
Stuart Kings, who received particularly bad press for their political
manipulation of the judiciary, were alleged to have transformed the
English bench from a body of learned jurists to a cadre of political
climbers.31 Holdsworth reports that the archetype of a Stuart judge
aspirants, Namier is quick to come to their defense. Remarking on the motivations of the
would-be M.P.s, Namier writes: "Men went [to Parliament] 'to make a figure', and no more
dreamt of a seat in the House in order to benefit humanity than a child dreams of a
birthday cake that others may eat it; which is perfectly normal and in no way reprehensi-
ble." Id.
26 GOLDWIN SMrrH, A CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 372 (1955).
27 As early as 1720, Parliament's abdication of its representative duty led "Cato" to
complain: "[P]ublic corruptions and abuses have grown upon us; fees in most, if not in all,
offices, are immensely increased;... the public has run very much in debt; and as those
debts have been increasing, and the people growing poor, salaries have been augmented,
and pensions multiplied." Cato's Letters no. 20, March 11, 1720, vol. I, at 140 (5th ed.
London 1748) quoted in BERNARD BAMLvN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN PoLrIcS 43 (1968)
[hereinafter BAILYN, ORIGINS]; BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION 48-49 (1967) [hereinafter BAiLYN, IDEOLOGICAL]. Cato was the pen name
signed to a series of 144 articles that appeared in The London Journal and The British Journal
between 1720 and 1723. The articles' true authors were Whig activistsJohn Trenchard and
Thomas Gordon. These pieces, which later appeared in a four-volume work entitled Cato's
Letters, became something of a credo for the "left" opposition both in England and
America. See BAILYN, ORIGINS, supra, at 40, 43; BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL, supra, at 35-36, 48-49.
The Whiggish Cato was not alone in his hostility toward the system of royal influence that
had "contributed every art to debauch and enervate the minds and morals of all ranks of
men." CHARLESTON [S.C.] GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 1775, quoted in WOOD, supra note 22, at 143.
28 BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL, supra note 27, at 48.
29 Henry St. John, Viscount Bolingbroke, The Craftsman, quoted in BAILYN, ORIGINS,
supra note 27, at 46. See also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL, supra note 27, at 47-49 (discussing eight-
eenth century opposition literature); BAILYN, ORIGINS, supra note 27, at 45-52 (same).
30 6 W.S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 213-16, 503-11 (2d ed. 1937);
GEOFFREY R.Y. RADCLIrFE & GEOFFREY CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 393-94 (GJ. Hand
& D.J. Bentley eds., 6th ed. 1977).
31 In 1684, Lord Halifax circulated a scathing critique of Charles II's unscrupulous
use of the summary dismissal power. This pamphlet, entitled The Character of a Trimmer,
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was the "political lawyer, without principles, with a fluent tongue, and
with a little knowledge of law."
3 2
The Crown's corrupting influence did not go unaddressed by the
newly powerful Parliament. Shortly after the Glorious Revolution,
Parliament made several attempts to insulate both itself and the judici-
ary from the corrupting influence of the King. In 1701, Parliament
passed the Act of Settlement, which along with the Bill of Rights of
1689, the Act of Toleration of 1689, and the Triennial Act of 1694, was
designed to codify the reallocations of government power secured by
the Revolution.33 Two of the Settlement Act's most important provi-
sions represented specific attempts to curtail the Crown's corrupt use
of patronage. 34 First, the Act secured the independence of the judici-
ary by providing that English judges would receive fixed salaries and
would remain in office quamdiu se bene gesserint ("during good behav-
ior"), subject to removal only for misconduct proved to the satisfac-
tion of both houses of Parliament.3 5 Second, and more remarkable
given the structure of British government today, the Settlement Act
contained a strict incompatibility rule that made all ministers, officers,
and pensioners of the Crown ineligible to serve in the House of
Commons.3
6
demonstrates the contempt with which the people regarded the King's corruption of the
system of justice:
The authority of a king, who is head of the law, as well as the dignity of
public justice, is debased when the clear stream of law is puddled and dis-
turbed by bunglers, or conveyed by unclean instruments to the people....
When men are made judges of what they do not understand the world cen-
sureth such a choice .... [I]t will be thought that such men bought what
they knew not how to deserve, or which is as bad, that obedience shall be
looked upon as a better qualification in ajudge than skill or sincerity....
To see the laws mangled, disguised, made speak quite another language
than their own; to see them thrown from the dignity of protecting mankind
to the disgraceful office of destroying them... will raise men's anger above
the power of laying it down again ....
Quoted in 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 508-09.
Halifax's warnings to Charles II fell on deaf ears, and his brother, James II, perpetu-
ated the practice of dismissing uncooperative judges. As he informed Sir Thomas Jones
upon dismissing him from his position as Chief Justice of the Court of Common Pleas,
James "was determined to have twelve justices of his opinion." 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note
30, at 509.
32 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 504.
33 WIL P. ADAMs, THE Firsr AMERICAN CONSTITrIONS 10 (Rita Kimber & Robert
Kimber trans., 1980); KEIR, supra note 23, at 268. The Septennial Act of 1716 superseded
the Triennial Act and replaced it as a major part of England's constitution.
34 In addition, the Act of Settlement determined the Protestant succession to the
throne and required that the Crown submit itself to the control of the Privy Council rather
than transacting business through an informal body of advisors. KEIR, supra note 23, at
268-69. See also SMrrH, supra note 26, at 378.
35 SMIrrH, supra note 26, at 369; Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Ori-
gins of the Appointment Clause, 37 SYRAcusE L. Rav. 1048 (1987).
36 The Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. III, ch. 2, quoted in SMITH, supra note 26, at
370. This provision stated: "no person who has an office or other place of profit under the
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This British incompatibility rule, however, was never put into ef-
fect.3 7 Instead, Parliament adopted a compromise rule as part of the
Regency Act of 1705.38 That Act permitted the King's ministers to
retain their seats in Parliament. However, the Act required any new
ministers appointed from the ranks of Parliament to resign their legis-
lative seats and stand for reelection, thus affording the electorate the
opportunity to refuse the presence of the King's ministers in
Parliament.3 9
Unfortunately for the colonists, neither the Act of Settlement nor
the Regency Act reached across the Atlantic to bind the Royal Gover-
nors, the King's representatives in America, who were as anxious as
the King himself to "purchase" a reliable cadre of sycophantic legisla-
tors and judges. Accordingly, the Royal Governors were unrestrained
in their ability to wield the "insidious and powerful weapon"40 of pa-
tronage to buy support for the Crown. Moreover, the patronage prob-
lem was exacerbated in America because the absence of a hereditary
nobility meant that appointive offices were often the main source of
social distinction. 41 In the New World, the Royal Governors' control
over the colonial assemblies42 was rivaled only by their power over the
social hierarchy.
43
As one might expect, Americans reacted quite badly to these arbi-
trary exercises of royal power. Just as Cato and Bolingbroke had
king or receives a pension from the crown shall be capable of serving as a member of the
House of Commons." Id.
37 Holdsworth suggests that Parliament enacted the incompatibility provision of the
Settlement Act as part of a post-revolutionary attempt to ensure its new-found indepen-
dence from, and supremacy over, the King. However, once Parliament believed its consti-
tutional position secure, the legislators rethought the wisdom of foreclosing their linkage
to the Crown. 6 HOLDSWORTH, supra note 30, at 242. See also SMITH, supra note 26, at 379
(enforcement of the incompatibility provision "was not practicable"); Banks, supra note 23,
at 31 (Parliament realized that "the practical inconveniences would outweigh the advan-
tages" of the incompatibility provision).
38 4 Anne, ch. 8 §§ 24, 25. The Regency Act was re-enacted in 1707 so that it might
apply to the Royal succession and the Parliament created by the Act of Union with Scot-
land. Thus, the Act is often cited as the Regency Act of 1707, 6 Anne, ch. 41. Banks, supra
note 23, at 31.
39 Banks, supra note 23, at 31 n.64 (discussing Reelection of Ministers Act of 1919).
The Regency Act remained in place until the early part of the twentieth century.
40 WOOD, supra note 22, at 143.
41 Id.
42 Aside from the legislative control gained through the patronage power, the Royal
Governors possessed and freely exercised an absolute veto over acts of the colonial legisla-
ture. See Robert F. Williams, "Experience Must Be Our Only Guide": The State Constitutional
Experience of the Framers of the Federal Constitution, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 403, 418 (1988).
The Governor of Rhode Island was the sole exception. In that colony, neither the gover-
nor nor the Crown possessed the right to veto legislative acts. Id. at 418 n.97. In many of
the colonies, the Royal Governor was also vested with power to dissolve the lower house of
the assembly. See BAILYN, ORIGINS, supra note 27, at 67-69.
43 WOOD, supra note 22, at 145.
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raged about the presence of "placemen" in the British Parliament, 44
so colonial Americans railed against the Royal Governors' "multiplica-
tion of officers to strengthen the court interest.... advancing to the
most eminent stations men without education, and of dissolute man-
ners,"45 and "sporting with our persons and estates, by filling the high-
est seats of justice with bankrupts, bullies, and blockheads."46 The
conventional wisdom was that the lure of office had converted many
colonial patriots into "implacable enemies to the liberties of their na-
tive country."47
The corruption of the British system of influence had thus left an
indelible impression on American memories. Designing a mechanism
to prevent the emergence of a similar system in America would, there-
fore, become a primary concern in the formation of both the state
and national governments.
B. The State Constitutions and the Articles of Confederation
A prime goal of constitution makers in the newly independent
American states was the creation of limited executive authorities that
would be unable to exercise the vast control that the British Kings and
Royal Governors had asserted over legal and social arrangements. 48
The state constitution makers believed the accomplishment of this
goal to be at the core of their mission of creating just government. By
1776, it had become axiomatic that "[h]e who has the giving of all
places in a government.., will always be master, . . even if the consti-
tution were in all other respects the best in the world."
49
In most state constitutions of the "founding decade,"50 the power
to appoint high officers51 was wrested from the executive and en-
trusted to the legislature.5 2 Although the state "governor" or "presi-
44 FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDo SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSrITUrION 199 (1985). See also BAILYN, ORIGINS, supra note 27, at 56-57 (describing the
profound influence of English opposition writers on eighteenth-century Americans).
45 PHILADELPHIA PA. PACKET, Mar. 4, 1777, quoted in WooD, supra note 22, at 145 n.36.
46 Id.
47 Boston INDEPENDENT CHRON., Mar. 26, 1778, quoted in WooD, supra note 22, at 146
n.38.
48 WOOD, supra note 22, at 148.
49 PHILADELPHIA PA. J., quoted in WooD, supra note 22, at 143.
50 Martin Diamond describes the period between 1776 and 1787 as America's "found-
ing decade." See Martin Diamond, Decent, Even Though Democratic, in How DEMOCRATIC iS
THE CONsrrrmON? 18, 24 (Robert Goldwin & William Schambra eds., 1980); Williams,
supra note 42, at 409.
51 "High officers" included secretaries, state treasurers,judges of the state courts, and
military officers. JAMES SCHOULYR, CONSTITUTIONAL STUDIES STATE AND FEDERAL 63 (Da
Capo Press 1971) (1897).




dent"5 3 generally retained the appointment power for lower state
officials, even this limited executive prerogative was constrained by
the requirement that he seek the advice and consent of his Executive
Council54 for any such appointments. 55 In addition, no state en-
trusted its executive with a power to create offices (or titles of nobility)
at will. The office-creating power was in all cases vested with the
legislature.
But the state constitutions did not stop with the reallocation of
the appointment power and the office-creating power. Instead, with
the exceptions of New York56 and South Carolina,57 all the state con-
stitutions provided for strict incompatibility between service in the leg-
islative and executive departments as an added precaution 58 against
53 A majority of the states referred to their chief executives as "governors," borrowing
the term from the English Royal Governors. In Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, South Car-
olina and Delaware, however, the state constitutions broke from this tradition and dubbed
their chief executive "president." See DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 7, reprinted in 1 THE FED-
ERAL AND STATE CONsTITTrIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAwS 563 (Fran-
cis N. Thorpe ed., 1909) [hereinafter CONSTITrUTIONS]; N.H. CONST. OF 1784, part II,
reprinted in 4 id. at 2462; PA. CONST. OF 1776, ch. II, § 1, reprinted in 5 i& at 3084; S.C.
CONST. OF 1775, art. iii, reprinted in 6 id. at 3243.
54 With the exceptions of New Hampshire and New York, all the state governors were
saddled with an Executive Council whose job was to "advise the Governor in the execution
of his office." See, e.g., N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XIV, in 5 CONSTITTrrIONs, supra note 53, at
2791. In practice, these councils severely limited the governors' independence, perform-
ing an "advice and consent" function for nearly every executive act. SCHOUMER, supra note
51, at 61.
55 SCHOULER, supra note 51, at 63. In New York, where the governor did not have an
Executive Council, the appointment power was exercised by a Council of Appointments
comprised of the Governor and one senator from each of the state legislature's four sena-
torial districts. ADDms, supra note 33, at 274.
56 In comparison with the other state constitutions, the New York Constitution of
1777 was surprisingly lax in its executive-legislative incompatibility provision. It excluded
only the state treasurer from serving in either house of the legislature. N.Y. CONST. OF
1777, art. XXII, reprinted in 5 CONsTrrTUrioNs, supra note 53, at 2633.
57 The South Carolina Constitution of 1776 allowed members of the legislature to
retain their seats in the assembly even upon election to the Privy Council, which was a body
of advisors to the president of the colony. S.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. V, reprinted in 6 CONSTI-
TUTIONS, supra note 53, at 3244. Furthermore, although the South Carolina Constitution
required that legislators appointed to other "places of emolument" resign their legislative
seats until a new election, it followed the British practice of allowing members to hold both
offices if the voters returned them to their legislative seats in a new election. S.C. CoNsT.
OF 1776, art. X, reprinted in 6 id. at 3244. For a discussion of the British practice, see supra
text accompanying notes 38-39. The South Carolina Constitution of 1790 abandoned this
practice, forbidding membership in the legislature while holding "any office of profit or
trust under this State [or] the United States." S.C. CONST. OF 1790, § 21, reprinted in 6
CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 53, at 3261.
58 McDonald describes the incompatibility provisions as being added "[flor good mea-
sure." McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 86. Wood attributes a similar purpose to these consti-
tutional provisions:
[S]o infecting and so incompatible with the public liberty or the representa-
tion of the people was magisterial power believed to be that the Americans
felt compelled to isolate their legislatures from any sort of executive influ-
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executive manipulation of the legislature.5 9 For example, the New
Jersey Constitution of 1776 emphatically declared its intention that all
"persons possessed of any post of profit under the Government" be
forbidden from service in the assembly so "[t] hat the legislative depart-
ment of this Government may, as much as possible, be preserved from
all suspicion of corruption."60 Other states were even more careful to
avoid the possibility of improper influence between the legislative and
executive departments. Several states expressly excluded all military
officers61 and government contractors62 from their assemblies. Some
states carried the idea of constitutionally regulating conflicts of inter-
est so far that they expressly prohibited members of the clergy from
sitting in the legislature or holding any executive post.68 The clergy
provisions were apparently added to avoid any appearance of an estab-
lished state church.64
The state constitutions also sought to prevent the new state exec-
utives from manipulating the judiciary as had the English Kings and
Royal Governors. 65 To this end, some of the state constitution writers
incorporated provisions like those in the English Act of Settlement,
granting judges tenure during good behavior and securing them
ence or impingement, thus setting American constitutional development in
an entirely different direction from that of the former mother country.
WOOD, supra note 22, at 157-58.
59 See DEL CONST. OF 1776, art. 18, reprinted in 1 CONSTrTUTONS, supra note 53, at 565-
66; GA. CONsT. OF 1777, arts. XVII, XVIII, reprinted in 2 id. at 780-81; MD. DECLARATION OF
RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XXX, reprinted in 3 id. at 1689; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXVII,
reprinted in id. at 1697; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. II, ch. VI., pt. 2, reprinted in id. at 1909-10;
N.H. CONST. OF 1784, pt. 11, reprinted in 4 id. at 2469-70; NJ. CONST. OF 1776, art. XX,
reprinted in 5 id. at 2598; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, arts. XXVII-XXIX, XXXV, reprinted in id. at
2792-93; PA. CONST. OF 1776 §§ 19, 23, reprinted in id. at 3087-88; VA. CONST. OF 1776,
reprinted in 7 id. at 3817-18.
60 N.J. CONST. or 1776, art. XX, reprYinted in 5 id. at 2598.
61 GA. CONS-. or 1777, art. XVII, reprinted in 2 id. at 780; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art.
XXXVII, repinted in 3 id. at 1697; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXVII, reprinted in 5 id. at 2792.
62 DEL. CONST. OF 1776, art. 18, reprinted in 1 id. at 565; MD. CONST. OF 1776, art.
XXXVIII, reprinted in 3 id. at 1689 (military contractors); N.C. CoNs-. OF 1776, art. XXVII,
reprinted in 5 id. at 2792.
63 GA. CONST. OF 1777, art. LXII, reprinted in 2 id. at 785; MD. CONS?. OF 1776, art.
XXXVII, reprinted in 3 id. at 1697; N.C. CONST. or 1776, art. XXXI, reprinted in 5 id. at
2793; S.C. CONST. Or 1778, art. XXI, reprinted in 6 id. at 3253. See Steven D. Smith, Separa-
tion and the "Secular": Reconstructing the Disestablishment Decision, 67 TEX. L. REv. 955 (1989).
64 WOOD, supra note 22, at 158 n.58. Of course, such prohibitions on clergy participa-
tion in political life would today be held unconstitutional. See McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
618 (1978) (striking down state constitutional amendment prohibiting ministers from par-
ticipating in political conventions on the ground that states cannot "punish a religious
professional with the privation of a civil right") (opinion of Burger, CJ.) (internal quota-
tions deleted).




against salary reductions. 66 Many of the state constitutions went even
further, however, and included explicit judicial-executive incompati-
bility provisions to preclude the executive from corrupting judges
through the lure of executive posts.
67
While the immediate goal of the state incompatibility clauses was
to stop corruption and curb executive power, the clauses also ex-
pressed American egalitarianism and rejection of the English social
hierarchy. Many people who previously had been denied the right to
vote or hold political office believed that the primary purpose of the
American Revolution had been "to abolish the political institutions by
which privilege had been maintained in the colonial governments.
'68
The state constitutions sought to discourage the formation of an of-
fice holding, courtier class that would be distinct from the public at
large.69 The new American office holder was to be a "virtuous ama-
teur, who would put aside his plow for a time to serve the people."
70
The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 expressed disdain for the
office-holding class in the most forthright terms: "As every freeman
... ought to have some profession, calling, trade or farm, whereby he
may honestly subsist, there can be no necessity for, nor use in estab-
lishing offices of profit, the usual effects of which are dependence and
servility unbecoming freemen, in the possessors and expectants."
71
Other state constitutions contained similar provisions. For example,
the North Carolina Constitution of 1776 provided that "no person in
the State shall hold more than one lucrative office at any one time. '72
It is important to note that broad bans on plural office holding of
the type found in the North Carolina, Maryland, and New Jersey Con-
stitutions were conceived first and foremost as anti-corruption meas-
ures. Surprisingly, the separation-of-powers aspect of incompatibility
seems not to have been the major theme. Only one state constitution
66 See infra note 394 (citing state constitutional provisions regarding judicial salary
and tenure).
67 DEL CONST. OF 1776, art. 12, reprinted in 1 CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 53, at 564-65;
MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS OF 1776, art. XXX, reprinted in 3 id. at 1689; MASS. CONST. OF
1780, pt. 2, ch. VI, art. II, reprinted in id. at 1909; N.Y. CONST. OF 1777, art. XXV, reprinted in
5 id. at 2634; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXIX, reprinted in id. at 2792; PA. CONST. OF 1776,
§ 23, reprinted in id. at 3088; VA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 7 id., at 3818.
68 Williams, supra note 42, at 411 (quoting E. DOUGLASS, REBELS AND DEMOCRATS: THE
STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL POLITICAL RIGHTS AND MAJORITY RULE DURING THE AMERICAN REVOLU-
TION Vi (1955)).
69 SCHOULER, supra note 51, at 68.
70 Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sm. 37 (1988).
71 PA. CONST OF 1776 § 36, reprinted in 5 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 53, at 3090. The
constitution further provided that "whenever an office, through increase of fees or other-
wise, becomes so profitable as to occasion many to apply for it, the profits ought to be
lessened by the legislature." Id.
72 N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. XXXV, reprinted in id. at 2793.
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appears to have framed its ban on plural office holding in separation-
of-powers terms. The Virginia Constitution of 1776 provided that
"[t]he legislative, executive, and judiciary departments, shall be sepa-
rate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers properly belong-
ing to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more
than one of them, at the same time. '73
Unsurprisingly, the prevalence of incompatibility clauses in the
state constitutions appears to have inspired the insertion of a kindred
clause in the Articles of Confederation. 74 That clause prohibited dele-
gates to the Continental Congress from "holding any office under the
United States, for which he, or another for his benefit receives any
salary, fees or emolument of any kind."75 This provision is arguably a
more sweeping anti-corruption measure than the Incompatibility
Clause adopted at Philadelphia in 1787. It bars the receipt of "any
salary, fees or emolument of any kind" and not the mere holding of
office. And the bar applies not only to a Member of Congress but also
to all others who might receive money "for his benefit." The latter bar
presumably would apply to congressional spouses, friends, and staff.
In sum, it can be said that although the incompatibility provisions
of the various state constitutions and the Articles of Confederation
differed in form and degree, by the time the delegates assembled at
the Federal Convention, the idea of providing for some measure of
interdepartment incompatibility had become something of an Ameri-
can constitutional tradition. Interestingly, it was a tradition that exis-
ted independently of the contemporaneous devotion to the
separation of powers.
C. Summary of the Decisions at the Federal Convention
The Philadelphia Convention, drawing on the British and colo-
nial antecedents described above, reached the following conclusions
on interdepartment incompatibility. First, the Convention adopted
the Incompatibility Clause forbidding Members of Congress (M.C.s)
from serving simultaneously in the executive and judicial departments
of the federal government. Second, the Convention did not adopt an
incompatibility provision to preclude joint service between the execu-
tive and judicial departments, even though such an exclusion was pro-
posed. Finally, the Convention did not adopt an incompatibility
provision barring joint service in federal and state offices even
though, again, such an exclusion was proposed. Part II.A.3., below
describes the debate at the Federal Convention surrounding the first
7- VA. CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 7 id. at 3815.
74 Donald S. Lutz, The Articles of Confederation, in RooTS OF THE REPUBLIC: AMERICAN
FOUNDING DOCUMENTS INTERPRETED 227, 228 (Stephan L. Schecter ed., 1990).
75 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. V.
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decision. The Convention's actions with respect to the second and
third decisions are described below in Parts IV.A.1. and IV.B.I., re-
spectively. This separate summation of the Convention's delibera-
tions is unfortunately required by the close connection that exists in
Parts II and IV between the discussion of the Convention's delibera-
tions and the historical development of the Incompatibility Principle
over the last two hundred years.
II
THE INCOMPATIBILITY CLAUSE
We turn first to a comprehensive textual and historical analysis of
the Incompatibility Clause of the U.S. Constitution. Section A looks at
the text and historical origins of the Clause. Section B weighs the
Clause's actual historical impact on American government over the
last two hundred years, considering whether it has been an ethics rule
success. Finally, Section C addresses the Clause's historically unantici-
pated consequences: the creation of a strong presidency and the rein-
forcement of the separation of powers.
A. The Original Meaning and Purpose of the Incompatibility
Clause
1. Text and Context
Any analysis of the original meaning and purpose of the Incom-
patibility Clause must begin with the constitutional text: "[N] o Person
holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of
either House during his Continuance in Office."76 Thus, in twenty-
one short words does an obscure constitutional provision foreclose
even the most attenuated forms of "parliamentary government" in
America. 77 Yet, the very words and context of the Incompatibility
Clause make clear that it was intended to be a constitutional ethics
76 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, ci. 2.
77 The precise type of parliamentary government foreclosed by the Incompatibility
Clause is that of the French Fifth Republic, which political scientist Arend Lijphart terms
"semi-presidentialism": a technical term for a regime that combines presidential and par-
liamentary features. See infra note 235. The 1958 Gaullist Constitution creates a dual exec-
utive, with a Prime Minister and Cabinet accountable to the Parliament and a directly-
elected President, accountable every seven years to the people. "Pure" parliamentary gov-
ernment of the kind practiced in Great Britain is foreclosed in this country not only by the
Incompatibility Clause, but also by those provisions of Article II and of the Twelfth Amend-
ment providing that the President will usually be elected indirectly by the people and not
by Congress.
As is explained in Part IV, "parliamentary government" in this country would mean in
practice government by the congressional committee system. See infra notes 318-37 and
accompanying text. Thus described, perhaps the prospect of a hybrid U.S. legislative-exec-
utive sounds less euphonic and appealing. See also supra note 11 (rosy connotations of
"parliamentary government" inapt in the American context).
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rule not a mainstay of the separation of powers. This is the case for
several reasons.
First, the Clause begins by imposing a disability on "Officers of
the United States" not on Members of Congress. Like non-citizens
and persons under the age of twenty-five, they are rendered ineligible
to serve in either House of Congress.78 The sentence structure, begin-
ning with the key words "no person" and moving on to the phrase
"holding any Office under the United States," clearly indicates that
"Officers of the United States" are the suspect bad apples here. They
are in the same position as Bills of Attainders, ex post facto laws, and
Titles of Nobility:79 They are mentioned in the Incompatibility Clause
immediately after the constitutional commandment "No."
80
This phrasing is entirely different from that employed by a genu-
ine separation-of-powers incompatibility clause, that of the 1776 Vir-
ginia Constitution. That document, which was well known to the
Framers, provided that: "The legislative, executive, and judiciary de-
partment, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the
powers properly belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise
the powers of more than one of them, at the same time .... -81 The
Virginia Clause mentions all three departments together and creates a
total trinitarian separation of functions and of personnel The U.S.
Clause does not mention either the "Trinity" of departments or of
powers,82 and creates no separation of institutional functions and only
a limited, incidental separation of personnel. Accordingly, the text of
the U.S. Clause strongly suggests that its purpose was to be about
something other than the separation of powers.
If we step back a bit, and look at the words in context, the pur-
pose of the Clause comes more clearly into focus. First, the Clause is
78 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 ("No Person shall be a Representative who shall not
have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years.. . ."); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 ("No Person
shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years .. ").
79 U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 ("No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be
passed."); U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 8 ("No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United
States....").
80 Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cls. 4-7 ("No capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be
laid . . . ."); ("No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State"); ("No
Preference shall be given ... ."); ("No Money shall be drawn ... .") (emphasis added) and U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cls. 1-3 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal.. . ."); ("No State shall... lay.., any Imposts or
Duties.... ."); ("No State shall.., lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War
....") (emphasis added) with U.S. CONST. art. I, cl.2 ("[N]o Person holding any Office
under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office.").
81 VA. CONST. oF 1776, in 7 CoNs'rrruTiONS, supra note 53, at 3815 (emphasis added).
82 See McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 80, suggesting that "the almost mystical [Western]
habit of thinking in threes" may have stemmed in part from "the concept of the Holy




conjoined in one sentence with an ineligibility provision that is plainly
a constitutional ethics rule on its face. The Ineligibility Clause pro-
vides: "No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of
the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof
shall have been increased during such time." 3 The goal here is plainly to
stop corruption by banning M.C.s from ever benefiting personally
from the creation of new government offices or from general pay raise
bills. It seems likely, therefore, that some similar anti-corruption pur-
pose must animate the Incompatibility Clause.
This likelihood is enhanced when we step back further and no-
tice that the Clause appears in Article I, Section 6, which begins by
dealing with the delicate subject of how Senators and Representatives
are to be paid. Clause 1 of Section 6 provides that congressional com-
pensation shall be "ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury
of the United States."8 4 This marked a key break with the Articles of
Confederation, under which Members of Congress were paid by their
respective states.85 The carefully considered decision to pay Members
of Congress out of the national treasury was critical to ensuring that
M.C.s would view themselves as national officials who were truly in-
dependent of their state governments.8 6 Thus, the salary provision
and the Ineligibility Clause of Section 6 bespeak a common concern
with the manner by which M.C.s were to be compensated and the pos-
sible corruption that might ensue therefrom. The likelihood in-
creases that this too was the object of the Incompatibility Clause.
Expanding our focus further, we find the Foreign Incompatibility
Clause of Article I, Section 9. This Clause warrants quotation in its
full anti-corruption, ethics rule context:
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no
Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, with-
out the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolu-
ment, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince,
or foreign State.
8 7
This provision is plainly an anti-bribery measure and was meant to
have nothing to do with the separation of powers. If the Foreign In-
compatibility Clause was so motivated, could not its domestic counter-
part have the same purpose?
83 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
84 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
85 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, arL V.
86 MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 138
(1913).
87 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, c1. 8 (emphasis added).
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Consider next the only other incompatibility rule in the amended
Constitution: "[N] o Senator or Representative, or Person holding an
Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed
an Elector"88 for the Offices of President and Vice-President. This
electoral college incompatibility rule seems also designed to secure
the financial and personal disinterestedness of those wise individuals
whom the Framers expected would choose the President and Vice
President. Persons with a direct, personal, political (in the case of
M.C.s), or financial (in the case of Officers of the U.S.) stake in who
won the Presidency were disqualified from being electors. Again, con-
stitutional incompatibility of offices is presented as a problem involv-
ing conflicts of interest.
Finally, consider one additional, striking aspect about the twenty-
one words of the Incompatibility Clause. They appear buried two-
thirds of the way through the first Article of a seven article-long docu-
ment-and that Article concerns only one of the three Departments
of the entire government. If the separation-of-powers effect of incom-
patibility had at all been appreciated, one suspects the drafters would
have placed the Clause in a separate Article, either before or after
Articles I, II, and III. Plainly, the words and the context of the Incom-
patibility Clause suggest an anti-corruption purpose for the provision.
Its momentous separation-of-powers impact was most likely an unin-
tended consequence of this constitutional ethics rule.
2. Public Statements Contemporaneous With Ratification
Having considered text and context, we turn next in our quest
for the original meaning and purpose of the Incompatibility Clause to
public statements made contemporaneously with the ratification of
the Constitution. The Incompatibility Clause did not by itself gener-
ate much controversy during the ratification debates.8 9 The single ref-
erence to the Clause in the Federalist Papers is made only in passing.
Along with the Ineligibility Clause, Hamilton describes the Incompati-
bility Clause as an "important guard[] against the danger of executive
influence upon the legislative body."90 However, as Luther Martin ex-
plained in stating his objections to the Constitution, "there was a great
88 U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
89 Notably, however, the Virginia Ratifying Convention proposed to amend the Con-
stitution to add ajudicial incompatibility clause. III PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON: 1787-1792,
at 1057 (R. Rutland ed., 1970).
90 THE FEDERALIST No. 76, supra note 1, at 459 (Alexander Hamilton). Madison also
mentions the related Ineligibility Clause of Article I, Section 6 as a safeguard to prevent the
President from subduing the "virtue" of the House of Representatives. THE FEDERAI.ST
No. 55, supra note 1, at 345-46 (James Madison).
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diversity of sentiment among the members of the convention"91 on
the general subject of legislators holding other offices. He made it
clear to the general public that he, and other delegates, had favored a
rule forbidding Members of Congress from holding any other office
under the United States until one year after their departure from the
legislature.9
2
In the ratification debates, Martin continued to defend the posi-
tion he had favored unsuccessfully at the Convention. He critiqued
the Incompatibility Clause as written, in the most apocalyptic terms:
It is true, the acceptance of an office vacates their seat, nor can
they be re-elected during their continuance in office; but it was said,
that the evil would first take place, that the price for the office
would be paid before it was obtained; that vacating the seat of the
person who was appointed to office, made way for the admission of
a new member, who would come there as desirous to obtain an of-
fice as him whom he succeeded, and as ready to pay the price neces-
sary to obtain it; in fine, that it would be only driving away the flies
who were filled, to make room for those that were hungry-And as
the system is now reported, the President having the power to nomi-
nate to all offices, it must be evident, that there is no possible security
for the integrity and independence of the legislature, but that they are
most unduly placed under the influence of the President, and ex-
posed to bribery and corruption.
9 3
Obviously, Martin, and those familiar with his views, understood the
Incompatibility Clause to be an anti-corruption device, albeit it an in-
adequate one. They certainly did not perceive the Incompatibility
Clause to be a general separation-of-powers provision.
3. Private Statements Made Prior to Ratification: The Convention
Debates
We turn last in our quest for the original meaning and purpose of
the Incompatibility Clause to the private statements made prior to rat-
ification in the Convention debates. These statements are of histori-
cal rather than of legal interest. The little that is recorded in the
Convention debates about the Incompatibility Clause 94 suggests that
91 Luther Martin, The Genuine Information Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Mary-
land, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 19, 52 (H. Storing ed., 1981).
92 Id.
93 Id. at 52-53.
94 Understanding the Convention debate on the Incompatibility Clause is made hard
by the delegates' tendency to use the single term "ineligibility" to refer to the ideas pres-
ently contained in both of the separate "Ineligibility" and "Incompatibility" clauses of Arti-
cle I, Section 6, Clause 2 of the Constitution.
Although today these concepts are treated in separate clauses, when they were first
introduced at the Convention as part of the Virginia Plan, they were the subject of a single
provision rendering members of the legislature "ineligible" to certain offices "during their
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the delegates may be divided into two camps, those for and those
against the Clause. The first group, which we will call the "Republi-
cans," 95 favored strict incompatibility. These delegates feared execu-
tive corruption of the legislature if the lure of "Office" was not
foreclosed. Following Bolingbroke and Montesquieu, the Republi-
cans sought to build a government of public virtue and they fought all
moves that risked any potential for governmental corruption.
96
Republicans were opposed on the issue of executive-legislative in-
compatibility by some followers of David Hume, whom we will call the
"Federalists.197 They assumed that public officials would often over-
look the Republican call for "virtue" and, instead, follow their self-
interest. 98 Thus, the Federalists thought a well-crafted government
must appeal to man's baser passions, harnessing his self-interest for
the common good.99 The Republican and Federalist positions on leg-
islative-executive incompatibility require detailed consideration.
term of service." See infra note 101 and accompanying text (quoting full text of the original
Randolph Resolutions dealing with incompatibility). Indeed, the Incompatibility Clause
was not separated from the rest of the text until the Clause emerged from the Committee
of Eleven on September 1, 1787. See 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 483. After this clarifica-
tion, some delegates became more precise in their speech, see, e.g., id. at 491 (Sept. 3,
1787). Before the Committee of Eleven's action, however, it is sometimes hard to be sure
which concept the delegates were referring to in their speeches on the floor.
95 Forrest McDonald refers to this group as the "republican idealogues." He includes
in this group Abraham Baldwin of Georgia; Pierce Butler, John Rutledge and Charles
Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina; Hugh Williamson of North Carolina; George Ma-
son and Edmund Randolph of Virginia; Luther Martin and Daniel Jenifer of Maryland;
John Lansing and Robert Yates of New York; Roger Sherman of Connecticut; and Elbridge
Gerry of Massachusetts. McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 200-01.
96 Id. at 199-200. For McDonald's detailed discussion of the philosophical perspec-
tives of this group, see id. at 199-203.
97 McDonald refers to this group as the "court-party nationalists" for its ideological
similarity to the Court party in England. Id. at 187. We use the more common term "Fed-
eralist" to describe the members of this camp. McDonald counts among this group John
Langdon and Nicholas Gilman of New Hampshire; Nathaniel Gorham, Rufus King, and
Caleb Strong of Massachusetts; Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut; Alexander Hamilton of
New York; James Wilson, Thomas Mifflin, and Gouverneur Morris of Pennsylvania; John
Mercer of Maryland; Charles Pinckney of South Carolina; and William Few, William Pierce
and William Houstoun of Georgia. McDonald characterizes James Madison of Virginia
and Alexander Martin of North Carolina as falling somewhere between the Republican
and court-party groups, although closer to the position of the latter contingent. Id. at 200.
98 Id. at 188. For McDonald's detailed discussion of the philosophical perspectives of
this group, see id. at 186-99. For a modem reiteration of the Federalists' philosophy, see
Steven G. Calabresi & Gary Lawson, Foreword: Two Visions of the Nature of Man, 16 HAgv.J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 1 (1993).
99 Hamilton's speech on the passions, delivered during the debates on incompatibil-
ity, captures the essence of this Humean approach to politics:
Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions.
There may be in every government a few choice spirits, who may act from
more worthy motives. One great error is that we suppose mankind more
honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambitions and interest;




Legislative-executive incompatibility was a key part of Edmund
Randolph's so-called Virginia Plan for a new Constitution. 100 Taking
a much stronger stance against dual office holding than was ultimately
adopted, Randolph's fourth and fifth resolutions would have barred
Members of Congress from holding any state or federal office both
during their term of service in the legislature and for an unspecified
period thereafter.1°1
The Republican supporters of these resolutions feared that al-
lowing Members of Congress to hold executive office would open the
way for the President to "buy" their votes in exchange for attractive
appointments, thus impairing public virtue. The honor and money to
be gained from office holding was thought to create a powerful temp-
tation for the legislators to sell. As Pierce Butler of South Carolina
warned:
We have no way ofjudging of mankind but by experience. Look at
the history of the government of Great Britain, where there is a very
flimsy exclusion' 02 -Does it not ruin their government? A man
takes a seat in parliament to get an office for himself or friends, or
both; and this is the great source from which flows its great venality
and corruption.'
0 3
passions, in order to make them subservient to the public good-for these
ever induce us to action.
1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 381 (June 22, 1787).
100 The fifteen resolutions that comprised the Virginia Plan are also often referred to
as the "Randolph Plan" or the "Randolph Resolutions" in recognition of Edmund Ran-
dolph's introduction of the plan at the Federal Convention on May 29, 1787. See id. at 18-
19. The Virginia delegates to the Federal Convention are thought to have jointly drafted
these resolutions during the opening weeks of the Convention while they awaited the arri-
val of a quorum of delegates from the other states. Although there is some speculation
that James Madison actually may have drafted the resolutions, Madison disclaimed full
credit, stating that the plan resulted from "consultation among the deputies, the whole
number, seven, being present." CATHERINE DRINKER BOWEN, MRAcLE AT PHILADELPHIA:
THE STORY OF THE CONSTrrTIONAL CONVENTION, MAY TO SEPTEMBER 1787, at 38 (1966).
101 Randolph's fourth and fifth resolutions provided as follows:
4. Resd. that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature
ought.., to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or
under the authority of the United States, except those beculiarly [sic) be-
longing to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and
for the space of - after its expiration ....
5. Resold. that the members of the second branch of the National Legisla-
ture ought... to be ineligible to any office established by a particular
State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly
belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of ser-
vice, and for the space of- after the expiration thereof.
1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 20-21 (May 29, 1787).
102 Butler was apparently referring to the British requirement that ministers temporar-
ily resign from Parliament and seek re-election in order to retain their legislative seats. See
supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
103 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 379 (June 22, 1787) (footnote added).
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George Mason of Virginia, also "enlarged on the abuses [and] cor-
ruption in the British Parliament, connected with the appointment of
its members. 10 4 "I admire many parts of the British constitution and
government," he said, "but I detest their corruption" which, through
the system of influence, "pervades every town and village in the
kingdom."' 05
Republicans thought Randolph's incompatibility rules would
block the replication of this English example on American soil.106
They also hoped to forestall any gradual accretion of Presidential
power. Knowing that the King's "sole power of appointing the in-
creased officers of government," had "remarkably increased" the
power of the Crown, 10 7 they feared a similar result in America. 10 8 Be-
ing more wary of executive power than their Federalist counter-
parts, 10 9 the Republicans naturally wanted strict legislative-executive
incompatibility." 0
b. Federalist Skepticism
The Federalist opponents of strict incompatibility were familiar
with the Republicans' worries. Similar reactions to the system of Royal
"influence" had led to incompatibility clauses in the state constitutions
and in the Articles of Confederation. Yet, by 1787, practical experi-
ence under these ineffective governments"' had unraveled much of
the radical republican theory that had inspired their design, leaving
104 Id. at 387 (June 23, 1787).
105 Id. at 380-81 (June 22, 1787).
106 "[B]y shutting the door against appointments of its own members to offices, which
was one source of its corruption," the Republicans hoped to "preserv[e] the legislature as
pure as possible." Id, at 386 (June 23, 1787) (statement of John Rutledge).
107 Id. at 380-81 (June 22, 1787) (statement of George Mason).
108 Allowing M.G.s to serve in the executive department, they believed, "would give too
much influence to the Executive." 2 REcoRas, supra note 9, at 490 (Sept. 3, 1787) (state-
ment of Roger Sherman). The legislators would then continually be "looking up to him
for offices." 1 id. at 393 (June 23, 1787) (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
109 For example, while conceding the need to check the excesses of democracy that
had wreaked havoc on the state governments, the Republicans wanted creation of either a
plural executive or a single executive who would share power with an executive council.
McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 202.
110 Of course, providing for incompatibility between legislative and executive offices
was just one way in which the Framers limited the patronage power of the President. In
contrast with the British monarch, who was "emphatically and truly styled the fountain of
honor," THE FEDERALiST No. 69, supra note 1, at 421 (Alexander Hamilton), the American
president was deprived of the power to create offices, which was entrusted to Congress, and
of the power to confer Titles of Nobility, which was abolished altogether. Thus, it would be
a gross misstatement to say that prohibiting Members of Congress from serving simultane-
ously in executive office was the only mechanism by which the Framers sought to curb
executive power.
Ill For a discussion of the corrupt condition of government under the state constitu-
tions, see infra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
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the Federalist delegates willing to reexamine even the most funda-
mental tenets of the revolutionary political science.
112
For example, the majoritarian excesses of the powerful assem-
blies under the state constitutions had convinced the Federalists of
the need for a reenergized executive as a check on legislative
power. 113 Also, by 1787 everyone knew that the loose central govern-
ment set up under the Articles of Confederation needed strengthen-
ing.114 This spirit of reevaluation influenced the Federalists' thinking
about incompatibility and caused them to question whether the state
constitutions' curtailment of corruption had endangered energetic
government. Many Federalists became worried that strong incompati-
bility provisions might conflict with the Federalist goal of a re-
energized executive and a stronger national government.
i. Revitalizing the Executive-In drafting the state constitutions,
the American revolutionaries had put great trust in the legislature. 115
Yet this trust soon proved naive. Despite the state constitutions' ex-
plicit invocation of the separation of powers, 116 the state assemblies
112 James Madison, for example, wrote that the excesses of the state legislatures had
brought "into question the fundamental principle of republican Government, that the ma-
jority who rule in such governments are the safest Guardians both of public Good and
private rights." James Madison, Vices of the Political System, in 2 WrrINGs OF MADISON 366
(Gaillard Hunt ed., 1901) [hereinafter WRmNGs]; WooD, supra note 22, at 410.
113 McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 241; WOOD, supra note 22, at 550-51.
114 See WooD, supra note 22, at 464-67 (discussing the need to reconstruct the central
government). See also FARRAND, supra note 86, at 45 (noting that the "wretched condition
of the government finances, and the unsatisfactory state of foreign and domestic trade"
threatened the continuance of the Union). In varying degrees, all the delegates admitted
that strengthening the national government was a necessary goal of the Philadelphia Con-
vention. McDONALD, supra note 44, at 185.
115 Robert F. Williams, Evolving State Legislative and Executive Power in the Founding Dec-
ade, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci. 43, 52 (1988).
116 All the state constitutions were structured so as to incorporate the doctrine of the
separation of powers. McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 84. Six of the state constitutions con-
tained explicit "separation of powers" clauses. See GA. CONST. OF 1777, reprinted in 2 CON-
STrLrrIONS, supra note 53, at 778; MARYLAND CONST. OF 1776, art. VI, reprinted in 3 id. at
1687; MASS. CONST. OF 1780, art. XXX, reprinted in id. at 1893; N.H. CONsr. OF 1784, art.
XXXVII, reprinted in 4 id. at 2457; N.C. CONST. OF 1776, art. IV, reprinted in 5 id. at 2787;
VIRGINIA CONsr. OF 1776, reprinted in 7 id. at 3813, 3815.
Nevertheless, the recitations of separation-of-powers principles in the state constitu-
tions did not prove sufficient to secure the doctrine. In practice, the doctrine was univer-
sally ignored, with the legislature controlling the legislative, judicial, and executive
functions. McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 84; WooD, supra note 22, at 156. See also Edward S.
Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the
Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HisT. Riv. 511, 514 (1924-25).
Madison explicitly invoked the image of the impotent state separation-of-powers
clauses to press the need for checks and balances in the new Constitution:
If we look to the constitutions of the several states we find, that notwith-
standing the emphatical and, in some instances, the unqualified terms in
which this axiom has been laid down, there is not a single instance in which
the several departments of power have been kept absolutely separate and
distinct.
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ran roughshod over governors and courts and were almost "omnipo-
tent."117 Left unchecked, the assemblies passed many foolish and
wicked bills,1 8 giving-rise to talk of "democratic despotism.""19
The Framers were well aware of the trouble caused by an "excess
of democracy"' 20 in the states. They sought to prevent such legislative
tyranny from plaguing the national government by "giving every de-
fensive authority to the other departments that was consistent with
republican principles."12 ' Thus, they favored a strong executive' 22
with lone control over the military, substantial power over appoint-
ments, and a term longer than the governor of any state.' 23 Yet, the
writing of such powers on paper did not satisfy many Federalists, who
... [I] n no instance has a competent provision been made for maintain-
ing in practice the separation delineated on paper.
THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 1, at 303, 308 (James Madison).
117 2 RECORDS, supra note 9, at 35 (July 17, 1787) (statement ofJames Madison).
118 See STEPHEN B. PRESSER &JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW &JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN
HISTORY 132 (2d ed. 1989); WOOD, supra note 22, at 405. Notorious examples of this legis-
lation, which wreaked havoc on the infant state economies, included schemes allowing for
the confiscation of private property, the overproduction of paper or "rag" money, and the
altering or invalidating of contracts for the payment of debts. Presser and Zainaldin, how-
ever, note that not all the workproduct of the young assemblies was substantively offensive
or unjust: "Virginia's revisal of her colonial laws, for example, was a model of circumspec-
tion." PRESSER & ZAINALDIN, supra, at 133.
Compounding the problem of the state assemblies was the fact that the law was in such
constant flux that even those charged with its enforcement often found themselves at a loss
to know what the law was. WOOD, supra note 22, at 405. Madison, writing in 1787, com-
plained: "We daily see laws repealed or superceded [sic], before any trial can have been
made of their merits, and even before a knowledge of them can have reached the remoter
districts within which they were to operate." James Madison, Vices of the Political System, in
WRmrNrs, supra note 112, at 365-66; WOOD, supra note 22, at 406.
119 In 1774, John Adams had thought this idea was oxymoronic. See John Adams,
Novanglus, in 4 THE WORKS oFJoHN ADAMS 11, 79-83 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851); WooD,
supra note 22, at 63. However, as early as 1781,Jefferson recognized that the accumulation
of power in the Virginia legislature had converted the representative body of the people
into "precisely the definition of despotic government." His Notes on The State of Virginia
went on to urge that "one hundred and seventy-three despots" were "as oppressive as one"
and that "elective despotism was not the government we fought for." THE FEDERAIIST No. 48,
supra note 1, at 310-11 (James Madison quoting Thomas Jefferson, NOTES ON VIRGINIA).
120 See 1 RECORDS, supra note 9, at 48 (May 31, 1787) (statement of Elbridge Gerry)
("The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy."). See also 2 RECoRDS, supra
note 9, at 35 (July 17, 1787) (statement ofJames Madison) (The "[e]xperience had proved
a tendency in our governments to throw all power into the Legislative vortex."); 1
RECORDS, supra note 9, at 26 (May 29, 1787) (statement of Edmund Randolph) ("Our chief
danger arises from the democratic parts of our constitutions.").
121 2 RECORDS, supra note 9, at 74 (July 21, 1787) (statement ofJames Madison).
122 Madison identified the Framers' main goals in drafting the Federal Constitution as
providing "proper energy" to the executive and "proper stability" to the legislature and
"adjust[ing] the clashing pretensions of the large and small states." Letter from James
Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 1 THE LErERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF
JAMES MADISON 345 (1865). '
123 WooD, supra note 22, at 521.
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perhaps remembered that the state separation-of-powers clauses had
done little to stop legislative usurpation.
124
The last powerful executives the Framers had known were the
King and the Royal Governors. Moreover, it was common knowledge
that after the death of Royal absolutism in 1688, the "dynamo" that
fueled the English executive engine had been the system of influence.
For all the "invidious appellations of corruption and dependence,"
wrote David Hume,125 the Royal Patronage had made the King in-
dependent of Parliament while at the same time linking the executive
and the legislature so that the government could function.' 26 Many
influential writers of the day, from Blackstone to Thomas Paine, ob-
served that without the system of influence, the British government
would have ground to a halt.'
27
Thus, when the Federal Convention debated the Incompatibility
Clause, the advocates of a strong executive questioned whether, for all
his supposed power on parchment, the new President would in reality
have any strength or independence, absent a British-style system of
influence. As John Mercer said, "[Governments] can only be main-
tained by force or influence. The Executive has not force, deprive him of
influence by rendering the members of the (Legislature) ineligible to
Executive offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority."
128
Hamilton similarly observed, "We have been taught to reprobate the
danger of influence in the British government, without duly reflecting
how far it was necessary to support a good government."129 Finally,
124 As Madison noted, "[A) mere demarcation on parchment of the constitutional lim-
its of the several departments is not a sufficient guard against those encroachments which
lead to a tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the same hands."
THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 1, at 313. See also supra note 116 (discussing state consti-
tutional separation-of-powers clauses).
125 David Hume, On the Independency of Parliament, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLMCAL AND
LrrERARY 117-22 (T.H. Green & T.H. Grose eds., 1912) (emphasis omitted).
126 SeeW.S. Holdsworth, The Conventions of the Eighteenth-Century Constitution, 17 IOWA L.
REv. 161 (1932) (discussing the system of influence as a vital link between the Crown and
Parliament).
127 See I BLACSTONE, COMMENTARIES 334-36 (1765) (without the ability to confer hon-
ors, the "Crown would soon have been overborne by the power of the people."); Thomas
Paine, Common Sense, in COMMON SENSE AND OTHER POLrICAL WRITINGS 3, 9 (Nelson F.
Adkins ed., 1953) (The Crown "derives its whole consequence merely from being the giver
of places and pensions.").
128 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 284 (Aug. 14, 1787).
129 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 381 (June 22, 1787). See also id. at 376 (June 22, 1787)
(statement of Alexander Hamilton) ("It was impossible to say what wd. be the effect in G.B
of such a reform as had been urged. It was known that (one) of the ablest politicians (Mr.
Hume) had pronounced all that influence on the side of the crown, which went under the
name of corruption, an essential part of the weight which maintained the equilibrium of
the Constitution."). However, while Hamilton opposed all other proposed limitations on
legislators' ability to obtain executive office, including the Virginia Plan's proposed post-
service waiting period, he concluded that, on balance, the "danger[s] where men are capa-
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Nathanial Gorham cautioned against an overly hasty rejection of the
British system:
The corruption of the English government cannot be applied to
America. This evil exists there in the venality of their boroughs: but
even this corruption has its advantage, as it gives stability to their
government. We do not know what the effect would be if members
of parliament were excluded from offices.' 30
Thus, the Federalists worried that an American President without pa-
tronage would be an impotent figurehead. They feared that strict leg-
islative-executive incompatibility would undercut one of the key goals
of the new Constitution.
ii. Strengthening the National Government-Another Federalist
goal that seemed threatened by the Incompatibility Clause was the
augmentation of national government power.13 ' While most of the
delegates to the Federal Convention acknowledged the need for such
a clause to stop legislative corruption, 3 2 by 1787 larger worries
loomed. Countering the fear of corrupt M.C.s was the dread of hav-
ing no national legislators at all, or at least of significantly reducing
the quality of those willing to run for Congress.
In 1787, the state governments were still the only effective polit-
ical forces the Framers had known since independence. They did not
lightly assume, therefore, that the new national government would be
able to hold its own against the states. Power and prestige in Ameri-
can politics were still to be found at the state level, and an ambitious
office seeker would find far greater reward as the Governor of Virginia
than as a delegate to the Continental Congress. 33 The Federalists,
ble of holding two offices" warranted a requirement that legislators vacate all other offices
upon taking their seats in Congress. Id.
130 1 REcoRws, supra note 9, at 381 (June 22, 1787). See also id. at 375-76 (June 22,
1787) (statement of Nathanial Gorham) ("It was true abuses had been displayed in G.B.
but no one cd. say how far they might have contributed to preserve the due influence of
the Gov't nor what might have ensued in case the contrary theory had been tried.").
131 McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 185 n.1.
132 See 1 RECoRDs, supra note 9, at 381 (June 22, 1787) (statement of Alexander Hamil-
ton) ("I confess there is a danger where men are capable of holding two offices."); id. at
388, (June 23, 1787) (statement of James Madison) (Madison "admitted the probable
abuses of an eligibility of members, to offices.").
133 Allan Nevins cites several examples of prominent statesmen who felt a greater call-
ing to serve in their respective state governments than in the weak Continental Congress.
For example, as early as 1776, Jefferson resigned his seat in the Continental Congress,
believing his duty was to the government of Virginia. AUtAN NEVINs, THE AMERICAN STATES
DURING AN) AXTER THE REvOLuTION, 1776-1789 206 (1924). Madison likewise thought he
could do more good in Virginia than in Congress and resigned his congressional seat in
1784 to serve in the Virginia House. Id. at 207. The pull of the governorship was also
great, despite the limited constitutional powers afforded the states' chief executives. Nev-
ins notes that "[tihe Governors or Presidents were treated with a popular deference which
helped to weaken the constitutional restrictions on their authority." Id.
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therefore, saw a need to make national office attractive. 34 As
Gouverneur Morris put it, "[i] f the state governments have the division
of many of the loaves and fishes, and the general government few,
[the general government] cannot exist."
13 5
The concern was particularly great with respect to the Con-
gress.' 3 6 AsJames Wilson observed: "[t] he members of the Legislature
ha[d] perhaps the hardest [and] least profitable task of any who en-
gage in the service of the state," 13 7 and it was common knowledge that
the lure of profitable offices had drawn many to Parliament and the
state legislatures. Thus, Wilson continued, "nothing seemed to be
wanting to prostrate the [national] Legislature, but to render its mem-
bers ineligible to [national] offices, [and] by that means take away its
power of attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight
to the [government] and to render it useful to the people.' 38
James Madison added that it would likely be even harder to get
good people to serve in Congress than it had been to get them to
serve in the State Assemblies, 3 9 "as the sacrifices [required] from the
distant members [would] be much greater, and the pecuniary provi-
sions, probably, more disproporti[on]ate."' 40  Therefore, Madison
counseled, it would be "impolitic to add fresh objections to the (Legis-
lative) service by an absolute disqualification of its members." 1
41
Drawing on the experience of his own state, Madison concluded,
"[t]he Legislature of [Virginia] would probably have been without
134 Cf 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 289 (Aug. 14, 1787) (statement ofJohn Mercer) ("It
is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the U. States. [it
is t]he men whom it will bring into the Governt. and interest in maintaining it that is to
govern them. The paper will only mark out the mode & the form-Men are the substance
and must do the business.").
135 1 id. at 518 (July 2, 1787).
136 The opponents of incompatibility were also worried, though to a lesser extent,
about the effect the Clause would have on the quality of office seekers in the executive
department. For example,James Wilson's support for limiting the ban on executive office-
holding reflected his concern with attracting the best people to executive service:
Strong reasons must induce me to disqualify a good man from office. If
you do, you give an opportunity to the dependent or avaricious man to fill
it up, for to them offices are objects of desire. If we admit there may be
cabal and intrigue between the executive and legislative bodies, the exclu-
sion of one year will not prevent the effects of it. But we ought to hold
forth every honorable inducement for men of abilities to enter the service
of the public.
Id. at 379-80 (June 22, 1787). Rufus King of Massachusetts, agreeing that this "restriction
on the members would discourage merit," also argued that restricting the eligibility of
legislators to executive office would "give a pretext to the Executive for bad appointments,
as he might always plead this as a bar to the choice he wished to have made." Id. at 376.
137 Id. at 387 (June 23, 1787).
138 2 id. at 288 (Aug. 14, 1787).
139 1 id. at 389 (June 23, 1787) ("[T he impulse to the Legislative service, was evinced
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many of its best members, if in that situation, they had been ineligible
to [Congress and...] other honorable offices of the State."142
c. Madison's Middle Ground and the Republican Rejoinder
For these reasons, the ever-pragmatic Madison put forth a com-
promise on incompatibility. Madison's "middle ground"143 would
have excluded Members of Congress only from those offices that
"should be established, or the emoluments thereof, augmented by the
Legislature of the U[nited] States during the time of their being mem-
bers."144 Madison "supposed that the unnecessary creation of offices,
and increase of salaries, were the evils most experienced." 145 Thus, "if
the door was shut [against] them, it might properly be left open for
the [appointment] of members to other offices as an [encouragement]
to the Legislative service."
146
Republicans balked at Madison's assumption that the lure of of-
fice was needed to get good citizens into public life. George Mason,
for example, thought that Madison's suggestion that "virtue should be
encouraged by such a species of venality, was an idea, that at least had
142 Id. It will be remembered that, along with most of the state constitutions, the Vir-
ginia Constitution of 1776 contained a clause barring members of the state assembly from
simultaneous executive service. See supra note 73. Thus, it is puzzling that Madison would
refer to the situation in Virginia as support for his hypothesis that any limitation on execu-
tive service would dampen people's desire to serve in the legislature. One possible expla-
nation is that Madison was not cautioning against making legislative service incompatible
with concurrent executive office; rather, he was arguing against any proposal that would
forever bar a legislator from accepting an executive appointment, even if he were to resign
his seat in the assembly. Yet, another equally plausible explanation for Madison's state-
ment is that the incompatibility provision of the Virginia Constitution was simply not en-
forced. The limited historical evidence available on the point reveals that such was the
unhappy condition of the government in several other states during the founding decade.
In Pennsylvania, for example, state representatives commonly held simultaneous positions
as county treasurers, in spite of the fact that the Pennsylvania Constitution contained one
of the strongest prohibitions on dual office holding. NEVINS, supra note 133, at 190. See
also supra text accompanying note 71 (citing text of the Pennsylvania incompatibility
clause). In Massachusetts, as well, the practice of appointing legislators to multiple execu-
tive offices was carried out to such an extreme that one notorious "Pooh-Bah" reportedly
held six executive posts at once. NEVINS, supra note 133, at 176.
The state legislatures' disregard for other structural provisions in the state constitu-
tions provides further support for the proposition that their incompatibility clauses may
also have gone unenforced. The separation-of-powers clauses found in many of these con-
stitutions are a case in point, since it was the common practice of the legislature to ignore
these clauses, with the result that the state legislatures exercised all three powers of govern-
ment. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. Since it would have served the interests
of the Virginia legislature to ignore the constitution's incompatibility provision, this clause
may have similarly been disregarded.
143 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 388 (June 23, 1787).
144 Id. at 386 (June 23, 1787). Madison's proposal would have retained the provision




the merit of being new."147 Elbridge Gerry was likewise sickened by
this base appeal to self-interest:
If men will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such
offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are
actuated by such mercenary views, we had better chuse a single des-
pot at once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than
of many.
148
Moreover, both Republicans and Federalists thought that Madison's
proposal would be easy to evade. Thus, Rufus King, a staunch Feder-
alist, scolded the Republican delegates for clinging to the "chimerical"
hope that any constitutional provision could prevent legislators from
soliciting offices:'
49
You say that no member shall himself be eligible to any office. Will
this restrain him from availing himself of the same means which
would gain appointments for himself, to gain them for his son, his
brother, or any other object of his partiality. We were losing there-
fore the advantages on one side, without avoiding the evils on the
other.'5 0
Republicans also objected that it would be easy for M.C.s to find
ways around a clause that rendered them ineligible only for newly-
created or newly-salaried offices. Roger Sherman observed that a cun-
ning legislator could avoid the rule by creating a new office and ar-
ranging for the appointment of an existing officer to the new post,
thus opening the vacated office for himself.' 51 Elbridge Gerry added
that the Madison proposal would "produce intrigues of ambitious
men for displacing proper officers, in order to create vacancies for
themselves."'15
2
Ultimately, Madison's proposed "middle ground" fell victim to
these attacks. Yet, the Constitutional Convention did not forget his
fear of Congress "creating offices or augmenting the stipends of those
already created, in order to gratify some of the members."' 53 Rather,
147 Id. at 387 (June 23, 1787). Mason "[could] not suppose that a sufficient number of
Citizens could not be found who would be ready, without the inducement of eligibility to
offices, to undertake the Legislative service." Id.
148 2 id. at 285 (Aug. 14, 1787).
149 1 id. at 387 (June 23, 1787).
150 Id. In answer to this objection, Elbridge Gerry argued that "although members, if
disqualified themselves might still intrigue [and] cabal for their sons, brothers.. . , yet as
their own interest would be dearer to them, than those of their nearest connections, it
might be e[x]pected they would go greater lengths to promote it." Id. at 388 (June 23,
1787).
'51 Id. at 387-88 (June 23, 1787).
152 Id. at 388 (June 23, 1787).
153 Id. at 380 (June 22, 1787).
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this concern became the motivation for the Ineligibility Clause of Arti-
cle 1, Section 6.154
d. Resolution: Compromise
What came out of the debates and became the Incompatibility
Clause was a compromise between Republicans, who wanted the strict
incompatibility rule of the Virginia Plan, and Federalists, who hated
legislative-executive incompatibility in any form. The Clause today
thus allows M.C.s to become officers of the United States, since there
is no absolute (post-employment) bar on their appointment to office.
But, upon taking office, the Clause does make them resign their seats
in Congress and it prevents them from seeking reelection to those
seats, as British ministers could do.155 Advocates of a strong executive
thus secured for the President half of the perceived powers of the
British King, while those who hated legislative corruption secured half
the protection they sought from executive abuse: the President would
not be able to influence Congress directly by the presence of his min-
isters in the Senate or the House, but he would retain the indirect
power to influence M.C.s who might want to give up their seats in
exchange for office. 1
5 6
The Convention debates thus confirm historically what a close
reading of the constitutional text had already made clear. The Incom-
patibility Clause was motivated by worries about British-style corrup-
tion. The Framers did not perceive it as having much to do with the
separation of powers or with Presidential independence. The farthest
thought from their minds when they passed two constitutional ethics
clauses was that they might be creating a whole new form of non-parlia-
mentary government. The unintended consequences of the Incompat-
ibility Clause have been profound indeed.
154 U.S. CONSr., art. 1, § 6, cl. 2. Again, the Ineligibility Clause prohibits Members of
Congress from being "appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been in-
creased during" his service in the legislature. See Stephen Chapman, A History of Bending the
Constitution for Political Purposes, Cr. TmB., April 14, 1994, § 9, at 27 (discussing application
of the Ineligibility Clause to a possible 1994 Supreme Court appointment for U.S. Senator
George Mitchell).
155 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
156 The Ineligibility Clause dealt with other worries. That Clause addressed the fear
that Congress might be corrupted by abusing its own power to create lucrative, but unnec-
essary, offices to be filled by its members. Moreover, the Framers' limitation of the ineligi-
bility provision to "Civil offices" eased the fears of some of the delegates that, in war time,




B. The Actual Effects of the Incompatibility Clause Over the
Last Two Hundred Years
1. The Scorecard on "Corruption": An Ethics Rule Success?
The purpose of the Incompatibility Clause was to stop the Presi-
dent from using certain kinds of patronage appointments to build
support for his programs in Congress. We now consider how well the
Incompatibility Clause has actually worked as a constitutional ethics
rule in fulfilling this "anticorruption" goal.
We give the Clause a grade of C+ in gauging whether it has suc-
ceeded on its own terms. It has undoubtedly played some role in
changing the motives of those who seek to work in Congress. Unlike
the eighteenth-century British Parliament, the U.S. Congress is not
filled today with Members whose main goal in life is a desire for
wealth to be sought through executive appointment to office. 157 And,
while it is hard to isolate precisely how this cleansing of motives came
about, the Incompatibility and Ineligibility Clauses must deserve some
of the credit.158 Simple logic makes clear that one would be much
more likely to go into politics with the hope of getting an executive or
judicial office if the supply of those offices were unlimited' 59 and if
acceptance of an office did not force the resignation of one's congres-
sional seat.'
60
This is not to suggest, however, that the ban on dual office hold-
ing has completely purged M.C.s of the desire for executive office.
On the contrary, former M.C.s have played a big role in nearly every
President's Administration. President Clinton's cabinet, for example,
includes former Senators Al Gore and Lloyd Bentsen, and former
Representatives Leon Panetta and Mike Espy. Former Representative
Les Aspin served one year as Secretary of Defense. In addition, Sena-
157 Studies of candidates' reasons for seeking congressional office reveal a multitude of
motivations behind their decisions to run. See, e.g., Gordon S. Black, A Theoy of Political
Ambition: Career Choices and the Role of Structural Incentives, 66 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 144 (1972);
Rufus P. Browning & Herbert Jacob, Power Motivation and the Political Personality, 28 PuB.
OPINION Q. 75 (1964); Thomas A. Kazee, The Decision to Run for the U.S. Congress, 1 LEGcs.
STUD. Q. 79 (1980). Prominent among the reasons candidates give for seeking congres-
sional office is the personal satisfaction they achieve from running. See, e.g., Kazee, supra,
at 82.
158 Credit also goes to the Framers for giving Congress, and not the President, the
power to create new offices and for dividing the appointment power between the President
and the Senate. Their refusal to grant an executive power to confer titles of nobility is also
relevant here.
159 Of course, the supply of offices would be limited by the individual Member's ability
to influence fellow legislators to create an office for her.
160 The acceptance of any office under the United States by a Member of Congress has
been held to operate as a forfeiture of his seat. Case XVIH1-John P. Van Ness, of New
York, CASES OF CONTESTED ELEariONS IN CONGRESS 123 (1834).
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tor Sam Nunn was a top contender for Secretary of State (or Defense),
and Senator Patrick Leahy was considered for Attorney General.
This tendency of Presidents to draw their advisors from the ranks
of Congress has been documented empirically. One study surveyed
the political appointments of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisen-
hower, Kennedy, andJohnson and found that former congressmen 161
filled six out of every one hundred executive posts studied.162 More-
over, this study found that the likelihood of finding former M.C.s in a
particular post rises sharply with the prestige and power of the execu-
tive office. Thus, 16% of all Cabinet secretaries in these administra-
tions came from the ranks of Congress,163 while former M.C.s
accounted for a mere 1% of agency deputy administrators. 164
But, these numbers, while noteworthy, are not so dramatic as to
prove that realized desire for executive office powerfully corrupts
Congress. Political science research predictably confirms that once a
politician's ambitions are focused on a particular office, she will alter
161 These really were men. Only 12 of the 1,567 appointments made by these five
presidents went to women. See DAVID T. STANLEY El" AL., MEN WHO GOVERN: A BIOGRAPHI-
CAL PROFILE OF FEDERAL PoLrcAL ExEcuras 2 (1967).
162 Id. at 41-42. The researchers studied a total of 1,567 appointments to the following
executive positions: secretary, under secretary, assistant secretary and general counsel of
ten Cabinet and three military departments; administrator and deputy administrator of
major administrative agencies; and members of seven regulatory boards and commissions.
Id. at 3.
163 Id. at 43. It should be noted, however, that these secretaries did not necessarily
come directly from Congress.
164 Id. at 41-42, 139 (table E.6). As for particular departments and agencies, former
legislators most often served in the Federal Trade Commission, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Department of Interior, the National Labor Relations Board, and the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare. Not surprisingly, they were least prevalent in the
Departments of the Army and the Navy. Id. at 43, 140-41 (table E.7).
A subsequent study found that Presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, and Reagan drew an
average of only 1.5% of their top appointees from Congress. See Linda L. Fisher, Fifty Years
of Presidential Appointments, in THE IN-AND-OUTERS 1, 15 (G. Calvin Mackenzie ed., 1987);
Janet M. Martin, An Examination of Executive Branch Appointments in the Reagan Administration
by Background and Gender, 44W. POL. Q. 173, 177 (1991). But, this study may greatly under-
state the presence of former members in the executive department. First, the study
counted only those officials whose occupation "immediately prior to appointment" was as a
member of Congress. Thus, this study leaves out many former M.C.s who would have been
included in the Stanley survey. Second, the researchers collected data on a smaller cross-
section of executive officials. See Martin, supra, at 174 n.1. Third, these last four Adminis-
trations more frequently confronted Congresses dominated by the opposite party than did
the five Administrations between FDR and LBJ. This too may have reduced the desirability
or likelihood that the President would offer Cabinet spots to former M.C.s. Accordingly,
the results of these two studies are not directly comparable.
The trend toward appointing former members of Congress increased substantially.
under President Bush. Bush, a former member himself, appointed six former Members of
Congress as Cabinet secretaries-Richard B. Cheney, Manuel Lujan, Jr., Jack F. Kemp,
Edward J. Derwinski, Lynn Martin, and Edward Madigan. All had served as members of
Congress immediately prior to their appointment. A seventh nomination, that of former
Senator John Tower (R-Tex.) to be Secretary of Defense, was rejected by the Senate.
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her behavior in her current job in order to get the job she has
targeted.1 65 Unhappily, there is no good way to measure the effect
that congressional desire for executive office has on legislative behav-
ior. But, several realities of modem government make clear that the
President has few opportunities to affect legislation by rewarding
friendly legislators with executive appointments.
First, the fact that the Incompatibility Clause forces a Member of
Congress to give up her legislative seat to accept an appointment
means that aspiring to executive office is not costless. Before an M.C.
will betray the interests of her constituents in order to curry favor with
the President, she must weigh the benefit of a possible executive ap-
pointment166 against the cost of leaving Congress, which includes loss
of congressional seniority and other non-transferable political re-
sources. 167 Second, the very limited supply of desirable offices and
the relatively remote chance of an actual appointment1 68 might dis-
courage an M.C. from running the risk that her friendliness to the
Administration might go unrewarded by the President but be
remembered by voters at the polls. Thus, to the extent that the In-
compatibility Clause forces legislators to calculate the political costs of
voting with the President out of a selfish desire for office, the Clause
has been a success.
Nevertheless, the President's inability to confer executive office
directly on individual M.C.s does not mean that the evil which the
165 AsJoseph Schlesinger has noted, "the constituency to which a legislator is respond-
ing is not always the one from which he has been elected, and... it is more important to
know what he wants to be than how he got to be where he now is." JOSEPH A. SCHLESINGER,
AMBITION AND POLITICS 5 (1966). Schlesinger was the first to study systematically the im-
pact of political ambition on political behavior. Subsequent research has generally sup-
ported Schlesinger's conclusions. See, e.g., Stephen E. Frantzich, De-Recruitment: The Other
Side of the Congressional Equation, 31 W. POL. Q. 105 (1978); Dennis 0. Grady, Gubernatorial
Behavior in State-Federal Relations, 40 W. PoL- Q. 305 (1987);John R. Hibbing, Ambition in the
House: Behavioral Consequences of Higher Office Goals Among U.S. Representatives, 30 AM.J. POL.
Sci. 651 (1986); Keith Nicholls, The Dynamics of National Executive Service: Ambition Theoy
and the Careers of Presidential Cabinet Members, 44 W. POL. Q. 305 (1991);Jack R Van Der Slik
& Samuel J. Pernacciaro, Office Ambitions and Voting Behavior in the U.S. Senate: A Longitudi-
nal Study, 7 AM. POL. Q. 198 (1979).
166 The marked decline in the perceived desirability of executive offices since the late
eighteenth century may also account for the relatively small number of former legislators
who have occupied executive office. For political science literature discussing the disincen-
tives to federal executive service, see RICHARD F. FENNO, JR., THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET 59-
62 (1959); JOHN W. MACv ET AL., AMERICA'S UNELECTED GOVERNMENT. APPOINTING THE
PRESIDENT'S TEAM 12-14 (1983); G. CALVIN MACKENZIE, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL Ap-
POINTMENTs 241-42 (1981); DEAN E. MANN &JAMESON W. DOIG, THE ASSISTANT SECRETAR-
IES: PROBLEMS AND PROCESSES OF APPOINTMENT 278 (1965); Nicholls, supra note 165, at 154.
167 Frantizch, supra note 165, at 106.
168 For example, a study conducted by Stephen Frantzich revealed that of 357 Repre-
sentatives leaving the House between 1966 and 1974, only four of them were appointed to
federal executive office. Three additional members were appointed to the federal judici-
ary. Id. at 113.
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Clause targeted has been stamped out. Although M.C.s cannot them-
selves hold office, there is no constitutional bar to prevent their
spouses, aides, and friends from doing so.169 Some evidence exists to
suggest that the ground for playing the patronage game may have sim-
ply shifted to these constitutionally permissible playing fields.
Unhappily, there is no good way of measuring how often Presi-
dents are able to build congressional support by making well-timed
appointments. As G. Calvin Mackenzie notes, "[t]here are few incen-
tives for partners in this kind of a bargain to admit its occurrence
publicly or to divulge the terms of trade.' 70 Nonetheless, anecdotal
information abounds and belies any claim that the inclusion of the
Incompatibility Clause in our Constitution has eradicated the ancient
governmental impulse whereby Kings and Presidents have used pa-
tronage to build legislative support.
One fact that may be of some relevance here is the frequent pres-
ence of congressional spouses in executive (and even judicial) offices
during the last three Administrations. Among those spouses who have
served, or are now serving, we can count: Elizabeth Dole, 17' Dee Jep-
sen,172 Anne Bingaman, 173 Ruth Harkin, 174 Sharon Percy Rockefel-
169 This was no oversight. The loophole left by the Incompatibility Clause's failure to
protect against the appointment of M.C.s' friends and family members was one of the
Federalist's central arguments against the Clause. See supra note 150 and accompanying
text.
170 MACKENZIE, supra note 166, at 224.
171 Wife of U.S. Sen. Robert Dole (R-Kan.), she served under President Reagan: as
Assistant to the President for Public Liaison; as a member of his Council to Coordinate
Women's Issues, Steven V. Roberts, Surveys on Women's Reaction Wony White House, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1982 at B6; as a Member of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC); and as
Secretary of Transportation, Congressional Wives Taking Own Place in Sun, U.S. NEws &
WORLD RE.,July 18, 1983, at 54 [hereinafter Congressional Wives]. She also served President
Bush as his first Secretary of Labor. Task at Labor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 1988, at A26. Con-
veniently, Senator Dole and his wife were able to share, or swap, a staff member. Rod
DeArment left his post as Chief of Staff to the then-Senate Majority Leader to become
Deputy Secretary of Labor. Frank Swoboda, Outgoing at Labor: Daily Overseer, WASH. POST,
May 22, 1991, at A19.
172 Wife of then-U.S. Sen. Roger W. Jepsen (R-Iowa), she served on the White House
Council to Coordinate Women's Issues with Elizabeth Dole.
173 Wife of U.S. Sen.JeffBingaman (D-N.M.), she presently serves President Clinton as
his Assistant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division. Laurie McGinley, A Growing
Number of Well Connected Women Land Key Positions in Clinton Administration, WALL ST.J.,June
2, 1993, at A16.
Attorney General Janet Reno's quoted reaction was: "When I first heard that the
White House was pushing Anne Bingaman, I said, 'Hmmm. Now the White House is push-
ing a senator's wife on me.'" According to Reno, however, she has since learned how very
able Ms. Bingaman really is. Stephen Labaton, Rousing Antitrust Law From Its 12-Year Nap,
N.Y. TIMES, July 25, 1993, at 8.
174 Wife of U.S. Sen. Tom Harkin (D-Iowa), she presently serves President Clinton as
the President of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). Ruth Harkin To
Take Oath as OPICPresidentJ. or CoMM.,June 1, 1993, sec. A at 3. Ruth Harkin was a prime
contender, along with former Rep. Matthew McHugh (D-N.Y.) for Administrator of the
Agency for International Development (AID). A bitter fight ensued and both Harkin and
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ler,175 Wendy Lee Gramm, 176 Heather Gradison, 177 Jane Roth, 178
Jeanne Hyde, 179 Harry Leinenweber, 80 Kathryn Porter,181 Cheryl
Weber, 82 Maryanne Knause,' 83 Rita Gail, 184 Susan Coughlin, 185 Loret
Ruppe, 86 Doris Matsui, 187 Sheila Anthony,188 Louise McClure, 189 Col-
McHugh lost out. Mary McGrory, Clinton Foot-dragging Leaves 3,000 Federal Positions Unfilled,
Buri'ALo NEws, Apr. 16, 1993, at 3.
175 Wife of U.S. Sen. John D. (Jay) Rockefeller IV (D-W.Va.) and daughter of former
U.S. Sen. Charles H. Percy (R-Ill.), she served President Reagan as head of the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting. She was quoted as telling The NationalJournah "Between my fa-
ther and my husband, I have known many members of Congress. I've never had difficulty
getting an appointment." Carol Matlack, Connected Couples, 1991 NAT'LJ. 1793, 1798.
176 Wife of U.S. Sen. Phil Gramm (R-Tex.), she served as Chairman of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission (CFTC), and as Director of the Bureau of Economics at the
FTC. Congressional Wives, supra note 171, at 59.
177 Wife of then-U.S. Rep. Willis D. Gradison,Jr. (R-Ohio), she was appointed by Presi-
dent Reagan to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), ultimately serving as ICC
Chairman. Carole Shifrin, Heather Gradison Wins Reagan ICC Nomination, WAsH. PosT,
March 19, 1982, at E8.
178 Wife of U.S. Sen. William V. Roth (R-Del.), she was appointed a U.S. DistrictJudge
by President Reagan and a U.S. Court of Appeals Judge by President Bush. Howard Kurtz,
Sen. Roth's Wife Picked To Be A Federal Judge. WASH. PosT, May 24, 1985, at A8.
179 Wife of U.S. Rep. Henry Hyde (R-Ill.), she was appointed by President Reagan to
serve as Staff Assistant in the Office of Presidential Correspondence. Congress: Spouse's Jobs,
U.S.A. TODAY, May 4, 1989, at 6A.
180 Husband of then-U.S. Rep. Lynn Martin (R-Ill), he was appointed by President
Reagan to be a U.S. DistrictJudge. Id. Former Rep. Martin herself served President Bush
as Secretary of Labor.
181 Wife of U.S. Rep.John Porter (R-Ill.), she was appointed to serve as a Special Assis-
tant in the U.S. Department of Energy. Id.
182 Wife of then-U.S. Rep. Vin Weber (R-Minn.), she was appointed by HUD Secretary
(and former U.S. Rep.) Jack Kemp to serve in the Congressional Affairs Office, U.S. De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development. Id.
183 Wife of U.S. Rep. Hamilton Fish (R-N.Y.), she served President Bush as Acting Di-
rector, White House Liaison, U.S. Department Commerce. Id.
184 Wife of U.S. Rep. Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.), she worked as a lawyer in the U.S.
Department of Labor. Id.
185 Wife of U.S. Rep. Lawrence Coughlin (R-P.A.), she served President Bush as Dep-
uty Administrator of the Federal Railroad Administration. Id.
186 Wife of former U.S. Rep. Philip E. Ruppe (R-Mich.), she served President Reagan
as Director of the Peace Corps. Kathryn Tolbert, Winner's Way: Potomac's Loret Ruppe Bones
Up to Direct the Peace Corps, WASH. PosT, March 26, 1981, at MD1. Ruppe later went on to
become President Bush's Ambassador to Norway. U.S. Gov'T MANUAL 1989-90 911 (1989).
187 Wife of U.S. Rep. Robert Matsui (D-Calif.), she serves President Clinton as a Deputy
Assistant in the White House. McGinley, supra note 173, at A16.
188 Wife of former U.S. Rep. Beryl Anthony (D-Ark.), she presently serves President
Clinton as Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs. She is also the sister of re-
cently deceased Deputy White House Counsel Vince Foster. Id.
189 Wife of then-U.S. Sen. James McClure (R-Idaho), she was appointed by President
Bush to the National Endowment for the Arts, Advisory Council. Allan Parachini, Top NEA
LauyerJulianne Davis Quits, L.A. TIMEs, April 17, 1991, at F5.
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leen Nunn, 190 and Lynn Cheney.' 9 ' Other congressional relatives
have served in high executive offices as well. For example, President
Clinton appointed jean Kennedy Smith, "favorite sister" to U.S. Sen.
Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.), to be Ambassador to Ireland, 92 and
Sally Metzenbaum, daughter of U.S. Sen. Howard Metzenbaum, was
named to head regional operations for the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). 193 Finally, Linda Daschle, wife of Senator Tom Das-
chle (D.-S.D.), is the Deputy Administrator at the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration. Husband Tom provided a key vote last year for
President Clinton's Budget package. 94
Moving beyond immediate family to friends, former staff, and for-
merM.C.s, we find a host of names. Among the former M.C.s recently
appointed to executive or judicial offices are: Al Gore, George Bush,
Dan Quayle, Lloyd Bensten, Les Aspin, Leon Panetta, Mike Espy, Tim
Wirth, Dick Cheney, Manuel Lujan, Jack Kemp, Bill Brock, Howard
Baker, Lynn Martin, Richard Schweicker, Margaret Heckler, Chic
Hecht, Walter Mondale, Nicholas Brady, James Buckley, Abner Mikva,
and Charles Wiggins. 195 Among the former staff and friends are: cur-
190 Wife of U.S. Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), she once served in the Central Intelli-
gence Agency (CIA) but resigned and has turned down other positions to avoid a "conflict
of interest." Lloyd Grove, The Limited Life of a Political Wife, WASH. POST, March 19, 1992, at
Cl.
191 Wife of then-U.S. Rep. Richard B. (Dick) Cheney (R-Wyo.), she served Presidents
Reagan and Bush as Chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities. Leslie
Maitland Werner, Of Humilities and Humanities, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1986, at B6.
192 Al Kamen, Exchanging One Chair for Another, WASH. POSr, March 11, 1993, at A27.
U.S. Sen. Clairborne Pell (D-R1.), Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, ex-
plained the appointment "indicates the respect and affection the Kennedy and Clinton
wings of the party have for each other." Phil McCombs, The Wearin' O' the Black Tie, WASH.
POsT, March 17, 1993, at B1.
193 Clinton Fills Posts At EPA and Energy Departmen WALL ST. J., July 19, 1993, at A12.
194 Daschle Confirmed for FAA PostJ. OF COMM., Nov. 23, 1993, sec. B at 3.
195 Former Congressman George Bush (R-Tex.) served as President Reagan's Vice
President; former Senator Timothy E. Wirth (D-Colo.) is a Special Ambassador at the De-
partment of State; former Congressman Manuel Lujan, Jr. (R-N.M.) served as President
Bush's Secretary of Interior, former Congressman Jack F. Kemp (R-N.Y.) served as Presi-
dent Bush's Secretary of Housing and Urban Development; former Congressman and Sen-
ator William E. Brock (R-Tenn.) served both as President Reagan's Secretary of Labor and
as Trade Representative; former Senator Howard Baker (R-Tenn.) served as President Rea-
gan's Chief of Staff; former Congresswoman Lynn Martin (R-Ill.) served as President
Bush's Secretary of Labor; former Senator Richard Schweicker (R-Pa.) served as President
Reagan's Secretary of Health and Human Services; former Congresswoman Margaret M.
Heckler (R-Mass.) served as President Reagan's Secretary of Health and Human Services
and Ambassador to Ireland; former Vice President and Senator Walter F. Mondale is the
Ambassador to Japan; former Senator Nicholas F. Brady (R-NJ.) served Presidents Reagan
and Bush as Secretary of Treasury; former Senator James L. Buckley (R-N.Y.) is a Circuit
Court Judge for the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Other
perhaps less well-known figures, who after retirement or electoral defeatjoined the execu-
tive include: former Senator James Abdnor (R-S.D.) who became President Reagan's Ad-
ministrator of the Small Business Administration; former Congressman Henson Moore (R-
La.) who became President Reagan's Deputy Secretary of Energy; former Congresswoman
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rent EPA Administrator Carol Browner, 96 former Director of the Of-
fice of Personnel Management (OPM) and, later, Undersecretary of
Health and Human Services (HHS) Constance Homer, former HHS
Assistant Secretary KayJames, former HHS Deputy Assistant Secretary
Nabers Cabaniss, 197 National Endowment for the Arts ChairJane Alex-
ander, 198 the twenty-one Reagan Administration ambassadors who
publicly endorsed U.S. Sen. Jesse Helms' (R-N.C.) 1984 re-election
bid, 199 U.S. Supreme Court Justices David Souter2°° and Clarence
Thomas, 20' Bob Lighthizer,20 2 Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) member Richard Roberts, 203 George Stephanopoulos, 20 4 Mark
Gearan, 205 and the one-hundred and eighteen former Democratic
staff members from Capitol Hill who The Washington Post reports are
now working loyally for President Clinton.20 6 Of these,
Patricia Saiki (R-Haw.) who became President Bush's Administrator of the Small Business
Administration; former Senator Roger W. Jepsen (R-Iowa) who became Chairman of the
National Credit Union Administration; and former Senator Chic Hecht (R-Nev.) who be-
came Ambassador to the Bahamas under President Bush.
196 Formerly a legislative aide to then-U.S. Sen. Al Gore (D-Tenn.) and before that to
then-U.S. Sen. (now Gov.) Lawton Chiles (D-Fla.).
197 In addition, Cabaniss had previously served on Capitol Hill as an aide to former
U.S. Sen.Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.) and U.S. Sen.Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). Ms. Cabaniss held
key HHS positions under both Presidents Reagan and Bush.
198 An actress, she was pushed for the National Endowment for the Arts by U.S. Sena-
tor Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.) and U.S. Rep. Sydney Yates (D-11.), "who both helped create the
NEA in 1965 and now chair the subcommittees that oversee the agency." Jacqueline
Trescott, Actress To Be Nominated to Head NEA: Jane Alexander is Supported by Arts Community,
Hill Leaders, WASH. PosT, July 30, 1993, at GI.
199 Philip Geyelin, Unseemly Ambassadors, WAsH. PosT, Oct. 30, 1984, at A19.
200 Souter had served as an Assistant Attorney General under then New Hampshire
Attorney General and later U.S. Sen. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.). Thereafter, Souter and
Rudman remained close friends. Rudman was regarded as essential in securing Souter's
nomination to the Court. See MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT UJwusA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERI-
CAN PoLrrics 1992, at 761 (1991).
201 Thomas is a former aide and close friend to U.S. Sen. Jack Danforth (R-Mo.).
Throughout Thomas' career, Danforth played the same vital role for Thomas that Rudman
had played for Souter. Id. at 729.
202 Former Chief Counsel to the Senate Finance Committee and then President Rea-
gan's Deputy Trade Representative under Bill Brock. David Shribman, Rising With a Net-
work of Contacts, N.Y. TiME, Apr. 27, 1983, at A22. Then-U.S. Sen. Russell B. Long (D-La.)
emphasized his pleasure at the appointment by explaining at Lighthizer's confirmation
hearing that Mr. Lighthizer would have an entertainment allowance in his new job and
that Finance Committee members would be "sort of disappointed if you don't invite us out
and pick up the tab on at least one occasion." Id.
203 A former Chief of Staff to U.S. Sen. Richard C. Shelby (D-Ala.), Roberts was ap-
pointed to the SEC by Republican President George Bush. Gregory A. Robb, Democratic
Nominee for S.E.C. Seat, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1990, at A31.
204 Stephanopolous served as a former staffer to House Majority Leader Richard A.
Gephardt (D-Mo.). Ann Devroy, Undergirding McLary, A Second-Tier Contras, WASH. PosT,
Dec. 14, 1992, at Al, A6.
205 Top Clinton White House aide and a former Chief of Staff to a Democratic M.C.
Id.
206 Al Kamen, So Much for the New Guard, WASH. PosT, Apr. 23, 1993, at A21.
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37 have landedjobs in the White House, and 38 have followed three
Cabinet members who came from the Hill. [Former] Defense Secre-
tary Les Aspin ha[d] 15 people (11 from the House Armed Services
Committee he chaired); Treasury Secretary Lloyd Bentsen has 13
(including 11 from the Senate Finance Committee he led); and Ag-
riculture Secretary Mike Espy has 10 (including six former aides
either on his staff or from the House Agriculture Committee.)
In addition, six of Vice President Gore's key Senate people
have moved to the White House and many former Gore people
have been sprinkled throughout the Clinton administration in key
posiions.
2 0 7
A recent Article in The American Political Science Review explains both
the phenomenon and its likely implications for those Presidents who
hire former Hill Staff:
20 8
[A] sizable fraction of time ... in the Washington world is devoted to
career development and protection, by nearly everyone to be sure,
but specifically by members of Congress on behalf of their staffs.
Indeed, some legislators are known for their staff networks spread
throughout the Washington community; while formal ties are sev-
ered, member and ex-staffer "keep in touch."
20 9
In sum, there can be no doubt that Members of Congress to some
degree circumvent the Incompatibility Clause by securing executive
and judicial offices for their spouses, relatives, friends, staffers, and
former colleagues in Congress. This is NOT to say that these individu-
als are necessarily unqualified for the posts they hold. Indeed, one of
us worked with a few of the individuals listed above and found them to
be quite a bit more able than many other Reagan or Bush Administra-
tion officials, who lacked their political savvy. Moreover, the explo-
sion of two-career families has made it often desirable, and necessary,
for congressional spouses to hold executive jobs. Our only claim here
is the very limited point that determined executives and legislators
may easily circumvent the Incompatibility Clause. We think the point
is clearly buttressed by the admittedly anecdotal evidence presented
above.
These examples suggest that Members of Congress and the Presi-
dent do, at times, get around the Incompatibility Clause by exploiting
the fact that the Clause does not apply to the spouses, aides, and
friends of M.C.s. 210 Mackenzie notes that "[w]hile the President can-
not create legislative majorities simply by offering appointments in ex-
207 Id.
208 Robert H. Salisbury & Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congressional Staff Turnover and the Ties-
That-Bind, 75 Am. POL Scr. REv. 381 (1981).
209 Id. at 394.
210 Perhaps now with the rise of more two career congressional families, this problem
will become more acute.
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change for congressional votes, his appointment powers do allow him
occasional tactically significant opportunities to curry favor among key
legislators or to change the outcome of a legislative vote that is likely
to be extremely close."21' Thus, if the Framers' intent in making con-
gressional service incompatible with executive office was to eliminate
patronage and its influencing effects, the Clause has not fully achieved
its goal. Although the Clause may have reduced the effects of presi-
dential patronage, its biggest impact may have been merely to change
the beneficiaries of such patronage as the President chooses to
confer.212
C. Unanticipated Consequences: Stronger President, Reinforced
Separation of Powers
In many respects, the story of the Incompatibility Clause'9 actual
impact over the last two hundred years is a study in unforeseen conse-
quences. Although the Framers' primary goal for the Clause was to
curtail legislative "corruption," Section B demonstrated that the
Clause has had only a limited ethics rule impact.213 Nonetheless, we
think it self-evident that the Clause has played a dramatic role in shap-
ing our governmental institutions, although in ways largely unfore-
seen by its drafters. Specifically, the Clause has: 1) contributed to the
strengthening of the Presidency and 2) reinforced the constitutional
separation of powers. We turn now to an examination of both of
these momentous, albeit unanticipated, consequences of the Incom-
patibility Clause.
1. A Stronger, More Independent President
The Framers believed the Incompatibility Clause would reduce
Presidential power as well as guard against "corruption." The debates
at Philadelphia make plain the delegates' fear that allowing M.C.s to
hold office would subject Congress to presidential control.214
Although logic should have counselled concern for the equal and op-
posite possibility of congressional control of the executive, the Fram-
211 MACKENZIE, supra note 166, at 224.
212 It should be noted at this point that the Republicans at the Philadelphia Conven-
tion may have agreed to allow M.C.s to be appointed to executive offices, with the sole
condition that they resign their legislative seats, because they may have believed that the
executive would not have the power to remove officers at will. Thus, there would have
been fewer open offices, and a weaker impulse among M.C.s to aspire to office. However,
this changed with interpretation and the Republicans later proposed a constitutional
amendment to deprive the executive of any removal power, although this proposal was
never approved.
213 See supra notes 157-212 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 94-156 and accompanying text.
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ers never expressed a fear of Congress forcing the President to grant its
Members executive office to gain legislative support for his programs.
It may at first seem surprising that the Framers would so fear
presidential abuse of patronage as a threat to congressional indepen-
dence. After all, the Constitution was written largely to stop the
abuses of the state legislatures, which had so grossly usurped even the
limited executive power granted under the early state constitutions.215
However, under the new Federal Constitution, the appointments
power was not to rest in the legislature alone, as it had under most of
the state constitutions,21 6 but rather would be exercised by the Presi-
dent acting jointly with the Senate.217 Thus, the danger of English-
style executive abuse of the appointments power was thought to have
reemerged.
The Framers offered two reasons why the President had to have a
key role in the appointments process. First, there was an "unspoken
consensus" that the President had to have the power to pick his subor-
dinates so he could provide for the effective administration of the gov-
ernment.218 Second, the Framers were wary of recreating a situation,
such as existed under the state constitutions, where unaccountable,
multi-member legislatures conferred offices on their "friends, favor-
ites, and dependents."21 9 A presidential appointments power would
mean appointments by a "single, responsible person,"220 who would at
least have the virtue of having 'fewer personal attachments to
gratifyr."
221
Although a presidential appointments power, shared with the
Senate, carried the day,2 22 many delegates feared abuse. 223 They
feared that control over patronage would make the President a defacto
King even if he lacked power to create offices, confer Titles of Nobil-
215 See supra notes 116-19 and accompanying text.
216 See supra note 52.
217 U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2.
218 Blumoff, supra note 35, at 1069 n.194. Madison's speech on the floor of the House
on June 16, 1789 supports this point: "I conceive that if any power whatsoever is in its
nature executive, it is the power of appointing ... those who execute the laws." James
Madison, Speech on the Floor of the House, in WRITINGS, suPRA note 112, at 394.
219 1 WoPxS OFJAMES WILSON 359-60 (J. Andrews ed., 1896). See also 1 REcoRms, supra
note 9, at 119 (June 5, 1787) (statement of James Wilson) ("Intrigue, partiality, and con-
cealment were the necessary consequences" of appointments by a multi-member body.).
220 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 119 (June 5, 1787) (statement ofJames Wilson).
221 THE FEDERAuSr No. 76, supra note 1, at 456 (Alexander Hamilton).
222 Blumoff argues that locating the appointments power in any department of govern-
ment caused the Framers such distress that "but for the need to lodge an appointing power
somewhere, one suspects that the delegates might never have agreed on article II, section
2, clause 2 of the Constitution." Blumoff, supra note 35, at 1061.
223 See id. at 1074-78 (discussing concerns that the Senate might be an ineffective
check on the President's appointment power).
1994] 1087
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
ity, or make appointments without senatorial consent.224 Hence, it
was natural for the Framers to conclude that the Incompatibility
Clause would weaken the President by offsetting somewhat the return
to the Executive of a role in making appointments. Ironically, how-
ever, the Clause has almost certainly increased presidential power by
securing presidential independence from Congress.
225
To understand this paradox, one must imagine what our govern-
ment would look like in the absence of an Incompatibility Clause. In
doing this, we must remember that the American President has few
powers that are expressly granted by the Constitution. In fact, the
President is vested personally with only eight specifically enumerated
powers, 226 which, although not insignificant, pale in comparison to
the list of eighteen powers the Constitution specifically gives to Con-
gress.2 27 The real political power of the presidency, therefore, stems
from the Chief Executive's ability to appoint, remove, and, to some
degree, oversee the thousands of like-minded officials who, as his
agents, actually run the federal government.228 Absent the Incompati-
bility Clause, however, the President would have totally lost this vital
source of power. Without such a Clause, he would have been forced
to fill many, if not most, of the highest executive posts with powerful
Members of Congress.2 29
The proof of this is easy to make. The President has an obvious
interest in passing legislation. He owes his office to the public's gen-
eral agreement with his proposed plan for governing, and, thus, has a
duty to the electorate to try to carry out his popular mandate. Success
224 See, e.g., Luther Martin, Information to the General Assembly of the State of Maryland
(Nov. 29, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 91, at 68 (the power of
appointment will make the President "King in name, as well as in substance"); Patrick Henry,
Speech Against Ratification, in THE POWER OF THE PRESIDENCY 22 (R. Hirchfield ed., 1968)
(arguing that the President could easily become a King).
225 Willi P. Adams notes that, in light of the common rhetoric regarding the colonists'
visceral reaction to abuse of executive power, "the striking fact of historical dimension is
that the reaction against the colonial governor was so weak that it did not lead to parlia-
mentary government with an executive committee of members of the legislature, but
rather that within a decade the American system of presidential government evolved with
full clarity and permanence." ADAMs, supra note 33, at 271.
226 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
227 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cls. 1-18. Many of these 18 powers have been broadly
construed. For example, many argue that the New Deal Supreme Court's remarkable ex-
pansion of the commerce power allows Congress to do virtually anything it wants. See, e.g.,
TRIBE, supra note 15, § 5-8, at 316.
228 See U.S. CONsr. art. II, § 2, cI. 2.
229 Of course, the President's freedom to appoint whomever he wishes to executive
office is already restricted by Congress. See Theodore B. Olson, The Impetuous Vortex: Con-
gressional Erosion of Presidential Authority, in THE FESlERED PRESIDENCY 225, 233-35 (L.
Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989). Nonetheless, the President traditionally
has been allowed exclusive control over his "inner-circle" of appointees. MAcKENzE, supra
note 166, at 228-29.
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in the legislative arena, moreover, helps ensure his continuance in
office and presumably sets the nation on a policy course he believes is
good for the country.
Of course, the President cannot alone turn his programs into law.
To accomplish this end, he needs the cooperation of Congress and,
thus, needs the means to influence that body. Absent a constitutional
prohibition, one source of influence would have been the President's
ability to appoint M.C.s to high executive office.230 And once Mem-
bers of Congress realized how dependent the President was upon
them for his reelectoral success, the most influential among them
would have routinely demanded appointment to prestigious executive
posts.
This convergence of the Executive and Legislative Departments
would have dramatically changed the character of the Presidency as
we know it today. Perhaps the greatest curtailment of presidential
power would have stemmed from the President's inability indepen-
dently to develop and recommend legislation to Congress.231 If M.C.s
dominated the President's Cabinet, the government would effectively
be run by congressional committee. The President would, thus, be
unable independently to perform many of the responsibilities that he
is now expected to undertake, such as developing a budget for the
national government, or proposing innovative programs that imple-
ment his campaign promises and respond to the needs of the coun-
try.23 2 Even the President's ability to exercise his enumerated power
as Commander-in-Chief, already the source of great contention be-
tween the legislative and executive departments, would be effectively
destroyed if the President's Secretary of Defense were simultaneously
the Chairman of the Senate or House Armed Services Committee.
Presidential inability to make independent policy proposals would be
most evident during periods of divided party control of Congress and
the Presidency.
230 This would have appealed to both of the passions that Benjamin Franklin perceived
as having the greatest "influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice;
the love of power, and the love of money." 1 Rxcoms, supra note 9, at 82 (June 2, 1787).
231 Textually, the President's role as "chief legislator" derives from the Constitution's
command that the President shall "from time to time give to the Congress Information of
the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall
judge necessary and expedient." U.S. CONST., art. II, § 3. But it was not until the early
twentieth century, under the administrations of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson,
and Franklin Roosevelt, that the modem role of the President as policy initiator became a
regular part of the American political system. The development of the President's role in
policy formation is detailed in EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT.: OFMCE AND POWEaRS,
1787-1984, at 303-17 (Randall W. Bland et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).
232 For example, whether or not one agrees with the undertaking, President Clinton
would have been unable to develop and propose his own national health care plan if his
Cabinet were dominated by current members of Congress.
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The existence of our elaborate system of congressional commit-
tees and subcommittees further proves this point. Although the com-
mittee system is nowhere contemplated or described in the text of the
Constitution, Congress has, for most of our history, maintained an ex-
tensive and costly extra-constitutional network of committees that
watch over the work of the various Cabinet departments and agencies.
Commentators have long recognized the power and significance of
these unplanned appendages of the Legislative Department. But con-
stitutional lawyers may not be fully aware that these appendages are,
in fact, the stunted growths of parliamentary ministries within our
constitutional system.23 3 Standing congressional committees, chaired
by a Member of Congress, that conduct detailed oversight hearings are
the beginnings of a compound legislature-executive of the kind that
evolved in England over the last two hundred years. The constitu-
tional bar of the Incompatibility Clause is, in our judgment, the main
reason these stunted growths have not overrun the departments and
agencies that they oversee.
The unplanned congressional committee system emerged in this
country at least in part because hydraulic pressures in Congress
caused it to grow. The ambition and love of power of our Senators
and Representatives caused them to lust after the patronage and me-
dia glory that a committee post could bring. Who can doubt that if
these hydraulic forces were great enough to raise up a committee sys-
tem where none was contemplated, they would not also be great
enough to raise up a full-fledged parliamentary government absent
the bar of the Incompatibility Clause? This same evolution occurred
in Britain between the end of the eighteenth and the middle of the
nineteenth centuries, so why not also in the United States?
Well, one reason, it might be argued, is because, unlike the Brit-
ish, we have an independently elected executive, the President, in-
stead of a hereditary executive Monarch who lacks democratic
legitimacy. This is an important difference between our constitu-
tional system and theirs but it by no means fully explains our presiden-
tial regime and rejection of parliamentarianism. Absent the
Incompatibility Clause, we could easily have evolved into an interme-
diate semi-presidential regime like that of the French Fifth Republic.
The President, with an independent electoral mandate, could quite
well have found himself exercising a few enumerated powers, while a
congressionally-chosen Prime Minister and Cabinet really ran the
233 Political scientists, however, are fully aware of this fact. Woodrow Wilson was cer-
tainly aware of the connection when he urged Americans to abandon government by legis-
lative committees in favor of what he called British-style cabinet government. Woodrow
Wilson, Committee Government or Cabinet Government? in PARLLAMENTARY VERSUS PRESIDENTIAL
GOVERNMENT 72, 72-74 (Arend Lijphart ed., 1992) [hereinafter PARLLmrNTARY].
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show. To illustrate this point further, consider how the French hybrid
presidential-parliamentary system actually works.
The French Constitution of 1958 creates a divided dual execu-
tive, 23 4 thus leaving open the possibility that the "government," as rep-
resented by the Prime Minister, will be independent of the President.
The French President is chosen in elections separate from those for
Parliament, and he thus receives an independent electoral mandate.
Yet, the Constitution of the Fifth Republic still contemplates the exis-
tence of a separate Prime Minister whose government depends on
parliamentary support. As a result, the French President is quite pow-
erful when his party controls the National Assembly, in which case he
can pick a Prime Minister he likes. The French President is very weak,
however, when there is divided party control of the Presidency and
the National Assembly, and in those circumstances the regime be-
comes essentially a parliamentary one.
23 5
Divided party control of the Parliament and the Presidency,
known as "cohabitation," has occurred twice in the lifetime of the Fifth
Republic. 236 The first instance happened in 1986, when President
Francois Mitterrand, a Socialist, faced a National Assembly dominated
by conservatives. Mitterrand picked the conservative leader, Jacques
Chirac, to be Prime Minister. The resulting dual executive regime was
an unhappy one. Mitterrand ceded control over all things domestic
to Chirac and was able to keep only an advisory role on domestic pol-
icy. In addition, the existence of a dual executive power greatly ham-
pered French foreign policy, since neither Mitterrand nor Chirac
234 The French Constitution divides the executive power between a Prime Minister,
who is the head of government, and a President, who is the head of state. Although this
mixed system is not uncommon to parliamentary democracies, France is unusual in that,
since the presidency of Charles de Gaulle, the French President has wielded an enormous
amount of actual power. The most dramatic change in the office of the presidency with
the advent of the Fifth Republic has been the mode of selection. The President, once
elected by the Parliament, is now chosen directly by the people, and thus receives an in-
dependent electoral mandate much the same as the President of the United States.
235 It has thus been said that "French semi-presidentialism does not mean either a
synthesis of the parliamentary and presidential types or an intermediate category more or
less halfvay between them. Rather, it entails an alternation of parliamentary and presiden-
tial phases, depending on whether or not the President's party has a majority in the legisla-
ture." Arend Lijphart, Introduction, in PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 233, at 8. The potential
for presidents and prime ministers of opposing parties has been called the "Achilles heel of
the 1958 constitution." LESLIE DERFLER, PRESIDENT AND PARLIAMENT: A SHORT HISTORY OF
TH FRENCH PRESIDENCY 213 (1983).
236 Arguably, the period immediately following the 1981 election of Socialist Francois
Mitterrand could be counted as another period of divided party control of government,
since the Parliament at the time was dominated by a center-right opposition. However,
Mitterrand quickly dissolved the National Assembly and called for new elections which
produced a Socialist majority.
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could make binding international commitments. 2 37 The Socialists
won back the National Assembly after two years of cohabitation, only to
lose it again to the conservatives in March 1993. Conservative
Edouard Balladur is thus the head of the government for the last two
years of Mitterrand's current term. Thus, France today exemplifies
what the U.S. might be like if, in the absence of the Incompatibility
Clause, an American President were forced to share the executive
power with his congressional-cabinet members. A figurehead Presi-
dent presides over a parliamentary regime in which most real power is
exercised by a Prime Minister and Parliament in the hands of the op-
position party
2 3 8
Skeptics might say, of course, that our Constitution allows for di-
vided party control of the Presidency and of Congress, and, indeed,
this condition has existed more often than not since 1945.239 But,
while divided government is not without its problems, 240 it cannot be
equated with the radical fusing of the legislative and executive power
that would ensue in the absence of the Incompatibility Clause. In that
situation, we would trade gridlock for congressional control of the
Cabinet and the government itself.
237 This evaluation is borne out by the impressions ofjournalists at the time. See, e.g.,
David Housego, Mitterrand to Stress French Independence on Soviet Trip, FIN. TIMES, July 7, 1986,
at 2 (Mitterrand's visit to the Soviet Union "has less weight than Mr. Mitterrand's earlier
trip to Moscow in 1984. . . because 'cohabitation' has limited the powers of the French
President to negotiate .... [H] e does not have the power to make trade commitments that
would bind the administration of Mr. Jacques Chirac.").
238 This analogy to the French system is not perfect. The French Constitution does
contain an incompatibility clause requiring that those who are appointed to ministerial
office resign their seats in Parliament. Fr. Const. art. XXIII, reprinted in 6 CoNsTrrurIoNs
OF THE COuNRsIES OF THE WORLD (Constitution du 4 Octobre 1958) (Blaustein and Flanz,
ed. 1971). Interestingly, this reform was instituted by De Gaulle in an effort to secure the
loyalty of his ministers. MAURICE LARIN, FRANCE SINCE THE POPULAR FRONT: GOVERNMENT
AND PEOPLE, 1936-1986 284-85 (1988). Nonetheless, it is the potential for a divided execu-
tive, through the office of the Prime Minister, that makes the French situation analogous to
the government we would have in the absence of the Incompatibility Clause. Although our
Constitution vests the executive power in one individual, who is at the same time head of
state and head of the government, the presence of M.C.s in the Cabinet would have effec-
tively divided the executive powers of the Presidency. Perhaps, although not necessarily,
this would have reduced the American President's powers, rendering the actual scope of
such presidential powers much closer to those of the figure-head Presidents of other West-
ern democracies.
239 Between 1946 and 1992, Congress and the Presidency have been controlled by dif-
ferent political parties 67% of the time, or 30 out of 45 years. James A. Thurber, Representa-
tion, Accountability, and Efficiency in Divided Party Control of Government, 24 PS: POL. SC. &
POL. 653, 653 (1991). In contrast, between 1897 and 1945 divided party control of govern-
ment occurred only 12% of the time. Id. But see David Menefee-Libey, Divided Government
as Scapegoal 24 PS: POL. Sc. & POL. 643, 643 (1991) (arguing that the contrast between
pre- and post- World War II statistics is less sharp if one defines "divided government" to
include periods in which a liberal President faced a conservative bipartisan coalition).
240 See infra notes 268-87 and accompanying text.
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There is a reason why the Framers provided for separate elections
of the President and Congress. That reason was to prevent the fusion
of the divided powers of government by ensuring "that the executive
should be independent for his continuance in office on all but the
people themselves." 241 The Framers' constitutional system as it works
today creates three different and independent electoral constituen-
cies: the President's (and Vice President's) national constituency,
each Senator's constituency of one state, and each Representative's
constituency of one of the 435 congressional districts. The net result
of this system, taken together with staggered four-year, six-year, and
two-year fixed terms, is to create a complex and highly sophisticated
method for sampling the national will of the American People. This
system would be substantially defeated if the President's Cabinet, and
three thousand or so political appointees, reported to Congress rather
than to the President. Under such a regime, the President's proactive
national voice would be totally submerged, and we would have a gov-
ernment of congressional committee chairs. Such a government
would be too localist in orientation, and far too much federal money
and attention would be lavished on the states and districts of the lucky
M.C.s who happened to be Cabinet secretaries at any given time.
242
We are spared all of this because the Incompatibility Clause vitally
protects the presidential independence created by the electoral sys-
tem. Thus, although the Framers may have envisioned that the In-
compatibility Clause would serve as a means to restrain presidential
power, ironically the Clause in practice has actually strengthened the
President by making him independent of control by congressional
and localist influences.
241 THE FEDERALIST No. 68, supra note 1, at 413 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton also
noted that the mode of electing the President was the only part of the Constitution not
condemned by its Anti-Federalist opponents. Id. at 411 ("The mode of appointment of the
Chief Magistrate of the United States is almost the only part of the system, of any conse-
quence, which has escaped without severe censure.").
242 As Madison explained more generally:
In order to lay a due foundation for that separate and distinct exercise of
the different powers of government, which to a certain extent is admitted
on all hands to be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that
each department should have a will of its own; and consequently should be
so constituted that the members of each should have as little agency as
possible in the appointment of the members of the others. Were this prin-
ciple rigorously adhered to, it would require that all the appointments for
the supreme executive, legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be
drawn from the same fountain of authority, the people, through channels
having no communication whatever with one another.
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 321 (James Madison).
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2. Reinforcing the Separation of Powers
The most striking, and to some the most troubling,243 actual ef-
fect of the Incompatibility Clause on the American political system
over the last two hundred years is that the Clause has became one of
the major constitutional roadblocks to the emergence in this country
of a British-style parliamentary regime. Because the Clause bars M.C.s
from holding office, it stops the Department Secretaries from formu-
lating government policy and later proposing and defending the gov-
ernment's programs in Congress, as do the British Ministers in the
House of Commons. In short, the Incompatibility Clause has kept
Cabinet government out of the United States.
Of course, the Clause is not the only constitutional impediment
to the development of an American parliamentary regime. Indeed, it
is the election of the President independently of Congress, and his
ability to retain office even when he does not command the confi-
dence of the legislature, that are commonly cited as defining charac-
teristics of American Presidential government. 244 Nonetheless, as
argued above, were it not for the Incompatibility Clause, the majority
party in Congress might very well pressure its way into the President's
Cabinet, thereby controlling the "government," if not the presidency
itself.245 It is this institutional convergence of the legislative and exec-
utive offices of government that is usually thought to be a key attribute
of parliamentary government; and it is by preventing this "nearly com-
plete fusion of the executive and legislative powers"246 that the Incom-
patibility Clause plays a vital role in securing our constitutional system
of separated powers.
Yet, although separation of powers is an obvious and inevitable
result of a constitutional command that bars M.C.s from the Presi-
dent's cabinet, the records of the Federal Convention do not show any
awareness by the Framers that adoption of the Incompatibility Clause
was going to have the effect of securing the separation of powers. The
243 For works criticizing the Incompatibility Clause for its relationship to the separa-
tion-of-powers, see works cited infra note 267.
244 See, e.g., Samuel Beer, The British Experienc4 in REFORMING AMERICAN GOVERNMENT:
THE BICENTENNIAL PAPERS OF THE COMMITrEE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM 215-16
(Donald L. Robinson ed., 1985) [hereinafter REFORMING]; William B. Gwyn, The Separation
of Powers and Modern Forms of Democratic Government, in SEPARATION OF POWERS-DoES IT
STILL WORK? 65, 75 (Robert A. Goldwin & Art Kaufman eds., 1986) [hereinafter SEPARA-
TION OF PoWERS]; Lijphardt, Introduction, in PARLIAMENTARY, supra note 233, at 1, 2-5; Doug-
las Verney, Parliamentay Government and Presidential Government, in PARLIAMENTARY, supra
note 233, at 31, 41, 43. In Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden, ministers
are prohibited from serving in Parliament. However, because ministers are able to partici-
pate in debate and are deemed ultimately accountable to the parliament, political scien-
tists classify these governments as parliamentary. Verney, supra, at 35-36.
245 See supra notes 230-42 and accompanying text.
246 WALTER BAGEHOT, THE ENGLISH CONsTrrUTION 201 (1928).
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delegates repeatedly said that controlling corruption was the purpose
of the Incompatibility Clause,247 and although a few delegates were
aware that inclusion of such a clause would affect the balance of
power between Congress and the executive, 248 the debates on incom-
patibility do not reveal a self-conscious attempt on the part of the
Framers to set in motion a radical departure from the British system
of parliamentary government.
We cannot fault the Framers for their failure to recognize that
their inclusion of the Incompatibility Clause in the Constitution
would result in a dramatically different form of democracy in America
than in Great Britain. Although their discussion of the Clause un-
doubtedly focused more on controlling "corruption and the low arts
of intrigue"249 than on structural concerns, this was not due to a lack
of insight into the workings of the English Constitution. Rather, the
Framers were simply unaware of the shape that British government
would later take. As Margaret Banks reminds us, "British government
in the eighteenth century was not what it is today. Some of the main
characteristics of British government in the twentieth century were
not fully developed or had not become apparent at the time the
American Constitution was drafted."250 Indeed, another of the many
ironies surrounding the Incompatibility Clause is that if the Framers
had given serious thought to the structural consequences of the
Clause, the state of English government in the eighteenth century
might well have cautioned them that to include an Incompatibility
Clause in the Constitution would actually undermine the system of
checks and balances and separated powers!
247 See supra section IIA.3.
248 Only one speaker alluded to the separation of powers during the debates over the
Incompatibility Clause, and even then the reference was made secondary to the concerns
over corruption. In response to Madison's suggestion to exclude legislators only from
those offices that "should be established, or the emoluments thereof, augmented" during
their service in Congress, see 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 386 (June 23, 1787), Elbridge
Gerry remarked:
At the beginning of the war we possessed more than Roman virtue.... [Yet
now w]e have more land and stock-jobbers than any place on earth. It ap-
pears to me, that we have constantly endeavored to keep distinct the three
great branches of government; but if we agree to this motion, it must be
destroyed by admitting the legislators to share in the executive, or to be too
much influenced by the executive, in looking up to him for offices.
Id. at 393.
Mr. Gerry's explanation of the separation-of-powers concerns apparently made little
impression on his fellow delegates, for Madison continued to press for his proposal to
decrease the restrictions on joint office holding, and none of the other delegates again
referred to the separation-of-powers. Slonim, supra note 14, at 400.
249 CLINTON ROSSITER, THE AMEiCAN PRESInENCy 58 (1956) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
250 Banks, supra note 23, at 15.
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It is often not appreciated 251 that, at the time of the drafting of
the American Constitution, Great Britain's system of cabinet govern-
ment and collective ministerial responsibility was still in its embryonic
stage and bore only a passing resemblance to the system that is in
place today.2 52 While it is true that toward the end of the eighteenth-
century there were signs that true cabinet government was on the
way,255 the British parliamentary system did not emerge in its full
glory until after the Reform Act of 1832.254 Thus, the British govern-
ment with which the Framers would have been familiar differed
greatly from the parliamentary democracy we think of today.25 5 As we
know from the writings of Blackstone, Hume, and Montesquieu,25 6
the eighteenth-century English government was divided between
King, Lords, and Commons, and the powers of each institution were
checked and balanced by the powers of the other two.25 7 Admiration
both for the work of these political philosophers and, in varying de-
grees for the British Constitution,258 encouraged the Framers to incor-
porate both separated powers and checks and balances into the
251 Holdsworth explains why the fact of the later development of the British cabinet
system is often disregarded:
In the eighteenth century a cabinet existed; and because the nineteenth
century constitutional lawyers and historians saw that it existed, they too
readily assumed that it held a position somewhat like that held by the mod-
em cabinet. ... [But] the process by which the cabinet became the principal
link between the executive and the legislature... was not completed until
after the Reform Act of 1832.
Holdsworth, supra note 126, at 163-64.
252 For most of the eighteenth century, the British Cabinet was, at best, a loose link
between the Crown and Parliament. Id. at 170. Although no government policy could
proceed without the support of Parliament, and Parliament could either force the resigna-
tion of a particular minister or demand the appointment of a favorite son, id. at 169,
neither the resignation of a particular minister nor the defeat of an especially important
government program could cause the resignation of the entire Cabinet, the way it would
today, id. at 170. As King George told Lord North in 1799, the ministers must "not mind
being now and then in a Minority." 4JOHN FORTESCUE, THE PAPERS OF GEORGE THE THIRD
275, quoted in id. at 170.
253 Id. at 176.
254 Id. at 164.
255 Cf SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, PoPUt.R GOVERNMENT 253, quoted in id. at 180 n.58
("The Constitution of the United States is a modified version of the British Constitution;
but the British Constitution which served as its original was that which was in existence
between 1760 and 1787.").
256 See, e.g., 1 BLACSTONE, supra note 127, at 50; Hume, supra note 125, at 119-20;
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRrr OF THE LAws 156-66 (Anne M. Cohler et al. trans. & eds., 1989).
257 Admittedly, this somewhat oversimplifies these writers' views of the English Consti-
tution. Montesquieu, for example, exaggerated the degree to which the powers of the
English government were separated. See McDONALD, supra note 44, at 82. For a summary
of the differences between these three men's visions of the English Constitution, see id. at
210-12.
258 Alexander Hamilton, for example, thought the British Constitution "was the best in
the world: and.., he doubted much whether anything short of it would do in America." 1
RECORDS, supra note 9, at 288 (June 18, 1787).
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American Constitution.2 59 Yet, in the eighteenth century, the Crown's
patronage power was the vital counterbalance and "check" to parlia-
mentary sovereignty that kept the "absolutely command[ing] '260
power of the Commons from "reduc [ing] both the king and the House
of Lords to insignificance."261 As Hume observed, "[w] e may ... give
to this influence what name we please; we may call it by the invidious
appellations of corruption and dependence; but some degree and some
kind of it are inseparable from the very nature of the constitution, and
necessary to the preservation of our mixed government.1262
Thus, in eighteenth-century England, the system of influence was
seen as vital to preserving the checks and balances of the British Con-
stitution. To eliminate the system would have meant removing the
one force that prevented the accumulation of all governmental power
in the hands of the legislature, which the Framers believed to be the
greatest threat to liberty.2 63 Therefore, yet another irony surrounding
the Incompatibility Clause is that by focusing on the problem of cor-
ruption without giving serious regard to the structural consequences
of their actions, the Framers wound up securing the new American
system of a separation of powers when all the contemporary signs
would have told them that the opposite would ensue.
III
NORMATIVE DISCUSSION: ASSESSING THE COSTS AND
BENEFrrS OF THE INCOMPATIBILr[Y CLAUSE
In the midst of the debate over incompatibility, James Madison
admonished his fellow delegates not to be too hasty in forming their
judgments regarding the merits of the Clause. "The question," he
counseled, "[ils not to be viewed on one side only. The advantages
[and] disadvantages on both ought to be fairly compared."264 Heed-
ing Madison's advice, this Part assesses the costs and benefits we have
incurred as a result of the Framers' decision to include the Incompati-
bility Clause in our Constitution. Section A sets forth the major criti-
cisms of the Clause as advanced by the Committee on the
Constitutional System (CCS), a reform group founded by former
White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler that advocates the Clause's repeal.
259 McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 276.
260 Hume, supra note 125, at 120.
261 Holdsworth, supra note 126, at 166. See also McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 83.
262 Hume, supra note 125, at 120-21.
263 It was a recognition of the essential role that the system of influence played in
maintaining the division among the three powers of the English government, and espe-
cially in preventing the legislative power from consuming the powers of the other two, that
caused three Federalists to speak out against the inclusion of an Incompatibility Clause in
the Constitution. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
264 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 388 (June 23, 1787).
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Section B then rebuts the CCS critique by showing that repeal of the
Clause will not produce the benefits predicted by CCS. Finally, Sec-
tion C points out several additional very serious costs that would be
incurred if the Incompatibility Clause were repealed.
A. The Case Against the Incompatibility Clause
Virtually the only mention of the Incompatibility Clause in the
modern legal academic literature has come from a reform group
known as the Committee on the Constitutional System (CCS),265
which is headed jointly by: Senator Nancy Landon Kassebaum, (R-
Kan.); C. Douglas Dillon, former Secretary of the Treasury; and, until
recently, Lloyd Cutler, White House Counsel to Presidents Jimmy
Carter and Bill Clinton.266 These noted lawyers, scholars, and public
officials have proposed that the U.S. adopt a constitutional amend-
ment repealing the Incompatibility Clause, thereby freeing Members
of Congress to serve in the President's Cabinet and other high execu-
tive posts. 267 They claim that the President's inability to have his Cabi-
net secretaries serve simultaneously as M.C.s leads to distrust between
the executive and legislative departments and causes confrontation,
stalemate, and gridlock. Our leaders are thus unable "to propose, leg-
islate, and administer a balanced program for governing."268 When
government is gridlocked, the parliamentary reformers assert,
265 . But see Sargentich, supra note 16, at 707-38 (providing a superb general defense of
the American system against Cutler's critique).
266 This Article will refer jointly to this group, along with others who would advocate
repeal of the Incompatibility Clause, as the "parliamentary reformers."
267 The parliamentary reformers' proposals take several different forms. For example,
Donald Robinson advocates eliminating the Incompatibility Clause as part of a larger pack-
age for constitutional reform. See Donald L. Robinson, The Renewal of American Constitution-
alism, in SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 244, at 38, 54. Lloyd Cutler has advanced,
though not specifically endorsed, a constitutional amendment that would either permit or
require the President to fill 50% of his Cabinet with members of his party in Congress. See
Lloyd N. Cutler, To Form a Governmen in SEPARATION OF POWERS, supra note 244, at 1, 13-
14. Henry Reuss's proposal would grant Congress the power to designate not more than
fifty offices in the executive department that could be filled by Members of Congress who
would retain their seats in the legislature. The President would then submit a slate of
candidates for these offices to the House of Representatives, which would have to approve
this slate by a simple majority. After gaining House approval, the President would still
require the advice and consent of the Senate to appoint his slate. See Henry Reuss, Legisla-
tors in the Executive Branch [A Proposed Constitutional Amendment] in REFORMING, supra
note 244, at 182-83. Yet another CCS proposal would authorize Congress to designate not
fewer than 25 and not more than 50 executive offices that could be filled by active mem-
bers of Congress. This proposal would require that the President appoint not fewer than 4
and not more than 25 members of Congress to those offices. See id, at 183-84. For com-
mentary on these last two proposals, seeJAMEs L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTrUTONAL REFORM AND
ErFrcrivE GOVERNMENT 168-77 (1986).
268 Cutler, supra note 267, at 1. Such criticisms are by no means new. For example, in
1896 James Bryce criticized the "defects in the structure and working of Congress, and in
its relations to the executive branch" including "[t]he discontinuity of Congressional pol-
icy," "[tihe want of opportunities for the executive to influence the legislature," and "[t]he
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"chronic budget deficits and growing national debt, an unfavorable
balance of trade, conflicting diplomatic efforts, decaying urban areas,
porous borders, and a host of other problems seem to mock the ca-
pacities of our political system."26
9
Of course, not even the most ardent foe of the Incompatibility
Clause claims that the Clause is solely to blame for this perceived pre-
dicament. Indeed, the parliamentary reform literature typically lists
the proposal to gut the Clause as just one item on a whole menu of
constitutional amendments aimed at narrowing the gulf between the
legislative and executive departments.2 70 While the parliamentary re-
formers disagree as to whether these proposals should be adopted as a
package, 271 they all make their case against the Incompatibility Clause
as part of a general critique of the separation between Congress's leg-
frequency of disputes between three coordinate powers." JAMES BRYCE, THE AMERICAN
COMMONvEALTH 216 (6th prig. 1956).
269 Donald L. Robinson, Preface, in REFORMING, supra note 244, at xiv.
270 For example, in addition to repealing the Incompatibility Clause, Donald Robinson
advocates the following package of reforms: 1) Abolishing the separate House of Repre-
sentatives and Senate; 2) Arranging representation in the unicameral legislature such that
each state would be guaranteed two seats, with additional seats assigned in proportion to
population; 3) Electing the President and all members of Congress at the same time, for a
concurrent fixed term, with no barriers on their reelection; 4) Providing both the legisla-
ture and the executive with the ability to call new elections in the event of stalemate; 5)
Establishing a National Council of "about one hundred notable persons, who would elect
one of their number to serve as chief of state, to issue the call for elections, and to superin-
tend their conduct." This council might also be empowered to review certain legislation,
to exercise a suspensive veto, and to provide leadership in times of national crises. Robin-
son, supra note 267, at 54.
Other CCS reformers offer variations on Robinson's themes. For example, Cutler sug-
gests giving the President the power to call new congressional elections, but requiring that
he not exercise this power more than once during his term of office. Cutler, supra note
267, at 14. Other ideas include tying the electoral fortunes of the executive department
and Congress by requiring the electorate to vote for the President, Vice President, and
their representative in the House on a team ticket, id. at 13, and lengthening the Repre-
sentatives' term of office to four years to coincide with the President's. Id. Another fre-
quently discussed proposal is a single six-year presidential term. Id. at 14-15.
271 Some, such as former Congressman Henry Reuss and, apparently, Lloyd Cutler,
argue that because large scale constitutional reform is unlikely to occur, we should focus
our energies on "modest" changes that would move us in the direction of parliamentary
government. See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 267, at 13; Lloyd N. Cutler, Party Government Under
the Constitution, in REFoRMING, supra note 244, at 93, 100-07. Although these "incremental"
reformers suggest a number of proposals, at least some would apparently be comfortable
with the adoption of an isolated constitutional amendment repealing the Incompatibility
Clause, which would "do what needs to be done, and no more." Henry Reuss, To Encourage
Cooperation, in REFORMING, supra note 244, at 155, 156. Others, such as Donald Robinson,
reject the notion that it is possible to correct any perceived defect in the constitutional
system by tinkering with a single clause. Robinson argues that because the Constitution is
an "organic whole," it is impossible to alter one clause or provision without affecting the
entire system. Robinson, supra note 267, at 53. The reformers in this camp would, there-
fore, urge the repeal of the Incompatibility Clause only as part of a larger package of
constitutional reforms. For Robinson's proposed package of reforms, see supra note 270.
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islative power and the President's executive power. The discussion
that follows sets out their case.
As the parliamentary reformers see it, the fundamental problem
with the U.S. government is that our two-hundred year old Constitu-
tion is a relic of a bygone era, incapable of keeping up with the de-
mands of an increasingly complex society that needs more and bigger
government.272 The Framers designed our Constitution under the
misimpression that the national government was to have a limited
number of concerns-matters of foreign relations, national defense,
and the regulation of commerce (narrowly defined).273 The relatively
narrow scope of the national government's jurisdiction, combined
with the more leisurely pace of the day, allowed the Framers the lux-
ury of dividing and checking the powers of government in the hope of
preventing tyranny and encouraging deliberation.274 However, the
parliamentary reformers claim, in today's "welfare-garrison state," the
separation of powers is a luxury we can no longer afford.275 "A gov-
ernment is an organism with work to do," and our system of separated
powers renders the government unfit "to perform the tasks we assign
it."276
The parliamentary reformers attribute our institutional paralysis
and gridlock to two key flaws in the constitutional system. First, they
argue that by allowing the executive department and Congress to be
controlled by different political parties, the Constitution creates the
possibility that partisan antagonism will forestall government action.
This problem is then compounded, in their view, by the Constitution's
failure to give the President any direct way to influence the legislature
to pass his programs. Under this scenario, the American people elect
Presidents because they like their policy proposals.2 77 But, because
there is no overlap of personnel and only the weakest ties of party
loyalty, it is very hard for the President to get Congress to pass his
272 Donald Robinson likens the Constitution to "[a] horse ... fit to pull a carriage, but
[not to] take a man to the moon." Robinson, supra note 267, at 40.
273 Id.
274 Id. at 40-41; Cutler, supra note 267, at 5. Any argument that the Framers might
have thought that separation of powers and checks and balances was a luxury unique to a
national government of enumerated powers fails, however, when one considers that the
state governments of general jurisdiction all emulate the Constitution's system of separated
powers and checks and balances. See NEVINS, supra note 133, at 196-205. The parliamen-
tary reformers do not address this point.
275 Robinson, supra note 267, at 40-41. As Lloyd Cutler asserts,"[t]he separation of
powers between the legislative and executive branches, whatever its merits in 1793, has
become a structure that almost guarantees stalemate today." Cutler, supra note 267, at 2.
276 Robinson, supra note 267, at 40. As Donald Robinson puts it, "[a] government that
might have to decide in minutes whether to return nuclear fire must be structured differ-
ently from one that did not learn for several weeks whether its envoys have been able to
buy the Louisiana territory." Id. at 41.
277 Cutler, supra note 267, at 12.
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popular programs into law.2 78 Moreover, once the President turns
over his proposals to Congress, he has no way of overseeing or control-
ling their often tortuous path through the legislative process. As a
result "[a] ny part of the [P] resident's legislative record may be defeated
or amended into [something] entirely different [and] the legislative
record of any presidency may bear little resemblance to the overall
program the President wanted to carry out."279 In sum, the Chief Ex-
ecutive, whom the public expects to govern, lacks the constitutional
power to carry out his popular mandate.
280
As one remedy for these alleged defects in our constitutional sys-
tem, the parliamentary reformers suggest we eliminate the Incompati-
bility Clause, which they believe creates an unnecessary distance
between Congress and the executive. Repeal of the Clause would "en-
courage[ ] comity between the branches by the carrot of permitting
the [P]residentto appoint [M]embers of Congress to his [C]abinet."2' 1
According to the reformers, "[i] t would tend to increase the intimacy
between the executive and the legislature and add to their sense of
collective responsibility,"2 2 thus promoting "cooperation rather than
stalemate" in government.283 Giving the President "some of his own
people in the Congress" 2 8 4 should help him in his battle to overcome
congressional opposition.
Furthermore, the parliamentary reformers believe that the costs
to our system from such a change would be small. They acknowledge
that the Framers' purpose in adopting the Clause was to prevent the
President from corrupting the Congress with the lure of lucrative of-
fice.2 8 5 Yet, this constitutional bar has not been adequate to remedy
the anticipated evil, since Presidents have been able to side-step the
Incompatibility Clause by "offering administrative appointments to
[the legislators'] cronies."28 6 Because the Clause has largely failed in
its appointed constitutional task, the parliamentary reformers believe
that we would be wise to eliminate it, thereby "open [ing] the way for
able leaders in Congress to display and develop executive talents, and
... encourag[ing] the integration of legislative and administrative ap-
proaches to policy."287
278 For a discussion of the role of political parties in this context, see Steven G. Cala-
bresi, Political Parties as Mediating Institutions, 61 U. Cm. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994).
279 Cutler, supra note 267, at 3.
280 Id. at 16.
281 Robinson, supra note 267, at 55.
282 Cutler, supra note 267, at 14.
283 Reuss, supra note 271, at 155.
284 Lloyd N. Cutler, Some Reflections About Divided Government, 18 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
485, 491 (1988).





B. Rebutting the Attack: Why the Case Against the Clause Fails
on its Own Terms
The CCS critique of our national institutions is not an isolated
one, even though to date most Americans have shown no enthusiasm
for a British-style parliamentary cure. Overcoming government
gridlock was a big issue in the 1992 presidential and congressional
elections and one which an overwhelming number of voters said they
considered important.28s Certainly, no one wants to live under a Con-
stitution that is truly dysfunctional and incapable of serving the ends
for which it was designed.
Of course, the Framers did not want such a Constitution either.
Although the Framers wanted to set up institutions of government
that would protect the American people from arbitrary rule, they were
also aware of the need to create a government that could legislate
energetically for the common good.289 Thus, if, as the critics claim,
the Incompatibility Clause stops the government from living up to the
aspirations of the Constitution's Preamble, we should give serious, if
skeptical, consideration to the arguments for its repeal.
Happily, the parliamentary reformers turn out on closer analysis
to be dead wrong. Their proposals will not cure the ill complained of,
and their remedy would produce results worse than the disease.
290
1. The Fallacy That Governmental Efficiency Will Be Increased if
Divided Government is Eradicated
The parliamentary reformers' main attack on the Incompatibility
Clause is that it allows for "divided government,"291 which in turn cre-
288 Yearningfor Change Leads Clinton to Victory, Gannet News Service, Nov. 4, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, News Library, CURNEWS File.
289 Gwyn, supra note 244, at 66. Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist 26, described
the Constitution as the result of a search for "that happy mean which... combines the
energy of government with the security of private rights." THE FEDERALIST No. 26, supra
note 1, at 168. James Madison likewise spoke of the Framers' desire to construct a govern-
ment capable of acting in a "prompt and salutary" fashion. THE FEDERALIST No. 37, supra
note 1, at 226 ("Energy in government is essential to that security against external and
internal danger and to that prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the
very definition of good government."). See also McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 2-3 (Framers
understood the need for energetic government).
290 See generally Mark P. Petracca, Divided Government and the Risks of Constitutional Re-
form, 24 PS: POL. ScI. & POL. 634, 634-35 (1981). Petracca warns against proposals for
constitutional reform that are really "diagnostic mismatches," a term that he borrows from
Justice Stephen Breyer's analysis of the frequent lack of harmony between market
problems and regulatory solutions. See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITs REFORM
(1982).
291 By "divided government," we do not only mean divided party control of Congress
and the Presidency, which of course is made possible by the electoral system, not the In-
compatibility Clause. Rather, we mean divided party control of Congress and the Cabinet,
or the entity that, in fact, exercises the bulk of the "executive power." The Incompatibility
Clause is responsible for divided government of this kind. For a more detailed explanation
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ates partisan infighting, bickering, deadlock, and delay. The main
benefit of gutting the Clause, they claim, would be to increase the
efficiency of the national government.
Underlying this attack, of course, is a normative judgment that
more government is necessarily better than less. While it is not our
project in this Article to debate the merits of large versus small gov-
ernment, we would point out that the parliamentary reformers' judg-
ment is not universally shared.292 Furthermore, the parliamentary
reformers' perspectives are understandably influenced by their posi-
tions as legislators and government insiders. From the vantage point
of an insider, government "works" when it is taking care of the day-to-
day business of governing-that is, when it is passing legislation and
designing public policy. 293 Yet, for the governed, government may
"work" best when it works least.2 94 As Professor Petracca reminds us,
"[w] here you sit as an analyst will influence what you see and how you
interpret it."295
However, even accepting the parliamentary reformers' implicit
assumption that producing more legislation is necessarily a good to be
strived for, it is questionable whether repealing the Incompatibility
Clause would even further their end of producing more laws. Recent
empirical studies contradict the parliamentary reformers' intuitions
about the actual consequences of such divided government.
For example, in a thought-provoking 1991 study of the effects of
divided party control of the Presidency and Congress, Professor David
Mayhew examined the validity of two assertions commonly held out as
nearly axiomatic: 1) that "[m]ajor laws will pass more frequently
under unified party control than under divided control," and 2) that
"Congressional committees, acting as oversight bodies, will give more
trouble to administrations run by the opposite party than to those of
their own party," thus preventing the executive from going about the
of the Incompatibility Clause's role in producing divided government, see supra notes 226-
42 and accompanying text.
292 Professor Sundquist candidly acknowledges this difference of opinion: "The ques-
tion is whether one fears government and expects it to make mistakes most of the time-as
people thought in the 1780s-or whether one feels that, on the whole, the government
ought to be able to act on the assumption that it will usually act wisely and well .... " James
L. Sundquist, The Question is Clear, and Party Government is the Answer, 30 WM. & MAR L.
REv. 425, 428-29 (1989).
293 Petracca, supra note 290, at 636.
294 See Richard A. Epstein, In Praise of Divided Governmen 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 567, 567
(1990) ("The correct way to look at things is with the strong presumption that the more
legislation you have, the worse that government works."). Moreover, it is not necessarily
the case that the increased complexity of modem life means that we need more and bigger
government. To the contrary, it almost certainly means that we need less. See, e.g., F1UED-
RICH A. HAYEK, LAw, LEGISLATION, AND LIBERTY (3 vols. 1973-79); THOMAS SOWELL, KNOWL-
EDGE AND DECISIONS (1980).
295 Petracca, supra note 290, at 636.
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business of governing.2 96 Professor Mayhew's research found that
neither of these assumptions held true.
297
First, Professor Mayhew found that the incidence of high public-
ity oversight investigations did not vary significantly with divided or
unified party control of government.2 98 Although acknowledging the
prominence of the Watergate investigations, which took place under
divided party control, Professor Mayhew is quick to point out that the
investigations launched by Democratic Congresses against the Tru-
man administration were among the most politically damaging investi-
gations in this half-century. 299 Thus, Professor Mayhew rejects the
parliamentary reformers' thesis that divided government promotes
inefficiency by encouraging a "beat up on the other party's adminis-
tration" mentality in the Congress.300
Perhaps more importantly, Professor Mayhew found a compara-
ble paucity of evidence supporting the parliamentary reformers' claim
that "divided [government] . . .causes deadlock" and, hence, legisla-
tive inactivity.30' On the contrary; Professor Mayhew's survey of 267
major statutes enacted between 1947 and 1990 found a rough equiva-
lence in the amount of major legislation passed under divided and
unified party control of government.30 2 Although the tremendous
burst of lawmaking that occurred under PresidentJohnson's Great So-
ciety Congress of 1965-66 and the dearth of activity under President
Eisenhower's last Democratic Congress of 1959-60 conforms to the
parliamentary reformers' productive one-party government thesis, 30 3
one need only examine President Reagan's early legislative successes
with a Democratic-controlled House of Representatives or President
Carter's and President Clinton's failures despite comfortable Demo-
cratic majorities in both Houses30 4 to appreciate the limits of the cor-
296 David R. Mayhew, Divided Party Control Does It Make A Dfference, 24 PS: POL. ScI. &
POL. 637, 638 (1991) (emphasis omitted) [hereinafter Divided Party]. See generally DAVID R.
MAYHEW, DIVIDED WE GOVERN: PARTY CONTROL, LAWMAKING, AND INVESTIGATIONS, 1946-
1990 (1991) (discussing the phenomenon of divided party control in America).
297 Professor Mayhew acknowledges, however, that his evidence depends on numerous
individual judgments that could be disputed. He therefore tempers his conclusions, assert-
ing that the reformers' assumptions about the effects of divided government are "false-or
at least largely or probably false." Mayhew, Divided Party, supra note 296, at 638.
298 Id.
299 Id. (citing ANDREWJ. DUNBAR, THE TRUMAN SCANDALS AND THE POLMCS oF MORAL-
IT (1984)).
300 Mayhew, Divided Party, supra note 296, at 638.
301 Id.
302 Id. at 639.
303 The reformers often cite the ten years between the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s as
illustrating the proposition that divided government cannot govern. See generallyJAMEs L.
SUNDQUIST, POLITICS AND POLICY. THE EISENHOWER, KENNEDY AND JOHNSON YEARS (1968).
304 Franklin Roosevelt, between 1938 and 1941, and Lyndon Johnson, between 1967
and 1968, also experienced serious difficulties with Democratic-controlled Congresses.
And, despite Democratic majorities in both Houses, President Clinton was able to muster
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relation between party control and 'legislative action.30 5 Hence,
divided government does not appear to be the only culprit that is re-
sponsible for our government's failure to legislate as "energetically" as
the parliamentary reformers would like.
In fairness, of course, most members of the CCS advocate far
more fusion of the executive and legislative departments than would
be accomplished just by gutting the Incompatibility Clause. What they
fail to realize, however, is that such a reform would not cure divided
government but would make it worse. The reason for this is that repeal
of the Incompatibility Clause would weaken the President instead of
strengthening him, as the reformers seem to expect. At the same
time, the President would not be eliminated as a national official with
an independent electoral mandate. As a result, the CCS proposal
would give us a French-style constitutional regime under which we
would have traded in the possibility of divided government for the
likelihood of a divided executive. To prove that the CCS proposal
would do to America what De Gaulle did to France, we turn now to
explaining why elimination of the Incompatibility Clause would
weaken the Presidency.
2. Eliminating the Incompatibility Clause Will Weaken the
Presidency, Not Strengthen It
A key assumption underlying the CCS's case against the Incom-
patibility Clause is that the existence of the Clause weakens the Presi-
dency.3 0 6 In this respect at least, the CCS reformers agree with the
Framers of the Constitution. Presidents, after all, are presumably
elected, at least in part, on the basis of the public's agreement with
their platform-their proposals for government action. It is logical,
therefore, to believe that gridlock30 7 would be eliminated and the
only razor-thin majorities for his major initiatives during the first year of his term in office
and has encountered even more trouble during his second year in office.
305 Mayhew recounts a litany of Presidential successes and failures that bear no correla-
tion to the divided or unified state of the government:
Johnson succeeded memorably in 1964 thorough 1966 with a Congress of
his own party, but so did Reagan in 1981 despite having to deal with a
House of the opposite party. Truman's Fair Deal and Kennedy's New Fron-
tier largely failed as legislative enterprises, despite the availability of Con-
gresses of the same party. Carter's years proved a washout for his party's
lawmaking aspirations, despite sizable Democratic House and Senate major-
ities of 292-143 and 62-38 during 1977-78. On the only occasion since 1840
when a party took over the House, Senate, and presidency all at once-in
1952 when the Republicans did-that party turned out not to have much of
a program to enact.
Mayhew, Divided Party, supra note 296, at 639.
306 See, e.g., Sundquist, supra note 292, at 428.
307 Sundquist describes the antagonism between the President and Congress:
If the President sends a measure to Congress, the Congress has to reject it.
It cannot follow the President's leadership because he is not their leader.
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Presidency strengthened if only the President could be as powerful as
a Prime Minister, with his Cabinet secretaries whipping the legislature
into line.
30 8
Even the opponents of constitutional change have tended to ac-
cept the parliamentary reformers' assumption that presidential power
would necessarily increase if the Incompatibility Clause were elimi-
nated and have devoted their efforts to attacking the desirability of
greater presidential control under a constitutionally-unified govern-
ment, rather than questioning whether that result would indeed fol-
low.30 9 Thus, much of the literature tends to conflate the desirability
of constitutional reform with one's inclination toward a comparatively
strong or weak executive, with the executivists disparaging and the
congressionalists extolling the virtues of the Incompatibility Clause.
310
We think this is total nonsense. Everyone from the Framers to
the parliamentary reformers to the reformers' scholarly opponents
have misunderstood the effect that the Incompatibility Clause has on
presidential power and on the separation of powers. For reasons we
have explained above, the actual effect of the Incompatibility Clause is
to strengthen the President. Its repeal would weaken him without ac-
tually killing him off. The likely result would be a French-style hybrid
He is the opposition leader, the enemy that they have to defeat in the next
election. If they accept his leadership, they are building him up for reelec-
tion .... By the same token, the President must veto a congressional initia-
tive-reject it and send it back and condemn the Congress.
Id. at 429.
308 See Cutler, supra note 284, at 491; Cutler, supra note 267, at 13-14; Robinson, supra
note 267, at 54.
309 See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, The Question's Not Clear, But Party Government is Not the
Answer, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 411, 421 (1989) (argues Cutler's reforms would lead to
greater legislative deference to the President); Mark P. Petracca et al., Proposals for Constitu-
tional Reform: An Evaluation of the Committee on the Constitutional System, 20 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 503, 521 (1990).
Professor Petracca and his colleagues, for example, criticize the parliamentary reform-
ers' proposals by warning of the "aggrandizement of executive power" that would occur as
a result. Petracca et al., supra, at 521. In response, Professor Sundquist goes to painstaking
lengths to diffuse this concern. He points out the numerous ways in which Congress could
protect itself from an overbearing executive:
[W] ere the experiment to produce a tilt in favor of the executive... [Con-
gress] would press prospective appointees not to serve, the Senate would
refuse to confirm them or extract behavioral promises in the confirmation
process and, if they were confirmed then legislators would penalize and
ostracize them within the halls of Congress if they abused their [executive]
posts.
James L. Sundquist, Response to the Petracca-Bailey-Smith Evaluation of the Committee on the Con-
stitutional System, 20 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 533, 541 (1990). Yet, no one has raised the
possibility that precisely because Congress could exercise all this informal control over its
members, removing the Incompatibility Clause could make Congress too powerful!
310 SeeJAMES A. THURBER, Preface, in DIVIDED DEMOCRACY. COOPERATION AND CONFLICT
BETIEEN THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS at xi, xi-xii (James A. Thurber ed. 1991) [hereinaf-
ter DVIDED DEMOCRACY).
1106 [Vol. 79:1045
1994] SEPARATION OF PERSONNEL 1107
regime that alternated between presidential and parliamentary
phases, depending on electoral results. This does not seem to accom-
plish what the parliamentary reformers want: a U.S. President with
the power of a British Prime Minister.
The reformers are fond of reminding us that the cry for some
measure of parliamentary-type government, (to be produced by re-
peal of the Incompatibility Clause), has a long and distinguished pedi-
gree in this country.311 In this they are right, for no less prominent
figures than Justice Joseph Story312 and President Woodrow Wilson
3 13
311 See generally SuNDQuisT, supra note 267, at 40-74 (describing "[t ]wo centuries of con-
stitutional debate" over the continued validity of our system of separation of powers). It is
interesting to note in this regard that legislative-executive separation became considerably
less popular by the second half of the nineteenth century than it had been fifty years
before. Perhaps this occurred because of a growing awareness of and admiration for the
then-new system of full parliamentary government that had grown up in Britain. By the
1860s, parliamentarianism was so in vogue that the drafters of the Confederate Constitu-
tion chose not to include a legislative-executive incompatibility clause in their constitution.
This is striking since the Confederate Constitution is in some other ways similar to the pre-
Civil War U.S. Constitution of 1787.
312 Justice Story was one of the few constitutional commentators to take notice of the
Incompatibility Clause, and he was by no means enamored of the fact that the Clause
prohibits the President's Cabinet from sitting in Congress. "If corruption ever eats its way
silently into the vitals of this republic," he wrote, "it will be, because the people are unable
to bring responsibility home to the executive through his chosen ministers." 2 JOsEPH
STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 334 (Da Capo Press
1970).
InJustice Story's opinion, the Clause destroyed any hope of accountable government
in America. Because the Constitution bars Cabinet members from simultaneously serving
in Congress, the government is compelled to entrust its legislative proposals to other men,
"who are either imperfectly acquainted with the measures, or are indifferent to their suc-
cess or failure." Id. at 333-34. This imposition of a disconnected congressional middle-
man, Story thought, permitted the executive to escape "that open and public responsibility
for measures" which is the "greatest security and strength" of republican government. Id.
at 334.
Moreover, Story believed the Incompatibility Clause encouraged the President to cut
secret and dishonest deals with members of Congress. "[P] rivate intrigues, political combi-
nations, irresponsible recommendations, and all the blandishments of office, and all the
deadening weight of silent patronage" would become the President's tools for getting his
programs through Congress. Id.
Finally, Story thought that eliminating the Clause would have a positive effect on the
caliber of people the President would choose to fill executive offices. Because the Cabinet
members would be forced to participate in the work of the Legislature and would be re-
quired to defend aggressively the government's position in Congress, the President would
feel compelled to choose appointees "not from personal or party favourites, but from
statesmen of high public character, talents, experience, and elevated services .... At
present, gross incapacity may be concealed under official forms, and ignorance silently
escape by shifting the labours upon more intelligent subordinates in office." Id. at 335.
313 While still an undergraduate at Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson, borrowing
from Justice Story's critique of the Incompatibility Clause, wrote a paper arguing that in
order to have truly responsible government, not only should the President's Cabinet be
allowed in Congress, but the President should be required to choose his Cabinet from the
ranks of Congress, and to resign when the government lost the support of the legislature.
See WOODROW WILSON, CABINET GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES, in 1 THE PAPERS OF
WOODROW WILSON, 493, 497 (Arthur S. Link, ed., 1966) reprinted in 6 INT'L REv. 146
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have argued that removing this constitutional barrier between Con-
gress and the executive is essential to effective, accountable govern-
ment. Yet, what both the modern-day parliamentary reformers and
their critics have overlooked is that historically, support for parliamen-
tary government has not been confined to those who favor Presiden-
tial power. On the contrary, the parliamentary banner was raised in
the 1970s to counter the "imperial presidencies" of Lyndon Johnson
and Richard Nixon,3 14just as Justice Story had raised it in the 1830's
to counter the imperial presidency of "King" Andrew Jackson.
Overlooking this history, today's reformers maintain that repeal-
ing the Incompatibility Clause and allowing M.C.s to serve in the Cabi-
net would reduce the conflict that often exists between Congress and
the White House.315 The premise is that M.C.s would be less distrust-
ful of executive officers who were also "one of them" and would thus
be more likely to support the administration's program.3 16 Moreover,
the fact that these M.C.s would owe their executive offices to the Presi-
dent would increase his power vis-a-vis Congress, allowing him to ful-
fill his constitutional role as the initiator of legislation.
3 17
(1879). An excerpted version of this paper can be found in REFORMING, supra note 244, at
131-34. In short, Wilson was arguing for full-blown British-style parliamentary government,
a preference he would continue to express with varying degrees of enthusiasm throughout
his academic and political career. See WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT: A
STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 102, 284-85, 318 (15th ed. 1900); CORWIN, supra note 231, at
308-10.
314 Petracca et al., supra note 309, at 520 (noting that commentators such as Charles
Hardin and Richard Strout advocated the parliamentary model as a "perfect antidote" to
imperial presidencies). See generally CRu.ES HARDIN, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND ACCOUNTA-
BILITY. TOWARD A NEW CONSTITUTION (1974); Richard L. Strout, Parliamentarianism, THE
NEW REPUBLIC, Sept. 28, 1974, at 4.
315 See supra notes 266-87 and accompanying text.
316 Petracca et al., supra note 309, at 520-21. See also REFORMING, supra note 244, at 184
(analyzing the benefits of M.C.s in the executive branch); Cutler, supra note 267, at 13-14
(suggesting that M.C.s serving in the executive branch will "tend to increase the intimacy
between the executive and the legislature and add to their sense of collective
responsibility).
317 For a defense of the President's role as "Chief Legislator," seeJAMES L. SUNDQUIST,
THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 127-54 (1981). See also Sundquist, supra note
292, at 427. An interesting attack on the conventional vision of the President's role as the
initiator of legislation can be found in Philip C. Bobbitt, The Committee on the Constitutional
System Proposals: Coherence and Dominance 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 403 (1989).
The reformers posit additional benefits of removing the Incompatibility Clause includ-
ing the addition of a "'home town touch' to federal agencies now too often isolated in
Washington," an improvement in the quality of individuals attracted to the House of Rep-
resentatives, and an expansion in the President's choice of executive officials, since quali-
fied congressmen are now off limits for executive appointments. Reuss, supra note 271, at
155-56. We, however, disagree that these results would actually benefit government. First,
as explained in greater detail infra part III.C.l., adding a "home town" touch to govern-
ment agencies would greatly distort the equality of representation received by the Ameri-
can people, since not every citizen could be assured of having one of their congressional
representatives in the executive department. Second, although in the eighteenth century
the lure of executive appointments may have been necessary to attract the most qualified
[Vol. 79:10451108
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We do not, of course, agree that repeal of the Incompatibility
Clause would either add to the President's power or promote more
effective government. First, striking the Clause from the Constitution
would greatly limit the President's freedom to choose his own Cabi-
net. The parliamentary reformers' protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding,318 the truth is that permitting the President to nomi-
nate members of Congress to his Cabinet would be tantamount to forc-
ing him to make that choice.319 Recall that the parliamentary
reformers' asserted purpose for allowing Cabinet secretaries to serve
in Congress is to increase the President's ability to influence Congress
in order to pass his legislative agenda. Obviously, the people who are
the most influential with Congress are the congressional power-
brokers themselves. Not only would the President feel compelled to
choose his Cabinet from among these high ranking Members of Con-
gress, but a cantankerous Congress could virtually force his hand
either by threatening to withhold legislative support for his programs
unless the requisite nominations were made, or by refusing to confirm
his alternate appointments.
Not only would the repeal of the Incompatibility Clause strip the
President of power over appointments, but it would also impinge
upon another key executive prerogative-the removal power. The
President's ability to dismiss subordinates at will has long been a sub-
ject of bitter contention between the executive and legislative depart-
ments.320 A similar divisiveness has plagued the Justices of the U.S.
Supreme Court, whose opinions on this subject have been at best in-
coherent, and at worst inconsistent.321 What appears certain, how-
individuals to the House of Representatives, today that is no longer the case. Finally, the
President's choice of executive officials would expand only slightly if the Incompatibility
Clause were removed, since he is currently barred from appointing only those Members
who remain in Congress. This marginal gain in the President's ability to appoint congres-
sional insiders to offices must be balanced against the concomitant loss in his ability to
appoint individuals from the private sector that would likely ensue if M.C.s were allowed to
serve in the executive. For a discussion of this possibility, see infra notes 343-50 and accom-
panying text.
318 See Sundquist, supra note 309, at 540 ("The Committee on the Constitutional Sys-
tem did not advocate appointment of members of Congress to the presidential cabinet. It
only suggested that the constitutional prohibition against such appointment be removed,
to permit what it called 'an experiment that has considerable promise and little risk.' ").
However, several CCS proposals do require the President to appoint a certain number of
legislators to designated executive offices. See supra note 267 (describing these proposals).
319 This prospect runs entirely counter to our long-standing tradition respecting the
President's right to choose his own closest advisors. See supra note 229.
320 See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1166 (describing the three forms of the
theory of the unitary executive). See also Steven G. Calabresi, The Vesting Clauses as Power
Grants 88 Nw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna Bangalore
Prakash, The President's Power to Execute the Laws, 107 YALE LJ. (forthcoming 1994).
321 Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 2, at 1167. Supreme Court cases taking a formalist
approach, and thus allowing the President great control over his subordinates include:
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986) ("A direct congressional role in the removal of
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ever, is that "the power to remove an executive official [may not be]
completely stripped from the President, thus providing no means for
the President to ensure the 'faithful execution' of the laws."
322
Rather, the President must retain a core of control over executive of-
ficers sufficient "to assure that [each officer] is competently perform-
ing . . . her statutory responsibilities."3 23 Without the protection of
the Incompatibility Clause, however, the President's removal power
would, at best, exist in theory only. In reality, the President would be
politically powerless to dismiss a Cabinet officer whose executive loyalty
and performance was substandard, but whose congressional influence
was vital to the President's legislative agenda. The result would be
that Congress, by threatening to withhold legislative support, would
be able to accomplish indirectly, ends that the Constitution forbids it
to pursue directly.
Finally, there is little reason to believe that the President would
face less opposition to his programs, or would be able to form a more
coherent national policy agenda, by the mere fact of having his Cabi-
net secretaries sit in Congress. True, the President might be relieved
of his perennial grapple with Congress to obtain majority support for
his programs because the congressional leaders in his Cabinet pre-
sumably would be able to deliver the requisite votes. But the conver-
sion of pure congressional leaders into congressional Cabinet
members would only change the locus of the President's battle-
ground, it would not relieve him of the need to fight. The problem
with Congress, as the parliamentary reformers see it, is that it has be-
come an "amalgam of individual fiefdoms."3 24 Members view them-
selves as autonomous power centers, with their own legislative and
career-building agendas, not as team players. That is at least part of
the reason why Presidents often face heated opposition, even from
members of their own party.3 25 Thus, it seems naive in the extreme to
officers charged with the execution of the laws... is inconsistent with separation of pow-
ers."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 135 (1976) ("Congress could not ... divest the Presi-
dent of the power to remove an officer in the Executive Branch whom he was initially
authorized to appoint."); Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926) (The Constitution
prevents Congress from "draw[ing] to itself... the power to remove or the right to partici-
pate in the exercise of that power.").
Cases taking a functionalist approach include: Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686
(1988) (limiting the President's removal of the Independent Counsel to good cause);
Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 623-26 (1935) (limiting the Presi-
dent's power to remove Commissioners of the Federal Trade Commission).
322 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 692.
323 Id.
324 Gloria Borger, The Reform War, U.S. NEws & WoRLD ReP., Aug. 31, 1992, at 54.
325 For example, Republican Representative Tom Tauke of Iowa explained why even a
Congressman of the President's own party may not believe it in his interest to ensure the
President's legislative success. Speaking of George Bush's relationship with Congress,
Tauke explained:
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assume that putting M.C.s in the Cabinet would magically transform
them into presidential loyalists.3 26 Instead, they would likely pursue
their own agendas in both the Cabinet3 27 and the Congress, working
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue to advance their constituents' inter-
ests and their personal reputations as people who can get their way
with the President. The President would be unable to make a single
move without obtaining the requisite blessings from the high priests
of his "congressional Cabinet," which would look a lot like a roomful
of congressional committee chairs.3 28 The result would be a President
dominated by his Cabinet, rather than the president-friendly Congress
the parliamentary reformers claim they would like to see.3 2 9
If Bush is enormously successful, the power of Congress is diminished
somewhat. If you work from the assumption that there has been some shift
of power to Capitol Hill, Members and especially their staffs are not going
to be inclined to let all that power back down Pennsylvania Avenue just
because we have a new president.
Statement of Rep. Tom Tauke, quoted injames A. Thurber, Introduction: The Roots of Divided
Democraty, in DMDED DEMOCRACY, supra note 310, at 1-2.
326 Of course, strong parties could cure this tendency among legislators to pursue
their individual ends in Congress rather than acting as team players. The reformers also
argue for a revitalization of the party system. See e.g.,James L. Sundquist, Reversing the Decay
of the Party, in REFORMING, supra note 244, at 89, 89-92; Cutler, supra note 271, at 93-109.
However, most scholars are skeptical that strong parties will reappear on the American
political landscape any time soon. For example, James Q. Wilson notes that the existence
of strong parties depends on strong partisanship among the voters, which is absent in
American political culture, and the ability of party leaders to control access to the party
ballot, which would require the elimination of the primary system and a major overhaul of
our electoral system. James Q. Wilson, Political Parties and the Separation of Powers, in SEPARA-
TION OF POWERS, supra note 244, at 8, 35.
The heterogeneity of American interests may also be a major impediment to the re-
emergence of strong parties in this country. The twentieth century has witnessed the crum-
bling of America's once-strong party system due, in large part, to its inability to respond to
the needs of an increasingly diverse electorate. Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 470. Thus,
even if it were possible to strengthen party government, the result of such reform would
likely be either to leave many voters' interests effectively unrepresented, id., or to multiply
the number of parties. Wilson, supra, at 35. As James Sundquist, an advocate of stronger
parties, concedes:
[T]here are no ready means to achieving stronger party organizations. If
there were, they surely would have been adopted, for those who lead the
Democratic and Republican parties assuredly desire to preside over more
potent organizations. The barrier is that the American people have not
wanted stronger parties.
SUNDQUIST, supra note 267, at 177-78.
327 Even under our present system it is obvious that many members of presidential
administrations pursue a personal agenda, rather than the agenda of the President who
appointed them.
328 Cf. Thomas K. Finletter, Cabinet Members on the Floor of Congress, in REFORMING, supra
note 244, at 148 (noting the proposal would "subject the whole field of executive action to
the deliberative power of Congress").
329 Similar, although less serious, concerns are raised by the CCS proposal to allow
Cabinet members a non-voting voice in Congress. See REFORMING, supra note 244, at 185.
See also Harold Laski, In Defense of the Presidential System, in REFoRMING, supra note 244, at
135, 137-42 (arguing against this proposal).
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The parliamentary reformers' tendency to overestimate the ex-
pansion of presidential power that would occur in the absence of the
Incompatibility Clause probably results from too cursory a glance at
the great power and control wielded by the Prime Minister of Great
Britain, despite a system under which Parliament is nominally
supreme. 330 But, in Great Britain, the Prime Minister's constitutional
power derives not only from the presence of her Ministers in Parlia-
ment, but also from her ability to threaten new elections, and to name
candidates to stand for election under her party's banner. Thus, er-
ecting a true British-style parliamentary system in this country would
require a massive constitutional and political overhaul. In addition,
Great Britain's relative cultural homogeneity, its strong tradition of
party discipline, its stratified social and class hierarchies (which rein-
force party discipline), and its unitary governmental structure are all
markedly absent in America. Accordingly, any attempt to replicate
British-style parliamentary government in this country would likely
meet with disaster.331 To say the least, it is uncertain whether and to
330 Images of the powerful British Prime Minister pervade the reform literature. This
excerpt from a piece by Lloyd Cutler is illustrative:
In 1979 Margaret Thatcher won a majority of some thirty to forty in the
British Parliament. She had a very radical program, one that could make
fundamental changes in the economy, social fabric, and foreign policy of
the United Kingdom. There was room for legitimate doubt whether her
overall program would achieve its objectives and, even if it did, whether it
would prove popular enough to reelect her government at the next elec-
tion. There was not the slightest doubt, however, that she would be able to
legislate her entire program ....
... The [American] president and the [congressional] leaders have a few
sticks and carrots they can use to punish or reward, but nothing even ap-
proaching the power that a British government... can wield against any
errant member of the majority.
Cutler, supra note 267, at 4-5.
Professor Petracca and his colleagues go so far as to call the British Prime Minister an
"elective dictator." Petracca et al., supra note 309, at 521. Other scholars may not be as
extreme in their characterization of the office, but the general consensus is that the British
Prime Minister does exercise a great deal of power. See, e.g., DOUGLAS E. ASHFORD, POLICY
AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN (1981); SAMUEL H. BEER, BRITAIN AGAINST ITSELF (1982); A.H.
BIRCH, REPRESENTATIVE AND RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT (1964); RIC-LARD H.S. GROSSMAN,
THE MYTHS OF CABINET GOVERNMENT (1972); ANDREW HILL & ANTHONY WHICHELOw,
WHAT'S WRONG WITH PARLIAMENT? (1964); Is BRITAIN DYING? (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1979);
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CYCLES OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1985); Geoffrey Smith,
Parliamentary Change in Britain, in THE ROLE OF LEGISLATURES IN WESTERN DEMOCRACIES
(NormanJ. Ornstein ed. 1981); GEOFFREY SMITH & NELSON W. POLSBY, BRITISH GOVERN-
MENT AND ITS DIScONNTs (1981); Rodney Brazier, Reducing the Power of the Prime Minister,
44 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 453 (1991).
331 The cultural and political heterogeneity of the American people and the independ-
ent and competitive spirit of our decisionmaking institutions suggest that the strict party
discipline that is essential to British government would not be warmly embraced here. As
Redish and Cisar rightly point out,
[wie cannot transplant a governmental system designed to serve a small,
homogeneous nation into our vast, heterogeneous one. It is both inevita-
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what extent the Prime Minister's strength derives from any or all of
these nonimportable attributes of British political culture.
332
Moreover, Britain's parliamentary and executive institutions did
not always historically take the form that they now take today. Since
the drafting of our Constitution in 1787, the British government,
which has never had an effective incompatibility provision, 333 has un-
dergone a series of transformations-evolving from a monarchy char-
acterized by executive supremacy, to a classic parliamentary system
with two effective houses exerting true legislative supremacy, to to-
day's prime-ministerial government.33 4 Were we to repeal our incom-
patibility provision today, who is to say that American government
would instantly adopt the type of prime-ministerial control that it took
the British two-hundred years to develop?
Finally, the vision of late twentieth-century scholars is understand-
ably colored by the brilliant, "iron-fisted" prime ministership of Mar-
garet Thatcher, who vastly increased the strength of her office.
3 3 5
But, Thatcher is one of the great figures of the twentieth century, and
British Prime Ministers before and since have had grapples with their
Cabinets every bit as fierce as those American Presidents often face
with Congress. 336 Winston Churchill, for example, is reported to have
said to Franklin Roosevelt: 'You, Mr. President, are concerned to
what extent you can act without the approval of Congress. You don't
worry about your Cabinet. On the other hand, I never worry about
Parliament, but I continuously have to consult and have the support
of my cabinet."
331
In sum, if Congress is really as powerful as the parliamentary re-
formers contend that it is, it seems curious to assume it would sud-
denly relinquish its control over the government in the face of
constitutional reform. The most likely consequence of repeal of the
Incompatibility Clause would be a President imprisoned by his Cabi-
ble and desirable that the electorate in a system as large and diverse as ours
will hesitate to embrace a tightly unified system. They will require more
control over governmental power than a mere choice between two political
parties.
Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 469-70.
332 See Gwyn, supra note 244, at 84.
333 See supra note 39.
334 Robinson, supra note 269, at xiii.
335 See Brazier, supra note 330, at 455; F.F. Ridley, UsingPower to Keep Power:. The Need for
Constitutional Checks, 44 PARLIAMENTARY As'. 442 (1991). For an example of Thatcher's
influence on the reformers, see supra note 330.
336 Brazier, supra note 330, at 455 (John Major acting much more like the traditional
"chairman of colleagues").
337 Wartime conversation between Winston Churchill and Franklin Delano Roosevelt,
quoted in Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., Leave the Constitution Alone, in REFORMING, supra note
244, at 50, 51 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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net-a far cry from the outcome sought by the parliamentary
reformers.
C. The Costs of Eliminating the Incompatibility Clause
We saw in Part III.B. above that repeal of the Incompatibility
Clause will not have the beneficial effects that the parliamentary re-
formers claim it will. We turn now to a consideration of several addi-
tional, very serious costs that would result from the Clause's repeal.
Specifically, elimination of the Clause would have profound adverse
effects on our system of representation, on the efficiency of our gov-
ernment, on the ethics of its officers, and finally, on our distinctively
American notion of the separation of powers.
1. Disparate Representation
One criticism that scholars repeatedly levy against proposals to
move toward a parliamentary system is that we would sacrifice the rep-
resentative nature of our government.338 Without accompanying elec-
toral reforms, eliminating the Incompatibility Clause would not in
itself undermine the representative style of government that is charac-
teristic of American democracy. Repeal would, however, significantly
alter the equality of the representation that is received by the American
people.
Under our present Constitution, the people of the United States
are guaranteed roughly equal representation in the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the states are guaranteed equal representation in the
Senate.33 9 Neither the people nor the states have any claim to repre-
sentation in the Administration of the national government, save
through their election of a President, who is accountable to the entire
nation. Elimination of the Incompatibility Clause, however, would al-
low some of the People's representatives in Congress to fill high execu-
tive offices, thus greatly increasing these representatives' power to
influence national policy and to bring home governmental "goodies"
for their constituents. Because not every congressional district, or
even every state, could be assured of a spot in the President's Cabinet,
some people's representation would end up "counting" for much
more than others. While the parliamentary reformers rail against the
present inequities of pork-barrel politics, their proposal to eliminate
the Incompatibility Clause would seem only to exacerbate this aspect
of the problem.
338 Chemerinsky, supra note 309, at 416.
339 Of course, the Seventeenth Amendment greatly reduced the extent to which the
Senate is comprised of true representatives of the states themselves. Nonetheless, Senate
seats are still apportioned equally among the states.
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To better appreciate the distributional consequences of gutting
the Incompatibility Clause, we need only look at the shadow parlia-
mentary government that has grown up in Congress-i.e., the com-
mittee system. As discussed above, the Incompatibility Clause has
fenced this shadow government out of the executive Cabinet entirely.
The distributional consequences of the Committee system are, of
course, grotesque and well known. Some states and districts get enor-
mous amounts of federal money and others very little. Such distribu-
tional inequities are precisely what we could expect, nationwide, if the
Incompatibility Clause were repealed.
This illustrates yet another point about the costs of repeal, which
is the unsuitability of British-style parliamentarianism for a huge, het-
erogeneous federation of 260 million people that stretches across a
continent. It is not even clear that the British system deals adequately
with regional problems in Britain, as the Scots might attest, but it is
certainly unsuited for the United States. No Cabinet member in the
U.S. could ethically juggle the competing interests of her regional
congressional constituency with those of the President's national con-
stituency. If she favored her local region, the nation would be mis-
served and vice versa. Repeal of the Incompatibility Clause is thus an
invitation to conflicts of interest and to regional strife.3
40
2. Inefficient Administration
Aside from its damage to our representational equality, gutting
the Incompatibility Clause would also have adverse consequences for
the administration of our government. Although not explicitly dis-
cussed during the incompatibility debates at the Federal Convention,
it seems possible that an unstated motive for the Framers' decision to
make congressional service incompatible with offices in the executive
department was to promote the efficient operation of the national
government. The Framers must have known that the ability of a single
person to hold a multitude of lucrative offices, whose duties he could
not possibly perform, had contributed to the disastrous inefficiencies
of both the British and state colonial governments.341 Thus, the Fram-
ers sought to create a government in which "one person, one office"
340 These points are greatly elaborated upon in Steven G. Calabresi, Some Normative
Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 79 ARK. L. REv. (forthcoming 1994).
341 Colonial complaints regarding the evils of plural office holding often stressed the
office holders' obvious lack of intention to perform the duties of their offices. See, e.g.,
Boston CONTINENTAL J., Aug. 15, 1775; Boston INDEPENDENT CHRONICLE, Mar. 6, 1777,
quoted in WOOD, supra note 22, at 156 (Colonial Americans resented the "piling of 'a multi-
plicity of posts upon one man,' offices that were obviously only a source of wealth and
could never be properly exercised" and "were eager to prevent 'any one man-family-or
their connections, from engrossing many places of honor and profit.' "). See also supra
note 142 (citing examples of plural office-holding under the early state constitutions in
spite of express textual prohibitions on the practice).
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would be the constitutionally prescribed norm. This norm eliminates
severe ethical conflicts of interest that may exist when individuals hold
two jobs simultaneously. For precisely this reason, many state govern-
ments expressly bar dual office holding in their state constitutions.
Moreover, at the center of our ethics laws lies a prohibition against
holding many public and private jobs simultaneously. This bar, too,
has been with us for most of our history. Accordingly, it should come
as no surprise today that, for the most part, our national government
now conforms quite strictly to the one person, one office ideal.3 42
In addition, it should be noted that the Incompatibility Clause
has influenced the effective administration of our government in ways
the Framers probably could not have foreseen. Because the Clause
eliminates, or at least greatly reduces, any pressure the President
might feel to appoint Members of Congress to high executive office in
order to win their support,343 the President is able to choose officers
from those segments of society whose expertise is most needed by the
nation. Accordingly, every four or eight years we wait two and one-
half months to inaugurate a new President so he can build a whole
new Executive Department and Cabinet from scratch that is, on bal-
ance, reflective of the new President's national constituency. For
years, talented state officials, entrepreneurs, and academics have thus
been vaulted from nowhere to high national office. This unique
American phenomenon brings fresh blood into the halls of our gov-
ernment and prevents Italian or Japanese-style governance by worn-
out, recycled officials.
This point is illustrated by Jeffrey Cohen's two-hundred year sur-
vey of the Cabinet, which demonstrates how the Presidents' freedom
from congressional control has permitted the composition of the Cab-
At another point in the Convention, Benjamin Franklin had noted that it was "[t]he
vast number of such places... that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The
struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing
the Nation [and] distracting its councils... ." 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 82 (June 2,
1787). Franklin offered his remarks in support of his proposal that executive officers re-
ceive no salary for their services, but only reimbursement for their "necessary expenses." Id.
at 81. Thus, although not offered during the debates over the Incompatibility Clause,
Franklin's remarks were aimed at controlling the same vice.
342 See STANLEY ET AL., supra note 161, at 8. See also 5 U.S.C. § 5533 (1988 & Supp. IV
1992) (setting forth limitations and exceptions for "dual pay" to government employees
who hold more than one position).
343 One could argue that President Clinton's selection of five members of Congress to
serve in his Cabinet belies the assertion that the Incompatibility Clause decreases the pres-
sure on the President to choose cabinet members from the ranks of Congress. It is cer-
tainly true that these appointments were widely perceived as being made with an eye
toward improving presidential relations with the legislature. This may, however, be a phe-
nomenon that is most likely to occur when there has been a change in party control of the
White house, which has helped to bring a congressional "shadow government" into power.
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inet to change through time.344 Professor Cohen's study divides the
nation's history into five "party eras"345 and calculates the number of
Cabinet secretaries drawn from the general occupational categories of
government, law, business, and education during each of these
eras.346 From these data he concludes that since the nation's found-
ing, the Cabinet secretaries' occupational backgrounds have under-
gone a "fundamental transformation" tied to the nation's needs for
leaders possessing particular skills and expertise.
347
For example, Cohen hypothesizes that the disproportionate
number of Cabinet secretaries drawn from other areas of government
service during the years 1789-1860 is explainable in terms of the coun-
try's need for leaders with the political savvy and expertise necessary
to found a new nation.348 Similarly, after the Civil War, with the
"traumas of nation building ... concluded," the country entered a
new era based on economic expansion; and in order to secure leaders
with the requisite scientific and business training to fuel the country's
progressive engine, Presidents naturally began to recruit their secre-
taries from the private sector.349 Thus, it appears that, in ways proba-
bly unforeseen by the Framers, the Incompatibility Clause has
contributed to the efficient operation of our government.
350
3. Paving Over the Separation of Powers
Surely the most perilous consequence of eliminating the Incom-
patibility Clause from our Constitution would be the concomitant col-
lapsing of our American system of checks and balances and of
separation of powers. The separation of governmental powers in our
Constitution was rooted in the Framers' "virtual obsession" with the
concentration of political power.351 Well-versed in the writings of
political theorists such as Montesquieu and Locke,3 52 the Framers ap-
344 JEFFREY E. COHEN, THE POLITICS OF THE U.S. CABINET: REPRESENTATION IN THE EXEC-
UTIVE BRANCH, 1789-1984 (1988).
345 Cohen's breakdown of the five party eras is as follows: 1) The founding era, 1789-
1824; 2) The nation-building era, 1825-1860; 3) The transitional era, 1861-1896; 4) The
progressive era, 1897-1932; and 5) The era of big government, 1933-1984. Id. at 56.
346 In Cohen's typology, "Government" includes any government post and many party
positions. "Law" includes only membership in a private law firm. "Education" includes
teachers, administrators, clergy, and foundation executives. "Business" includes all other
jobs. Id. at 76.
347 Id. at 74.
348 Id.
349 Ia. at 74, 77.
350 But see supra notes 268-87 (setting out the parliamentary reformers' efficiency cri-
tique of the Incompatibility Clause which argues that the Clause causes government con-
flict and gridlock).
351 Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 463.
352 For examples of the delegates explicitly invoking Montesquieu, see 1 REcoRDs,
supra note 9, at 580 (July 11, 1787) (Edmund Randolph); id. at 485 (June 30, 1787) (James
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proached the crafting of a government with the assumption that the
accumulation of too much power in any one political institution was a
sure recipe for tyranny.353 Thus, they divided the powers of govern-
ment horizontally among three coequal departments and vertically be-
tween the federal and state governments.
Given the Framers' painstaking efforts to divide the powers of
government, the most profound and disturbing ramification of elimi-
nating the Incompatibility Clause would be its effect in uniting the
once-separated powers of the executive and legislative departments.
Although the parliamentary reformers are adamant that their propo-
sal would be only "experimental"35 4 and would not "alter [the separa-
tion of powers] in any fundamental way,"3 55 the foregoing discussion
of the likely effects on presidential-Cabinet relations makes plain both
the radical and lasting consequences that removing the Incompatibil-
ity Clause would have for our system of government.35 6 As we have
explained, eliminating the Incompatibility Clause would likely result
in a fusion of the executive and legislative powers, with the Congress-
filled Cabinet controlling the President's exercise of his constitution-
ally granted powers.3
57
The parliamentary reformers nonetheless argue that their pro-
posed reallocation of governmental powers is consistent with the pur-
pose of the original constitutional design. For example, Lloyd Cutler
correctly points out that although the Framers were "very, very careful
about preventing what they thought of as the rise of tyranny on the
part of any branch, they certainly were trying to design a system that
was more efficient than the system that had gone before" under the
Articles of Confederation.358 Cutler further reminds us, again cor-
Madison). See also THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 1, at 301 (James Madison) ("The
oracle who is always consulted and cited on [the separation of powers] is the celebrated
Montesquieu."). McDonald notes that the "contract and natural-rights theories of John
Locke were repeatedly iterated without reference to their source." McDoNALD, supra note
44, at 7.
353 Madison, for example, states in Federalist 47, "[tlhe accumulation of all powers, legis-
lative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very defini-
tion of tyranny." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, supra note 1, at 301. An excellent discussion of
both the pre-American intellectual thinking about separation of powers and the influence
of this doctrine on our national Constitution can be found in Redish & Cisar, supra note 2,
at 456-65.
354 Sundquist, supra note 309, at 540-41.
355 Id. at 534. "[The Committee on the Constitutional System does not 'challenge' the
principle of the separation of powers. It accepts the principle as necessary and desirable
for the United States. What minor modifications it was able to agree upon are designed
only to make the Constitutional system work better, not to alter it in any fundamental way."
Id. See also Cutler, supra note 267, at 13-14.
356 See supra notes 319-29 and accompanying text.
357 Id.
358 Cutler, supra note 284, at 486.
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rectly, that the Constitution is not a pristine exemplar of the separa-
tion of powers,3 59 but is a system of "separate branches exercising
shared powers."3 60 Therefore, Cutler asserts, "as is true of all shared
powers, the sharers of power have to figure out a way to cooperate in
exercising the shared powers or the result is deadlock."3 61 And of
course, one way in which the parliamentary reformers hope to en-
courage this cooperation is by repealing America's constitutional eth-
ics rule, the Incompatibility Clause.3 62
Yet, this reasoning is flawed. The "power sharing" of which Cut-
ler speaks arose from the Framers' recognition that the mere demar-
cation on paper of the boundaries of each department's power was
insufficient to prevent interdepartment encroachments.3 63 Thus, they
sought to enforce the primary allocation of governmental powers by
allowing each department a narrow and textually explicit inroad or
"check" on the powers granted primarily to the others.3 64 This type of
"selfish sharing" was viewed as necessary to secure and enforce the
separation of the departments. It was not intended to bridge the gap.
Madison explicitly clarified the Framers' purpose in Federalist 48. "un-
less these departments be so far connected and blended as to give
each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of separation
which the maxim requires, as essential to a free government, can
never in practice be duly maintained."3 65
Yet the parliamentary reformers would use the Constitution's nar-
rowly defined instances of shared powers to argue for a far, far greater
communion between the executive and Congress.3 66 Cutler's argu-
ment is based on an appeal to our ordinary sense of what it means to
359 See, e.g., Lloyd N. Cutler, Now is the Time forAll Good Men..., 30 WM. & MARY L. REv.
387, 387 (1989) (citing RicHARD NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: THE Po.rrcs OF LEADER.
SHIP 101 (1976)); Cutler, supra note 284, at 485.
360 Cutler, supra note 359, at 387.
361 Cutler, supra note 284, at 486.
362 Id. at 491.
363 The Framers had learned from their experiences under the state constitutions that
some sort of enforcement mechanism was essential to preventing the accumulation of gov-
ernmental power in the hands of any one department. See supra note 116 (discussing the
states' common practice of ignoring the recitation of the separation of powers in their
constitutions). As Madison counseled in Federalist 48, "experience assures us that the effi-
cacy of [merely marking the boundaries of power] has been greatly overrated." THE FEDER-
AIsT No. 48, supra note 1, at 308-09 (James Madison).
364 As explained in Federalist 51, the Constitution's "great security against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department consists in giving to those who
administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to
resist encroachments of the others.... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.
The interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of the place."
THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 321-22 (James Madison).
365 THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 1, at 308 (James Madison).
366 A rough analogy might be granting your neighbor an easement to use your drive-
way, and having her argue that this is evidence of your intent to give her your whole lot!
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"share." Sharing, as we all learned on the playground, is about coop-
eration and mutual sacrifice. We do not deny that this give-and-take is
essential to the passage of legislation, but this is not the sense in which
the Framers intended the three departments of government to share
power. Instead, the Constitution contemplates that the coequal de-
partments would share power in much the same fashion that the
United States and the former Soviet Union "shared" nuclear capabili-
ties during the Cold War. The "balance of power" created by the
knowledge of the other guy's strength was intended to keep each gov-
ernmental actor from overreaching.
3 67
Thus, it is apparent that the parliamentary reformers' proposal to
repeal the Incompatibility Clause cannot in good faith be justified as
an attempt to further the Framers' purposes in partially blending the
separated powers of government. Furthermore, while the parliamen-
tary reformers have attempted to make a case for the benefits of re-
moving the Incompatibility Clause,3 68 they have almost completely
ignored the very real costs, measured in terms of arbitrary govern-
ment and loss of liberty, that might flow from such a reform.3 69 The
parliamentary reformers themselves are continually raging about the
undue accretion of power in the hands of Congress.370 If one accepts
our prediction that a President dominated by the Congress and his
Cabinet would be the likely result of repealing the Incompatibility
Clause,371 it might be but a short step for the exercise of congressional
power to move from aggressive to arbitrary. And one need look no
further than the scandals of the Nixon administration to appreciate
the threat to basic freedoms that would likely ensue even if we are
367 We acknowledge that this analogy is far from perfect. The theory behind the nu-
clear balance of power was that the "shared" nuclear capabilities of the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. would keep both countries from ever exercising what would be an unspeakably
destructive force. Clearly, the checks that are built into our Constitution are nowhere near
as potent and are intended to be used, frequently if necessary. Still, the analogy is apt in
that it conveys the protective purpose for which the separated powers of government were
blended in our Constitution and the awful fear with which the Framers regarded the con-
centration of governmental power.
368 See supra notes 267-87 and accompanying text (discussing the reformers' thesis that
repealing the Incompatibility Clause would provide for more efficient government and
would strengthen the presidency).
369 Marty Redish and Elizabeth Cisar have noted that "[t]he most significant problem
with the modern attacks on separation of powers is that they completely ignore the very
real fears that led to the adoption of the system in the first place." Redish & Cisar, supra
note 2, at 471.
370 See, e.g., Cutler, supra note 284, at 489 (complaining about Congress's tendency to
micromanage foreign policy and the budget). The comments of former Attorney General
Dick Thornburgh regarding the rapidly increasing power of Congress are also worth not-
ing. Thornburgh is not in any way associated with the CCS. See Dick Thornburgh, The
Separation of Powers: An Exemplar of the Rule of Law, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 485, 487-93 (1990).
371 See supra notes 318-37 and accompanying text.
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wrong, and the President emerged supreme after the eradication of
incompatibility.
3 72
Thus, although it would be virtually impossible to construct an
empirical proof demonstrating that the Incompatibility Clause has in
fact played a critical role in preventing our decline into tyrannical gov-
ernment,373 the Framers' well-founded fear of centralized power,
combined with the nation's (fortunately limited) examples of danger-
ously strong government,37 4 should lead us to appreciate the utility of
the delicate and precarious balance the Framers created in distribut-
ing the powers of government. Before we embark on any mission to
tinker with the constitutional separation of powers, we would do well
to heed Edmund Burke's admonition to proceed with "infinite cau-
tion,"375 and insist at least that the parliamentary reformers meet the
heavy burden of "demonstrat[ing] either that the fears of undue con-
centrations of political power that caused the Framers to impose sepa-
ration of powers are unjustified, or that separation of powers is not an
important means of deterring those concentrations."
376
IV
THE UNWRITTEN INCOMPATIBILITY TRADITIONS: HISTORY,
PRACTICE, AND A NORMATIVE DEFENSE
We turn now to the second project of this Article, which is to
explore how the one person, one office principle embodied in the
Incompatibility Clause gradually expanded over time until it came to
include a number of unwritten incompatibility traditions. Section A
considers the tradition that has grown up of substantial federal judi-
cial-executive incompatibility. Section B then turns to the tradition,
now largely codified in state constitutional law, of federal-state incom-
patibility. Both sections begin with a part describing the texts and
relevant original debates. They then progress to a part describing our
actual practice over the last two hundred years, during which time
372 One might also point to the numerous threats to individual rights that occurred as
a result of President Lincoln's exercise of virtually unrestrained executive power. See Red-
ish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 473. Martin S. Sheffer has compiled a study of three of
America's most "prerogative" presidents, Lincoln, F.D.R., and Nixon, that is interesting
both for its discussion of the alarming accretion of presidential power under these admin-
istrations and its unique discussion of the presidents' use of attorney general opinions to
justify their actions. See MARTIN S. SHEFFER, PRESIDENTIAL POWER: CASE STUDIES IN THE USE
OF THE OPInONS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL (1991).
373 See Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 473.
374 See supra note 372.
375 "It is with infinite caution that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an
edifice which has answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of soci-
ety." Edmund Burke, quoted injames W. Ceaser, In Defense of Separation of Powers, in SFPARA-
TION OF PowERS, supra note 244, at 168.
376 Redish & Cisar, supra note 2, at 471.
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powerful incompatibility traditions have grown up. And, they con-
clude with a part offering a normative defense of the one person, one
office rule in each context.
A. The Tradition of Judicial-Executive Incompatibility
The Federal Constitution contains no provisions that bar federal
judges and justices from simultaneous service in the executive depart-
ment.377 This striking lacunae is so contrary to contemporary notions
of the separation of powers that even constitutional scholars have
been known to assume mistakenly that the Framers did bar such extra-
judicial service.3 78 Our story begins with a consideration of the rele-
vant constitutional text and the historical debates that surrounded its
adoption into law.
1. Text and Origins: No Federal Judicial-Executive Incompatibility
a. Text and Context
As we have seen, the Constitution contains an express legislative
Incompatibility Clause but no comparable provision exists to barjoint
service in the judicial and executive departments. Nonetheless, this
outcome sufficiently startles modern sensibilities that some have been
tempted to advance constitutional arguments as to why the U.S. Con-
stitution must create judicial-executive incompatibility. Alan Morri-
son in his Supreme Court brief for John M. Mistretta thus points out
that when the Constitution makes exceptions from the general princi-
ple of the separation of powers it does so in the most explicit and
377 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397 (1988) ("The text of the Constitu-
tion contains no prohibition against the service of active federal judges on independent
commissions .... [Although] [t]he Constitution does include an Incompatibility Clause
applicable to national legislators... [n]o comparable restriction applies to judges.").
Although the Constitution is silent on the question of federal judges simultaneously
holding executive office, the Code of Conduct for United States Judges seeks to regulate the
extent to which joint executive-judicial service is acceptable. Canon 5, subsection G of the
Code provides:
A judge should not accept appointment to a governmental committee,
commission, or other position that is concerned with issues of fact or policy
on matters other than the improvement of the law, the legal system, or the
administration ofjustice, unless appointment of ajudge is required by Act
of Congress. Ajudge should not, in any event, accept such an appointment
if the judge's governmental duties would interfere with the performance of
judicial duties or tend to undermine the integrity, impartiality, or indepen-
dence of the judiciary.
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Canon 5, subsection G.
378 Perhaps because the Incompatibility Clause prohibits federal judges from holding
seats in Congress, it is sometimes assumed that judges are likewise constitutionally barred
from serving in executive posts. See, e.g., COHEN, supra note 344, at 16 (the Constitution




express terms.3 79 Any sharing of the powers of government is pre-
cisely described and goes only so far as the text clearly provides.380
Accordingly, since the constitutional text does not expressly authorize
the sharing of judicial and executive power by one individual, Morri-
son's Mistretta brief concludes that it must not be allowed.
One might counter, however, that since the Incompatibility
Clause is express, and applies only to joint service in Congress, there
can be no other "structural" incompatibilities in the Constitution.
The canon relied upon would be expressio unius, exclusio alterius, and
the Mistretta brief's conclusion would be said to be suspect because it
renders the Incompatibility Clause redundant or meaningless.
But, an advocate of the Mistretta brief's position might respond
by observing that the Constitution is full of redundancies of which the
Incompatibility Clause's buttressing of the separation of powers could
be just another example.381 Sure the Clause is express, it might be
argued, but it is just an express reinforcement of the general separa-
tion-of-powers principle that imbues the document. It is not an ex-
press and exclusive description of an exceptional sharing of otherwise
separated powers.
To these arguments, we believe a definitive response can be
made. First, the Constitution creates a regime of separated and
shared governmental powers. It does not create a regime of separated
(or shared) governmental personneL Except for the Incompatibility
Provisions of Article I, Section 6, Article I, Section 9 and Article II,
Section 1,382 the Constitution speaks only of a separation of functions
among three institutions of government and not of a separation of
powers among personnel. Unlike the Virginia Constitution of 1776, a
document with which the Framers were deeply familiar, the U.S. Con-
stitution does not prohibit "any person" from exercising the powers of
more than one department of government at the same time.383 Ac-
cordingly, the Mistretta brief errs when it concludes that express au-
thorization is required for a sharing of powers by the same personnel.
Express authorization is only necessary for a sharing of powers in the
same governmental institutions.38 4
379 Brief of Respondent-Petitioner John M. Mistretta at 44-46, United States v. Mis-
tretta, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-1904 & 87-7028) [hereinafter "Brief for Mistretta"]. See
also Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d 1245 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidating the U.S. Sen-
tencing Commission on separation-of-powers grounds).
380 Brief for Mistretta, supra note 379, at 44-46.
381 For a brief discussion of redundancy and the Constitution, see Calabresi & Prakash,
supra note 320.
382 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
2.
383 See supra note 73.
384 There are only two instances in which the Constitution expressly addresses the is-
sue of the separation (or sharing) of personnel among the three departments. First, the
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Second, the fact that the Constitution contains three different In-
compatibility Clauses in two different articles strongly suggests that
the absence of such a clause in Article III was deliberate and was not
an oversight. One superfluous Incompatibility Clause in Article I, Sec-
tion 6 could arguably be a redundancy, but the presence of a Foreign
Incompatibility Clause, an Electoral College Incompatibility Clause,
and a Congressional Incompatibility Clause in three separate places
could not be an accident. The Framers must have thought that their
document created no structural incompatibilities and that, as a result,
express provision for incompatibility was required.
Third, there is simply no general separation of powers "clause" in
the Constitution to generate the principle asserted in the Mistretta
brief. Unlike some state Constitutions in 1787, the U.S. Constitution
has no separation of powers clause at all.385 It is thus legally meaning-
less to talk of the Constitution's "principle of separation of powers."
All the Constitution contains is a series of explicit clauses that are
worded at a low level of generality, and that expressly separate (or
share) certain very specific powers.
386
Finally, it must be remembered that the Mistretta brief argues for
an implied ineligibility to government office. By claiming that there
are certain implied inherent ineligibilities to the holding of executive
orjudicial office in our democracy, the Mistretta brief tries to close the
door on a fundamental democratic freedom. The Supreme Court has
made clear in Powell v. McCormack3 s 7 that no department of govern-
ment can add to the explicit, textual prerequisites of the Constitution
for holding a seat in Congress.388 Why then should any department of
government be able to add a one person, one office prerequisite for
service in the judicial or executive departments?
For all of these reasons, we believe the textual case against the
Mistretta brief's position is ironclad. For better or worse, there is pres-
Vice President of the United States, presumably an executive officer, is made also the Presi-
dent of the Senate. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4. Second, the Chief Justice, a judicial
officer, is also the presiding officer of the Senate when the President is tried by that body
on an impeachment. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6. These two express authorizations for the
sharing of personnel both allow for the joint exercise of very limited legislative power si-
multaneous with an exercise of one (or both) of the other two powers of government.
These Clauses thus are necessary to waive the ban of the Incompatibility Clause since it
seems highly likely that the presiding officer of the Senate must also necessarily be deemed
a Member of that House. The fact that the Constitution explicitly authorizes this sharing of
personnel does not help the Mistretta brief's argument because the explicit authorization is
made necessary to get around the Incompatibility Clause's explicit bar on dual office-hold-
ing by Members of Congress.
385 See supra note 116.
386 Compare, for example, the three vesting clauses, which separate powers, with the
Appointments or Treaty Clauses, which share them.
387 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
388 Id. at 522.
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ently no specific, textual constitutional bar to joint service in the judi-
cial and executive departments. The members of the Virginia
Ratifying Convention obviously read the Constitution the same way in
1788 that we read it today. They urged the First Congress to adopt an
amendment drafted by George Mason providing that:
The Judges of the federal Court shall be incapable of holding any
other Office, or of receiving the Profits of any other Office, or
Emolument under the United States or any of them.
3 8 9
The First Congress declined to adopt Virginia's proposal.
b. Explaining the Gap
The debates at Philadelphia and in the ratifying conventions con-
firm that the absence of a federal judicial-executive incompatibility
clause was a knowing and deliberate act of the Framers. We turn now,
therefore, to a consideration of two proposals offered at the Federal
Convention that would have limited the judges' extrajudicial roles,
and we offer some possible explanations for their rejection.
The Constitution's omission of a judicial-executive incompatibil-
ity clause cannot be explained by any unfamiliarity of the Framers
with the problem of executive manipulation of the judiciary. The
Framers vividly described the insidious abuses that stemmed from
royal control over colonial judges who could be removed from their
posts at the King's pleasure.390 Since the Glorious Revolution, judges
in England had held their positions during good behavior, and the
Crown's stubborn refusal to extend life tenure to colonial judges had
been a much-discussed and divisive issue in colonial times.391 So great
was the colonists' hatred of King George's manipulation of their
judges that the Declaration of Independence expressly cited the prac-
tice as one ground for the break with England. Charging that the
389 PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, supra note 89, at 1057.
390 See supra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
391 See PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 249-51 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1965)
[hereinafterPMPHL-rs];WOOD, supra note 22, at 160; Blumoff, supra note 35, at 1048-51.
One author described the situation as follows:
The failure of the English government to establish a court system for South
Carolina's rapidly developing western counties led to the violence in 1767.
In North Carolina, abuses by corrupt court officials in the western counties
led to an open rebellion that lasted for three years, between 1768 and 1771.
Throughout the 1760's English attempts to alter judicial commissions from
"during good behavior" to "at the King's pleasure," met with stiff resistance
from colonial legislatures and pamphleteers. The Ministry's decision in
1772 to remove control of the judge's salaries from the Massachusetts legis-
lature... led to the establishment of local Committees of Correspondence;
and the widespread bitterness of the American reaction to the Intolerable
Acts was due in no small part to British tampering with the Bay Colony's
judicial system.




King had "made Judges dependent on his Will alone, for the Tenure
of their Offices and the Amount and Payment of their Salaries" and
thereby "obstructed the Administration ofJustice," 92 the colonists de-
clared themselves forever free of his corrupting influence.
King George's power over the colonial judiciary led the drafters
of many of the constitutions of the newly-independent states to strip
executive authorities of any role even in the making of judicial ap-
pointments.3 93 When this power was largely returned to the President
under the Federal Constitution, the Framers sought to buttress judi-
cial independence by safeguarding both judicial salaries and tenure
from Presidential tampering.394 Yet, although most of the original
state constitutions in the 1770s and 1780s had also protected judicial
independence by barring judges from joint judicial-executive ser-
vice,3 95 the drafters of the Federal Constitution chose not to provide
for this protection.
The delegates did not lack opportunities to vote for judicial-exec-
utive incompatibility had they wished to constitutionalize it. In fact,
two separate proposals for such incompatibility were put before the
Federal Convention, but neither led to any discussion, debate, or vot-
ing.3 96 The first proposal appeared as part of the famous NewJersey
Plan, which William Patterson introduced on June 15 as the small
states' alternative to the Virginia Plan.3 97 The NewJersey Plan's fifth
392 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 10 & 11 (U.S. 1776).
393 WOOD, supra note 22, at 160. In most of the state constitutions, the appointments
power was entrusted to the legislature. Only Maryland and Pennsylvania excluded the state
legislatures from the appointments process. However, even in these states, no single per-
son held sole power to appoint the judges. In Maryland, the governor's appointments
required confirmation by an Executive Council comprised of five persons elected annually
by the legislature. MD. CONST. OF 1776, art. XLVIII, reprinted in 3 CONSTrrUTIONS, supra
note 53, at 1699. In Pennsylvania, the power to appoint judges was vested solely in the
executive, but the executive power in that state was lodged in a twelve-person Executive
Council. PA. CONST. OF 1776, sect. 20, reprinted in 5 id. at 3087.
394 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
The early state constitutions did not uniformly provide for judicial salary and tenure
protection. In New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Connecticut, for example, the judges held
their offices for a term of years. See NJ. CONST. OF 1776, art. XII, reprinted in 5 CONSTrru-
TIONS, supra note 53, at 2596 (seven year appointed terms); PA. CONST. OF 1776, § 23,
reprinted in id. at 3088 (seven year appointed terms); CT. CONST. OF 1818, art. 5, § 3, re-
printed in 1 id. at 543 (one year elected term). In the states that did protectjudicial tenure
during good behavior, the legislature controlled the judges' salaries and had lax proce-
dures for judicial removal. WOOD, supra note 22, at 161.
395 See supra note 67 (listing state constitutional prohibitions on simultaneous service
in judicial and executive office).
396 Despite the fact that the secret Philadelphia debates are not of legal relevance and
despite the fact that neither of these proposals were discussed on the floor of the Conven-
tion, Justice Harry Blackmun writing for the Supreme Court in Mistretta said that it was "at
least inferentially meaningful" that the delegates did not act on either proposal to limit the
extrajudicial activities of the judges. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 398 (1989).
397 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 242 (June 15, 1787). On June 19, 1787, the delegates
rejected the NewJersey Plan by a vote of seven states to three, with one state divided. Id. at
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resolution provided "that none of the Judiciary shall during the time
they remain in Office be capable of receiving or holding any other
office or appointment during their time of service, or for - thereaf-
ter."398 Yet, although the delegates spent nearly three days debating
the merits of this proposed substitute system of government, the
records of the Convention fail to reveal a single mention of the New
Jersey Plan's judicial incompatibility clause.3 99 Even James Wilson,
who carefully laid out thirteen points of difference between the New
Jersey and Virginia Plans for his colleagues' consideration, did not cite
the inclusion of a judicial incompatibility clause in the former as one
of the provisions that distinguished the two.
4° °
A second proposal that included a partial judicial-executive in-
compatibility clause came on August 20, 1787 when Charles Pinckney
put forward a number of amendments to the Virginia Plan, including
a resolution which stated that no 'Judge of the[ I supreme Court...
shall be capable of holding at the same time any other office of trust
or emolument under the United States, or an individual State."40 1
Yet, Pinckney's suggestions were immediately referred to the Commit-
tee of Detail and never emerged from that body. Thus, like the New
Jersey Plan, the Pinckney proposal did not generate debate.
Although this lack of debate certainly makes it harder for us to
understand the Framers' reasons for not adopting ajudicial-executive
incompatibility clause, we can nonetheless identify several plausible
explanations for their decision. One possibility is that the absence of
such a clause was simply an oversight. It will be remembered that the
Virginia Plan, while prohibiting Members of Congress from serving in
the executive or judiciary departments, was silent on the issue of si-
multaneous service in judicial and executive offices. And, although
the delegates at Philadelphia were twice presented with proposals to
prohibit simultaneous judicial-executive service, both proposals were
submitted as part of much larger packages for constitutional reform.
Thus, the delegates may have failed to notice either the presence of
312-13 (June 19, 1787). A concise description of the Plan's major provisions and the dele-
gates' discussion of the Plan can be found in FARRAND, supra note 86, at 84-90.
398 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 244 (June 15, 1787).
399 The delegates' discussions of the NewJersey plan are recorded at I REcoRDs, supra
note 9, at 249-333 (June 16-19, 1787).
400 See 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 252 (June 16, 1787) (statement ofJames Wilson). It
should be noted that Wilson was not remiss in pointing out other discrepancies between
the Virginia and NewJersey plans with respect to thejudiciary. On the contrary, three of
the 13 differences Wilson cited dealt specifically with the judicial power as defined in the
NewJersey plan's fifth resolution. Id. (describing the provision for inferior courts in the
Virginia plan but not in the New Jersey plan and the greater scope of federal trial and
appellate jurisdiction in the Virginia plan).
401 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 335 (August 20, 1787).
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judicial incompatibility clauses in the Patterson and Pinckney propos-
als or the absence of such a clause in the Virginia Plan.
40 2
A second and, in our view, more likely explanation for the ab-
sence of ajudicial incompatibility clause is that the status of the judici-
ary and the distinction between judicial and executive power itself
were both uncertain in 1787.403 Although Articles I, II, and III of the
Federal Constitution faithfully replicated Montesquieu's classic three-
power conception of government, the idea that the judiciary was a
wholly independent and coequal department with the other two did
not have deep roots in America at the time of its drafting.40 4 Only
eleven years before, in 1776, John Adams wrote that the judiciary was
a mere branch of the executive department. "[T] he first grand divi-
sion of constitutional powers," he wrote, consisted of "those of legisla-
tion and those of execution" with "the administration ofjustice" being
entrusted to "the executive part of the constitution."40 5 Between the
Revolution and the drafting of the Federal Constitution, a few state
courts had made tentative moves toward the assertion of a power of
judicial review over legislation, 40 6 but the distinctiveness of the rela-
tionship between the executive and judicial departments remained
unclear, even to many of the finest constitutionalists of the times.
40 7
Thus, the Framers might have knowingly and deliberately chosen not
to provide for judicial-executive incompatibility because they thought
it natural that judicial talents ought sometimes to be put to use in
simultaneous executive roles.
In his extensive and superb study of the extrajudicial activities of
the pre-Marshall Supreme Court, Professor Russell Wheeler makes
several persuasive arguments that suggest the Framers may well have
402 Wilson's failure to highlight the discrepancy between the NewJersey and Virginia
plans in terms ofjudicial incompatibility supports this hypothesis. See supra text accompa-
nying note 400.
403 This could also explain, of course, why the Framers overlooked the absence of a
judicial-executive incompatibility clause in the Virginia Plan.
404 Even Montesquieu did not think of the judiciary as being independent to the de-
gree that contemporary federal judges are. Rather, Montesquieu envisioned that the
judges should be temporary office holders, drawn intermittently from the public at large.
See MONTESQUIEU, supra note 256, at 156-57; McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 85.
405 John Adams, The Earl of Clarendon to William Pym, BOSTON GAzETTE Jan. 27, 1766,
reprinted in 3 THE WORKS OFJOHN AnAMs, supra note 119, at 477, 480-82. See also BERNARD
BAILYN, THE ORDEAL OF THOMAS HUTCHINSON 103 (1974) (quoting Governor Hutchinson's
opinion that "[ciourts are part of the law enforcement procedure, not a check upon it").
406 "[I]n isolated but important cases" in the 1780s, judges began to impose some re-
straints on legislative power. WOOD, supra note 22, at 454-55. The practice in England
(and in Connecticut for that matter) of having the upper house of the legislature also serve
as the jurisdiction's highest court of appeal must have augmented the indistinctiveness of
the concepts ofjudicial and legislative power.
407 This uncertain relationship led such reasonable minds asJames Madison's to urge
the uniting ofjudges and the President in a Council of Revision. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9,
at 109-10; 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 74, 77-78.
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wanted federal judges to be able to perform at least some extrajudicial
activities, including those that involved the holding of executive of-
fices.40° Wheeler notes that the Framers' concept of the judicial role
was necessarily informed by the English constitutional tradition.
Under that tradition, 'judges were obligated to serve the nation extra-
judicially in various ex officio capacities in which their judicial skills
would be of use."40 9 Interestingly, the records of the Federal Conven-
tion do indicate that several of the most prominent delegates did at
least contemplate such extrajudicial service for the federal judges.
For example, Gouverneur Morris submitted to the Committee of
Detail a proposal for a Council of State that would have the Chief
Justice as its second ranking member.410 Morris envisioned the Chief
Justice's role as recommending legislation that would "promote useful
learning and inculcate sound morality throughout the Union. '411 In
addition, Professor Wheeler points to the well-known arguments ad-
vanced in support of James Madison's proposed Council of Revision
as indicating the Framers' general support of an extensive nonjudicial
role for the judges.41 2 Madison himself argued that principled extra-
judicial use of "the Judiciary talents" would lend "perspicuity... con-
ciseness, and ... systematic character ... [to] the Code of laws." 413
Mason later added that judges could improve legislation by virtue of
their "habit and practice of considering laws in their true principles,
and in all their consequences." 414 From these examples,415 Wheeler
408 Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 Sup. CT. REV.
123 [hereinafter Wheeler, Extrajudicial]. See also Russell Wheeler, Extrajudicial Activities of
United States Supreme CourtJustices: The Constitutional Period, 1790-1809 chs. 7-8 (un-
published Ph.D dissertation, University of Chicago, Department of Political Science, 1970).
409 Wheeler, Extrajudida4 supra note 408, at 123-24.
410 Id. at 127.
411 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 342 (Aug. 20, 1787); Wheeler, Extrajudicial, supra note
408, at 127.
412 Wheeler, Extrajudicial supra note 408, at 128. Wheeler notes, however, that
"[m]ajority sentiment in the 1787 Constitutional Convention toward extrajudicial activity is
hard to discern." Id. at 127.
413 1 REcoans, supra note 9, at 139 (June 6, 1787); Wheeler, Extrajudicial supra note
408, at 128.
414 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 78 (July 21, 1787); Wheeler, Extrajudicia supra note
408, at 128.
415 Wheeler also finds support for his thesis in Charles Pinckney's proposal that the
President and Congress have the authority "to require the opinions of the supreme judicial
Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." Wheeler, Extrajudi-
cial supra note 408, at 129 (quoting 2 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 341 (Aug. 20, 1787)). He
notes that, contrary to the common assumption, the delegates at Philadelphia did not re-
ject Pinckney's suggestion that the Supreme Court be authorized to issue advisory opin-
ions. Rather, "It]he motion simply did not emerge from the Committee of Detail, to which
he submitted it. This could well mean that the committee assumed that the President and
Congress could and would seek the judges' opinions in accord with the Anglo-American
practice, which indeed they did." Extrajudicial, supra, at 129. For a discussion of the early
use of Supreme Court Justices as advisors, see id. at 144-48.
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concludes that the delegates generally did not believe that the judges'
role should be confined to deciding cases and controversies. Rather,
he posits, "[m]any delegates shared Mason's conviction that it was
proper that 'further use be made of the judges.' "416
Of course, the obvious objection to Professor Wheeler's conclu-
sion is that the Convention as a whole decisively rejected the proposals
for a Council of State and a Council of Revision. 417 Nonetheless, a
surprising colloquy from the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention,
although unmentioned by Professor Wheeler, does provide some sup-
port for his thesis.
In defending the Constitution's judicial article in the Penn-
sylvania Convention, James Wilson was confronted with an objection
which, he "confess [ed], [he] had not expected."418 One of the conven-
tion's attendees had noticed the Constitution's lack of ajudicial-exec-
utive incompatibility clause and protested that "the judges under this
Constitution, are not rendered sufficiently independent, because they
may hold other offices."419 Wilson, thinking this objection "a little
wire-drawn,"420 responded to the gentleman's concern in a speech
that strongly suggests his belief that federal judges should not have
been barred from extrajudicial service:
It is true that there is a provision made in the Constitution of Penn-
sylvania, that the judges shall not be allowed to hold any other of-
fice whatsoever... but this, sir, is not introduced as a principle into
this Constitution. There are many states in the Union, whose con-
stitutions do not limit the usefulness of their best men, or exclude
them from rendering those services to their country for which they
are found eminently qualified.... Now it is not to be expected that
eleven or twelve states are to change their sentiments and practice,
on this subject, to accommodate themselves to Pennsylvania.421
416 Wheeler, Extrajudicia supra note 408, at 130 (quoting 2 RECoRDs, supra note 9, at
78 (July 21, 1787)).
417 2 RECoRDs, supra note 9, at 542 (Sept. 7, 1787) (rejecting Council of State); 1 id. at
140 (June 6, 1787) (rejecting Council of Revision); 2 id. at 80 (July 21, 1787) (same); id. at
298 (Aug. 15, 1787) (same).
418 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTION 514 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1881).
419 Id.
420 Id.
421 Id. See also 2 THE WORs OF JAMES WILSON 794-802 (Robert G. McCloskey ed.,
1967) (Wilson's speech at the Pennsylvania convention to review its state constitution). It
should be noted that Wilson's allusion to the practices of other states is not entirely apt.
For example, Wilson's reference to the constitution of New York spoke of that state's prac-
tice of allowing judges to sit in Congress. Apparently, the gentleman to whom Wilson was
responding objected to the Federal Constitution's allowing federal judges to hold execu-
tive office, since the Constitution's Incompatibility Clause does preclude federal judges
from sitting in Congress. Likewise, Wilson counted "eleven or twelve states" that permitted
their judges to hold contemporaneous executive office. However, this figure is inaccurate
unless it purported to include only those states that enforced their constitutional prohibi-
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Thus, although the historical record is far from clear, there is at least
some support for the proposition that the Framers did see some merit
in allowing the judges to serve the nation in extrajudicial capacities
and that they did not envision a sharp separation of the judicial and
the executive powers.
2. Development Over Two Hundred Years of the Partial Judicial-
Executive Incompatibility Tradition
Whatever the reason for the silence of the constitutional text on
this subject, Americans have, from the beginning, debated the wisdom
of the simultaneous holding of judicial and executive offices. In the
nation's early years, it was not uncommon for some federal judges also
to hold executive office. 422 Among the most notorious examples of
this early practice are: John Marshall's simultaneous service as Secre-
tary of State and Chief Justice,423 John Jay's simultaneous service as
Special Ambassador to England and Chief Justice, and Oliver Ells-
worth's simultaneous service as Special Ambassador to France and
ChiefJustice. 424 Although these appointments were "not received fa-
tions on dual office holding. See supra note 67 (listing the state constitutions that prohib-
ited dual office holding by statejudges). See also supra note 142 (discussing the possibility
that states simply ignored their constitutional prohibitions on joint office holding).
422 It has been said that " [d] uring the Federalist era, 'the politicians-or statesmen-of
that day bivouacked in the chiefjusticeship on their march from one political position to
another.'" Alpheus T. Mason, Extra Judicial Work forJudges: The Triews of ChiefJustice Stone,
67 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193 (1953) (quoting SHIRLEY, THE DARTMoUTH COLLEGE CAUSES AND
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNrrIED STATES). Indeed, two Supreme Court Justices even
went so far as to run for elective office without leaving the bench: Jay, who sought the
Governorship of New York, and Cushing who sought the same office in Massachusetts. Id.
423 In 1800, Marshall became President Adams' Secretary of State. Later that year,
Adams nominated him for the office of Chief Justice after John Jay declined reappoint-
ment to that position. The Senate confirmed Marshall's appointment as ChiefJustice on
January 27, 1801, yet he did not resign his position as Secretary of State until March 4 of
that year. See ALBERTJ. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OFJOHN MARSHALL 558-59 (1919); 1 CHAiRES
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 178, 184-85, 200-01 (1922); Slo-
nim, supra note 14, at 392 n.3.
Marshall was not the first person in the young republic to hold the offices of Secretary
of State and Chief Justice simultaneously. For six months in 1789-90, Chief Justice Jay
filled Thomas Jefferson's position as Secretary of State while Jefferson was away in France.
BEVERIDGE, supra, at 11; Slonim, supra note 14, at 392 n.3. Of course, Marshall's dual role is
the most famous since, during his tenure as Secretary of State, he himself signed and
sealed, but failed to deliver, the commission appointing William Marbury as Justice of the
Peace for the District of Columbia. This infamous commission would later become the
subject of his landmark opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 1
WARREN, supra at 200-03.
424 In the Spring of 1795, President Washington appointed ChiefJustice John Jay as
Special Ambassador to England for the purpose of negotiating a treaty with the mother
country. The so-called "Jay Treaty" that resulted was the occasion of bitter partisan contro-
versy. Indeed, the controversy was so heated that it sank the nomination of recess ap-
pointee John Rutledge to be Chief Justice in replacement of Jay. Oliver Ellsworth, the
third ChiefJustice of the United States, served from 1799-1800 as PresidentJohn Adams'
special envoy to France to negotiate restrictions put on American ships in the wake of the
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vorably by the Senate," 425 the fact is that they could not have been
made at all426 unless all three Departments of the government, filled
at that time with men who had helped to write and ratify the Constitu-
tion, believed that it was constitutional for Supreme Court Justices to
hold simultaneously these executive posts.
427
As further indication of this early belief that federal judges could
constitutionally hold executive posts, the original legislative and exec-
utive departments adopted statutes giving inferior judges a role in
overseeing the salvaging of French ships, in assessing the evidence in
electoral disputes, in naturalization proceedings, and in evaluating
the pensions of Revolutionary War Veterans. 428 This latter scheme led
to the famous opinions in Hayburn's Case,429 wherein the then-Justices
of the Supreme Court indicated that no court could undertake an ex-
ecutive task that was subject to review by the Secretary of War, but
several justices indicated that individual judges might be able to under-
take executive tasks concurrent with their judicial service as Article II
"commissioners."430 Thus began a distinction, now well-established,
between what Article III courts can be asked to do and what particular
judges can be asked to do individually if they hold a simultaneous ex-
ecutive office. 4
31
XYZ affair. Ellsworth continued to serve as Chief Justice, even though his peace mission
was politically controversial. 1 WARREN, supra note 423, at 119.
425 1 WARREN, supra note 423, at 119. For example, during the debate over the Jay
nomination, Aaron Burr protested:
That to permitJudges of the Supreme Court to hold at the same time any
other office or employment emanating from and holden at the pleasure of
the Executive is contrary to the spirit of the Constitution and, as tending to
expose them to the influence of the Executive, is mischievous and
impolitic.
1 JOURNAL OF THE EXECUTIVE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 152 (1828) (motion of Sen. Burr (Apr. 19, 1794)), quoted in Maeva Marcus, Separa-
tion of Powers in the Early National Period, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 269, 273-74 n.16 (1989).
426 After three days' debate on jay's appointment, the Senate ultimately confirmed his
nomination on April 19, 1794 by a vote of 18 to eight. 1 WARREN, supra note 423, at 119.
Ellsworth's nomination as ambassador to France was similarly approved on February 27,
1799. Id. at 156.
427 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 399 (1989) ("This contemporaneous prac-
tice by the Founders themselves is significant evidence that the constitutional principle of
separation of powers does not absolutely prohibit extrajudicial service.").
428 Wheeler, Extrajudicia4 supra note 408, at 132-36.
429 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
430 Id. at 410 n.t (Jay, C.J., Cushing, J., Duane, Dist. Ct. J.) (individual judges could
perform that function); id. at 411-12 n.t (Wilson & Blair, JJ., and Peters, Dist. Ct. J.) (not
expressing an opinion on that question); id. at 413-414 n.t (Iredell,J., & Sitgrevaves, Dist.
Ct. J.) (leaving question open).
431 This distinction was confirmed by the decision in United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 40 (1851). In that case, the Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to
review an executive act taken by a Florida district judge pursuant to statute. The act itself
was subject to revision by the Secretary of the Treasury. Essentially, the Supreme Court
concluded that it was constitutional for the district judge to serve simultaneously as an
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The early Congresses and Administrations also indicated their ap-
proval of simultaneous executive posts for judges by statutorily as-
signing potentially controversial executive functions to the Chief
Justice. As Professor Wheeler describes, the ChiefJustice was assigned
to the Sinking Fund Commission, which had the task of reducing and
refunding the Revolutionary War debt.43 2 The Chief Justice was also
assigned to a Commission to inspect the operation and output quality
of the United States Mint.433 The quality of currency and debt repay-
ment were both hot political issues in the founding period. These
statutory assignments therefore drew the ChiefJustice directly into po-
tentially controverted areas.43 4 Finally, Professor Wheeler notes that
President Washington repeatedly sought all kinds of advice from
Chief Justice Jay, whom he seems almost to have regarded as a mem-
ber of his Cabinet.435 As indicated by The Correspondence of the Justices,
Jay resisted the most extreme requests, but acceded to many others. 436
However, to assert that many or all of these extrajudicial activities
and escapades were accepted as constitutionally tolerable is not to say
executive officer for purposes of the statute even though it would not be constitutional for
Congress to make the final actions of any Article III Court, supreme or inferior, subject to
revision by an official in the executive department. See Brief for the United States at 49-51,
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-1904 & 87-7028); Brief for the
United States Sentencing Commission at 42, Mistretta. See also Marcus, supra note 425, at
269-71 (noting that Congress and the President were able to deal with the earliestJustices
of the Supreme Court in their individual rather than institutional capacity).
432 Wheeler, Extrajudicia, supra note 408, at 140-44. SeeAct of Aug. 12, 1790, ch. 47, 1
Stat. 186 (ChiefJustice to serve ex officio as a member of the Sinking Fund Commission).
433 Wheeler, Extrajudicial supra note 408, at 140. SeeAct of Apr. 2, 1792, ch. 16, § 18, 1
Stat. 250 (Chief Justice to serve ex officio as a member of the U.S. Mint Commission).
Wheeler reports that:
sample coins [were to] ... be "assayed under the inspection of" a group
including the ChiefJustice, the Secretary and Comptroller of the Treasury,
the Secretary of State, and the Attorney General. The ChiefJustice's associ-
ation with such activity had clear English precedents, namely the "Trial of
the Pix," before, among others, the Lord Chancellor.
Wheeler, Extrajudicia4 supra note 408, at 140. The Lord Chancellor of England, of course,
is an officer of all three departments of government, presiding over the House of Lords,
serving in the Cabinet, and being the highest judge in the English court system.
434 Wheeler, Extrajudicia, supra note 408, at 140. Wheeler suggests that ChiefJustice
Jay, perhaps cognizant of these difficulties, tried to keep his involvement in the Sinking
Fund Commission to a minimum. Id. at 142-44.
435 Id. at 145-48.
436 Id. The Correspondence of the Justices is reprinted in PAUL M. BATOR ET AL, HART AND
WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 65-67 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinaf-
ter HART & WECHSLER]. Wheeler concludes that
[this] incident was more than a refusal to give advice. It was part of a
broader attempt by the early Supreme Court to deemphasize the obligatory
extrajudicial service concept, so widely held in the early period. It was-
along with Haybum's Case and Jay's bout with the Sinking Fund Commis-
sion-an attempt to point out to nonjudges and future judges that the
duties of the American judge were best limited to judging cases and
controversies.
Wheeler, Extrajudicia4 supra note 408, at 158.
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that they were looked upon with universal approval. In fact, quite the
reverse is true.43 7 Opposition to many of the judges' executive activi-
ties was intense, and the objections raised echoed the cries of execu-
tive interference with a coequal department that had produced the
constitutional ban on coterminous legislative-executive service just a
few years earlier.
Thomas Jefferson, for example, complained that the executive
had
been able to draw into this vortex the Judiciary branch of the Gov-
ernment, and by their expectancy of sharing the other offices in the
Executive gift to make them auxiliary to the Executive in all its
views, instead of forming a balance between that and the Legisla-
ture, as was originally intended .... 438
Jefferson's conviction that the judiciary's acceptance of executive of-
fices had unjustly slanted their opinions in favor of the executive is
evident in many of his writings. For example, in a letter to James
Madison railing against the "infernal" excise laws, Jefferson wrote:
"We shall see what the Court lawyers and CourtlyJudges and would-be
Ambassadors will make out of it."4s9 Rufus King similarly warned that
"although the prospect of an honorary appointment within the gift of
the President was remote," the practice was dangerous since it "put
the Judges under the influence of the Executive... [and] might influ-
ence and lessen their independence." 440 To many, especially those
who had been Antifederalists, 441 it seemed that the President's power
to reward federal judges with offices and promotions had made the
judiciary "simply an annex" to the President and the Federalist
party.442
Undoubtedly, the prestige of the Supreme Court was badly hurt
by the political controversies swirling around ChiefJustice Jay's highly
controversial treaty with England and ChiefJustice Ellsworth's peace
mission to France in the wake of the XYZ affair. Confidence in the
judiciary cannot have been helped either by Chief Justice John Mar-
shall's amazing involvement in the signing of William Marbury's Com-
mission and his subsequent adjudication of the lawsuit arising out of
437 Even ChiefJustice Jay had his doubts about some of the extrajudicial requests. See
supra note 434.
438 WARREN, supra note 423, at 167.
439 Id. at 156.
440 I THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RuFus KING 1894-1900, at 521-22 (Charles Rt
King ed., 1894); 1 WARREN, supra note 423, at 120.
441 The opposition to dual judicial-executive office holding was not exclusive to Anti-
federalists, however. Federalists opposed the practice as well. See 1 WARREN, supra note
423, at 120-21.




his own actions when he served simultaneously as ChiefJustice and as
Secretary of State.
It should come as no surprise therefore that Senator Charles
Pinckney, believing that the failure of the Constitution to prohibit fed-
eral judges from holding other offices had created "an unwise and
degrading situation for a National Judiciary,"443 proposed in 1800 a
constitutional amendment that would have provided forjudicial-exec-
utive incompatibility. 4" When nothing came of his amendment pro-
posal, Pinckney sought to bar joint judicial-executive office holding
through legislation, but again to no avail.
445
Of course, the failure of Senator Pinckney's proposals did not
lead to a situation where federal judges holding simultaneous execu-
tive office was viewed as commonplace and unproblematic. In fact, in
the years after the Jay and Ellsworth controversies, the Jeffersonians
came to power, and the early practice of frequent and prominent in-
stances ofjoint judicial-executive office holding largely died out. Per-
haps the Jeffersonians were sincere in the constitutional arguments
they had made against the practices of Presidents Washington and Ad-
ams. As likely, however, they found, initially, few Supreme CourtJus-
tices whose political offices they wished to engage. In any event, a
practice did begin to grow up of not commissioning federal judges to
hold politically sensitive executive posts. This practice became suffi-
ciently solidified so that its general acceptance became most evident
when we observe the negative reaction engendered by its breach.
In the nineteenth century, instances of extrajudicial service in ex-
ecutive office continued, but, with one notorious exception, the ser-
vice was in significantly less controversial and important posts. 446 The
exception, of course, was the disastrous participation of five Supreme
Court Justices in the infamous 1876 Hayes-Tilden Commission.
4 7
443 Id. at 167.
444 The text of the proposed amendment can be found in ANNALS OF THE CONGRESS OF
THE UNITED STATES, 6th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-42 (1800). Congressman Livingston of New York
proposed a similar constitutional amendment in the House of Representatives on February
13, 1800. Professor Wheeler relates an 1806 attempt byJohn Randolph to ban plural office
holding byjudges. The Randolph proposal would not have affected ex officio service with-
out salary such as on the Sinking Fund Commission. Wheeler, Extrajudida4 supra note 408,
at 142.
445 Similar legislation was proposed in the House in 1804. See 1 WARREN, supra note
423, at 162.
446 For example, President Grant appointed Justice Nelson to represent the U.S. in
arbitrating claims against Great Britain in 1871. Chief Justice Fuller and Justice Brewer
accepted appointments as boundary arbitrators in a dispute between Venezuela and British
Guiana. The Governor of California appointed Justice Stephen Field to serve on a com-
mission for the revision of state laws. Mason, supra note 422, at 194 n.3.
447 The Hayes-Tilden Commission is discussed further in C. VANN WoonwARD, REuN-




This Commission ratified a deal whereby Democrat Samuel Tilden's
presidential victory was "stolen" from him in exchange for the Repub-
licans in Congress agreeing to end Reconstruction. The unfortunate
involvement of Supreme Court Justices in this partisan fiasco marked
an isolated return to the judicial politicization of the 1790s.
448
Most twentieth-century instances of extrajudicial service have also
involved uncontroversial posts. 449 But, beginning with the very
politicized New Deal period and continuing to the present, a few ex-
ceptional instances of extrajudicial service have stirred bitter contro-
versy. This controversy, like the controversy engendered in 1940 by
F.D.R.'s bid for a third term, itself indicates how unacceptable simulta-
neous dual office holding has become. Presidents Roosevelt and Tru-
man triggered the crisis by a series of actions. Initially, F.D.R., to the
annoyance of the ChiefJustice, appointed Justice Roberts to the politi-
cally sensitive commission investigating Pearl Harbor.450 The prob-
lem escalated to involve an undue presidential reliance on various
justices for "advice," 451 and culminated with President Truman's ap-
pointment ofJustice Jackson as Chief Prosecutor for the United States
in the Nuremberg Trials of 1945-46.452
Chief Justice Harlan Fiske Stone, himself a Roosevelt appointee,
turned down an F.D.R. commission appointment with a stern letter
observing that "[w] e must not forget that it is the judgment of history
that two of my predecessors, Jay and Ellsworth, failed in the obliga-
tions of their office and impaired their legitimate influence by partici-
pation in executive action in the negotiation of treaties."453 He
continued that: "it is not by mere chance that every Chief Justice
since has confined his activities strictly to the performance of hisjudi-
448 It should be mentioned, however, that the Court was also badly hurt at this time by
Justice Davis' and Justice McLean's openly entertained presidential ambitions. Davis ulti-
mately resigned from the Court to become a Senator. Mason, supra note 422, at 194 n.3.
449 Thus, Justice Hughes served on a Commission to determine postal rates in 1911,
and in 1930 settled a boundary dispute between Guatemala and Honduras. The firstJus-
tice Harlan sat as an arbitrator in the Fur Seal arbitration. Justice Day was named to the
American-German Claims Commission, and Justice Roberts served on the Mexican Claims
Commission. Justice Van Deranter arbitrated the controversy with Great Britain over the
seizure of the ship, I'm Alone. See Mason, supra note 422, at 194 n.3. An extensive listing of
federal judges who have served the executive while retaining their positions on the bench
can be found in the REPORT OF SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE ON ABE FORTAS, 90th Cong.,
2d Sess. 6-8 (1968).
450 Mason, supra note 422, at 199. Later, ChiefJustice Stone was also offered a series of
commission appointments, including a commission to investigate the nation's rubber sup-
ply, a politically contentious issue at the time. I& at 199-216. Before thatJustice Roberts
served on the Commission investigating the Pearl Harbor disaster.
451 Id. at 198-99. Professor Mason recounts that F.D.R. frequently sought advice from
Justices Douglas, Frankfurter and Byrnes.
452 Id. at 209-16.
453 Id. at 203-04 (text of letter from Stone to Roosevelt).
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cial duties."454 Stone was furious about Justice Jackson's extrajudicial
service at Nuremberg,455 which embroiled the Court in current
events, exacerbated problems of workload, and occasioned jealousy
on the part of the other justices. Professor Mason makes clear that
Stone arranged for the posthumous publication of his letter to F.D.R.
turning down the proposed Rubber Commission appointment pre-
cisely to insure that a widely-known precedent of judicial refusal of
such posts be set.456
Notwithstanding these events, only a few years passed before Pres-
ident Lyndon B. Johnson embroiled the Justices in two even more
bitter controversies stemming from dual office holding. The first re-
sulted from Johnson's appointment of a very reluctant Chief Justice
Earl Warren to head the President's Commission on the Assassination
of President Kennedy.457 Warren initially refused Johnson's request,
noting that the Jackson appointment to the Nuremberg post had pro-
duced "divisiveness and internal bitterness on the Court."458 But
Johnson insisted and Warren relented, thus embroiling his name, and
the Supreme Court's prestige, in one of the most controverted and
bizarre episodes in American history.
But, the Warren Commission fiasco was nothing compared to the
controversy that came to swirl around Associate Justice Abe Fortas'
nomination to be Chief Justice. Complaints about Fortas' extrajudi-
cial advice to Johnson459 led, in 1969, to a full-scale investigation by
454 Id. at 204.
455 Id. at 209-16.
456 Id. at 205-06.
457 President Lyndon Johnson created this commission, commonly known as the War-
ren Commission, by Executive Order No. 1130, dated November 29, 1963. Later, Congress
designated the Chief Justice as a Regent of the semi-public Smithsonian Institution, 20
U.S.C. §§ 41-42 (1990).
458 EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN, 356 (1977). In his memoirs, Chief
Justice Warren acknowledged the harmful effects that extrajudicial service can have on the
federal judiciary. Recounting his reasons for initially refusing Johnson's request that he
head the investigation into President Kennedy's death, Warren wrote:
[H]istorically, the acceptance of diplomatic posts by Chief Justices Jay and
Ellsworth had not contributed to the welfare of the Court,... the service of
five Justices on the Hayes-Tilden Commission had demeaned it .... the
appointment ofJustice Roberts as chairman to investigate the Pearl Harbor
disaster had served no good purpose, and ... the action ofJustice Robert
Jackson in leaving Court for a year to become chief prosecutor at [Nurem-
berg] after World War II had resulted in divisiveness and internal bitterness
on the Court.
Id.
459 The nomination of Associate Justice Fortas for the office of ChiefJustice provoked
considerable discussion of the judiciary and the separation of powers when the Senate
committee considering the Justice's promotion discovered that Justice Fortas had aided
the President in drafting several pieces of legislation, had helped to craft the 1966 State of
the Union address, and had participated in White House policy sessions regarding the
Vietnam War and the Detroit riots. Slonim, supra note 14, at 393. These events should not
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the Senate Subcommittee on the Separation of Powers into the nonju-
dicial activities of federal judges.460 As a result of these hearings, Sub-
committee Chairman Sam Ervin introduced a bill that, much like the
legislation proposed by Senator Pinckney nearly two hundred years
earlier, purported "to enforce the principle of separation of powers"
by "prohibit[ing] the exercise or discharge by justices and judges of
the United States of nonjudicial governmental powers and duties."461
Nothing came of Senator Ervin's proposed legislation, 462 and the
problem of extrajudicial service has continued to generate
controversy.
In 1983, President Reagan established the President's Commis-
sion on Organized Crime,463 chaired by then-active Circuit Judge Ir-
ving R. Kaufman, himself no stranger to controversy. The Kaufman
Commission, which played an advisory role only, and on which mem-
bership was voluntary, generated two circuit court opinions that en-
forced Commission subpoenas, but caustically criticized the inclusion
of judges on the Commission itself.
464
More dramatically, in Mistretta v. United States,465 the issue arose as
to whether three inferior federal judges could sit on the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission if the Commission was, as the Department of Justice
argued, an agency of the executive department.466 The majority of
the Court, idiotically concluding that the Commission was an Article
III entity, allowed dual service in this instance.467 Justice Scalia wrote
an impassioned dissent that correctly and elegantly explained the
Court's separation-of-powers errors in upholding the constitutionality
of the U.S. Sentencing Commission.
468
We thus arrive at the present day to find circuit courts in some
degree of doubt about the legality of Judge Kaufman's extrajudicial
service and the Supreme Court straining to describe the Sentencing
be confused with later allegations that Justice Fortas had accepted an improper gratuity
from a foundation, which ultimately led to his resignation from the Court.
460 See NONJUDICIAL AcTrvmEs OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND OTHER FEDERAL
JUDGES, HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEPARATION OF POWERS OF THE COMMITTEE
ON THE JUDICIARY, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
461 Slonim, supra note 14, at 395 n.15 (quoting S. 1097, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)).
462 The proposal was never reported out of the SenateJudiciary Committee. Id. at 395
n.15.
463 Exec. Order No. 12, 435, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1983).
464 See In re President's Comm. on Organized Crime (Scarfo), 783 F.2d 370, 377 (3d
Cir. 1986) ("[T]here has been a rising tide of criticism of judicial participation in such
extrajudicial bodies. Responsible commentators have suggested that such conduct by
judges violates the separation of powers."); In re President's Comm. on Organized Crime
(Scaduto), 763 F.2d 1191 (11th Cir. 1985) (RoneyJ., specially concurring).
465 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
466 See Brief for the United States, supra note 431.
467 488 U.S. at 398.
468 488 U.S. at 422-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Commission as being within Article III, perhaps in part to avoid this
issue.469 We have a sustained and serious scholarly literature on the
propriety of federal judges participating in extrajudicial activities,
which literature has itself been spawned by some of the controversies
extrajudicial activity has led to.470 For similar reasons, we have com-
ment G to Canon 5 of the Code of Judicial Conduct purporting to
advise federal judges on what very limited extrajudicial appointments
they may accept.47' Finally, we have a by now 190-year-old practice
and tradition of not allowing joint judicial-executive service in Cabi-
net, subcabinet, or ambassadorial positions. In fact, the great dual
service controversies of this century have all involved only the use of
judges in executive posts that involved such court-related functions as:
prosecution in a foreign jurisdiction (Nuremberg), law enforcement
investigations (the Warren and Kaufman Commissions), and the issu-
ance of Sentencing Guidelines (Mistretta).472
Given all of this, perhaps it is fair to say that a tradition has
evolved that very nearly replicates the situation that would exist if we
had a judicial-executive incompatibility clause. Thus, if we look at
state constitutional law, we see that forty-six out of fifty states now pro-
vide for a substantial measure of judicial-executive incompatibility in
their state constitutions.473 Twenty-eight states go even further with
469 In a pre-Mistretta case, the Ninth Circuit found the Sentencing Commission to be
unconstitutional on separation of powers grounds. Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele, 857 F.2d
1245 (9th Cir. 1988) ("We can prevent undue entanglement by the judiciary in the opera-
tion of the political branches only by adopting a clear cut prophylactic rule: Congress may
not, under our system of separated powers, require judges to serve on bodies that make
political decisions.").
470 For scholarly treatment of the propriety of federal judges' participation in extraju-
dicial activities, see Redish, supra note 17, at 300-03; Talbot D'Alemberte, Searching for the
limits ofJudicial Free Speech, 61 TUL. L. REv. 611, 620-25 (1987); Steven Lubet, judicial Ethics
and Private Lives, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 983 (1985); Robert B. McKay, TheJudiciay and Nonjudi-
cial Activities, 35 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 9 (1970); Nathaniel L. Nathanson, The Extra-
Judicial Activities of Supreme Court Justices: Where Should the Line BeDrawn?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV.
494, 494-525 (1983) (book review); Slonim, supra note 14; Wheeler, Extrajudicial, supra
note 408. See alsoJames T. Barry, III, The Council of Revision and the Limits ofJudicial Power,
56 U. CHI. L. Ray. 235, 261 (1989) (discussing Framers' debate over role of federal judges
in creating laws).
471 See supra note 377.
472 Of course, in some ways the use ofjudges for executive posts of this kind raises the
most serious separation-of-powers problems because litigation often results from law en-
forcement and sentencing activities, thus necessitating recusal of any judge who has al-
ready expounded on a litigated issue while serving in an executive post.
473 ALA. CONsr. art. 5, § 130; ALA. CONST. art. 17, § 280; ALA. CONST. amend. 328,
§ 6.08(b); ALASKA CONSr. art. 3, § 6; ALAsKA CONST. art. 4, § 14; ARiz. CONST. art. 6, § 28;
Amea CONsT. art 6, § 22; ARK. CONsr. art. 7, § 10; ARK. CONsr. art. 7, § 18; C.. CONST. art.
5, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18; COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 18; DEL. CONsT. art. 4, § 4; FLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 5(a); FLA. CONSr. art. 5, § 13; HAW. CONsr. art. 5, § 1; HAW. CONSr. art. 6,
§ 3; IDAHO CONST. art. 5, § 7; ILL. CONSr. art. 6, § 13(b); IND. CONST. art 2, § 9; IND. CONSr.
art 5, § 8; IND. CONSn. art 5, § 24; IowA CONST. art. 4, § 14; IOWA CONST. art. 5, § 18; KAN.
CONSr. art. 3, § 13; Ky. CONST. § 123; LA. CONsr. art. 4, § 2; ME. CONsr. art 6, § 5; ME.
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the one person, one office principle and extend it to private sector
"offices" by explicitly forbidding judges from practicing law.474 Ac-
cordingly, there is an important sense in which one person, one office
judicial-executive incompatibility is now firmly a part of America's un-
written constitutional tradition.
But, there are vital limits to this point as well, which bear noting.
First, there are many arguably executive functions and posts which we
continue to assign to Article IIIjudges, by statute or otherwise, that no
one finds controversial. Thus, Congress has created numerous enti-
ties that obviously do not function exclusively as "courts" such as the
Judicial Conference, the Judicial Councils, and the Special Division of
the D.C. Circuit for Independent Counsels.475 With the exception of
the Special Division, these entities do not decide cases or controver-
sies and, in our judgment at least, should not as an original matter
have been understood as exercising exclusively judicial power.476 In-
deed, to some extent it seems to us that they might have been better
understood, originally, as entities composed of judges who were tem-
porarily exercising executive power. Even though these entities are
composed of Article III judges, we believe they are probably constitu-
tional under the rule of United States v. Ferreira4 M7 because there is no
CONST. art. 9, § 2; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 2; MAss. CONST. amend., art. 8; MICH.
CONST. art. 6, § 21; MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 6; Mo. CONST. art. 5, § 24; MONT. CONST. art. 6,
§ 5(2); MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 9(3); NEB. CONST. art. 4, § 2; Nav. CONST. art. 6, § 11; N.H.
CONST. pt. 2, art. 93; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 95; N.J. CONST. art 6, § 6, para. 7; N.M. CONST.
art. 6, § 19; N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 20, para. b(1); N.C. CoNSr. art. 6, § 9(1); N.D. CONST. art.
6, § 10; OHIO CONST. art. 4, § 6(B); OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 11(b); OR. CONsr. art. 2, § 10;
OR. CoNsT. art. 5, § 3; PA. CONST. art 4, § 6; PA. CONST. art. 5, § 17(a); S.C. CONST. art 4,
§ 2; S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. 6, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 10; TENN. CONST.
art. 2, § 26; TENN. CONST. art. 3, § 13; Tax. CONST. art. 4, § 6; TEx. CONST. art 4, § 18; Tax.
CONST. art. 16, § 40; TEx. CONST. art 16, § 33; UTAH CONST. art. 8, § 10; VT. CONST. ch. 2,
§ 54; VA. CONST. art. 6, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 15; W. VA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; W. VA.
CONST. art. 8, § 7; Wis. CONST. art. 7, § 10(1); Wyo. CONST. art. 5, § 27.
474 ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.08(a); ALAsKA CONST. art 4, § 14; ARIz. CONST. art. 6,
§ 28; CAL. CONST. art. 6, § 18; COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 18; DEL. CONST. art. 4, § 4; FLA.
CONST. art. 5, § 13; HAw. CONST. art. 6, § 3; ILL CONST. art. 6, § 13(b); KAN. CONST. art 3,
§ 13; Ky. CONST. § 123; LA. CONST. art. 5, § 24; MD. CONST. art 4, § 41C; Mo. CONST. art 5,
§ 20; MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 9(3); NEB. CONST. art. 5, § 14; NJ. CONST. art. 6, § 6, para. 6;
N.Y. CoNsT. art. 6, § 20, para. b(4); N.D. CONST. art 6, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 11(b);
PA. CONsr. art. 5, § 17(a); S.C. CONST. art. 5, § 16; S.D. CoNsT. art. 5, § 10; UTAH CONST.
art. 8, § 10; VA. CONST. art. 6, § 11; WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 19; W. VA. CONST. art. 8, § 7;
WYo. CONsT. art. 5, § 25.
475 For a thoughtful discussion, see Redish, supra note 17, at 311-19.
476 For an explanation of how judges might validly undertake some administrative
functions, see id. at 315-18 (discussing authority to hire law clerks). This power may also
come from the inferior officers appointment clause, which recognizes thatjudges will hire
at least some officers inferior to themselves who need not necessarily decide cases or con-
troversies. Conversation with Akhil Amar, July 29, 1994.
477 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1851). See discussion supra note 431. We have not consid-
ered whether such entities raise separation-of-powers problems under the Appointments
Clause. We also assume here that the federal courts may only decide cases or controversies
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judicial-executive incompatibility clause to prevent Article III judges
from holding simultaneous executive posts.
Similarly, the various statutes which uncontroversially give all in-
dividual Article III judges the equal power to naturalize citizens478 or
to conduct marriages 479 are unquestionably constitutional because, in
the absence of a judicial-executive incompatibility clause, there is no
bar to giving such judges civil executive offices that entail tasks (argua-
bly) beyond the adjudication of cases or controversies. 480 Accord-
ingly, even a truly wooden "originalist" need not entertain any fear
that his or her civil marriage is invalid simply because it was per-
formed without controversy by a Federal judge.
In sum, our modem practice after two hundred years is to avoid
simultaneous dual service when it would in any way whatsoever impair
the "checking" power of the judiciary relative to the other depart-
ments of government, while allowing dual service in other minor in-
stances.481 The minor instances are almost all tied closely to problems
of judicial administration or to other issues of a court-related
nature.48
2
3. A Normative Defense ofJudicial-Executive Incompatibility
The delegates to the Federal Convention never discussed, de-
bated, or voted on the concept of federal judicial-executive incompati-
bility.48 3 The reasons for this silence are not clear. But what is clear is
that the problem of excessive judicial power was not a burning issue at
Philadelphia in 1787. As Forrest McDonald reminds us, "[t]he dele-
gates devoted less time to forming the judiciary-and less attention to
careful craftsmanship-than they had expended on the legislative and
executive branches. 484 This may well have been because the Framers
had no recent practical experience with abusive judicial power.485
and that they lack ajudicial prerogative. See generally Thomas W. Merrill, TheJudicial Prerog-
ative 12 PACE L. REv. 327 (1992).
478 8 U.S.C. § 142(a) (1988).
479 See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 30-106 (1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 750, para. 5/209
(Smith-Hurd 1993); N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 11 (McKinney 1988).
480 The received wisdom is that these tasks do fall within the case or controversy de-
scription, since there is no inherent reason why a "case" cannot include an application by a
private person for a government grant of property or status. See HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 436, at 93; Tuten v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926) (Brandeis, J.).
481 Wheeler, Extrajudicia4 supra note 408, at 130-31, 152.
482 See supra notes 469-72 and accompanying text.
483 See supra notes 396-401 and accompanying text.
484 McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 253.
485 Indeed, John Dickenson warned his fellow delegates to the federal convention to
let "[e]xperience ... be our only guide" since "[r] eason may mislead us." 2 REcoRDs, supra
note 9, at 278 (Aug. 13, 1787). See also William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminaty of the Separation of
Powers in the Age of the Framers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REv. 263, 263 (1989) (quoting Louis
FISHER, PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: POWER AND POLICY 4-5 (1972)) (The Framers' argu-
1994] 1141
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Royal despotism in the 1770s and majority tyranny in the 1780s
had made the Framers acutely aware of the threat posed by concentra-
tions of power in the executive and legislative departments. The judi-
ciary, however, had never been an oppressive power of its own right, but
rather had been dominated and controlled by one of the two other
departments. 486 Thus, the Framers' main goal in drafting Article III
was to protect the federal courts from presidential or congressional
interference. 487 In 1787, the specter of judicial imperialism was im-
possible to conceive.48 Today, however, the "least dangerous
branch"489 looks a bit more menacing, and a great many thinkers on
both the right and the left have directed a lot of energy toward find-
ing principled ways to cabin its power.490 While most of these efforts
have sought to restrain the judiciary within the bounds of theories
that control constitutional and statutory interpretation, recent years
have also seen an increased interest in structural reforms as an answer
to our judicial woes.491 An expansion of the incompatibility principle
to prevent any commingling in the same hands ofjudicial and execu-
tive powers might be a structural reform worthy of consideration.
As explained above, a tradition of very substantial judicial-execu-
tive incompatibility has already grown up.492 The soundness of this
tradition requires little defense, for the hazards associated with judi-
cial service in the executive department are readily apparent. Aside
from the fact that extrajudicial service distracts judges from court
ments were always "grounded on what had been learned at home. Theory played a role,
but it was always circumscribed and tested by experience.").
486 See supra notes 30-32, 116 and accompanying text (royal governors and crown
manipulated colonial judges; state legislatures usurped most judicial power granted under
the state constitutions).
487 See THE FEDERALIsT No. 78, supra note 1, at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) ("[T]he gen-
eral liberty of the people can never be endangered.., so long as the judiciary remains
truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive.").
488 The early American complacency toward the judicial power stands in sharp con-
trast to the fear and contempt with which the judiciary was regarded in civil law countries.
This fear of the judiciary was markedly strong in France, where the judges had misused
their power in ways designed to sustain the ancien regime. Accordingly, after the Revolution,
the French severely constrained the power of theirjudges. See, e.g., MARY Am GLENDON ET
AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS 72-73 (1985).
489 Hamilton predicted in Federalist 78 that, as between the three great departments of
government, the "judiciary, from the nature of its functions, will always be the least danger-
ous to the political rights of the Constitution." THE FEDERALIST No. 78, surpa note 1, at
465.
490 See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); JOHN
HART ELY, DEMOCRACY & DISTRUST: A THEORY OFJUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); MICHaELJ. PERRY,
THE CONSrrrUTION IN THE COURTS: LAw OR PoLITICs? (1994).
491 See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Time's Up, Mr. Rehnquist: Term Limits forustices and Other
UnCourtly Ideas, WASH. PoST, May 8, 1994, at CI (discussing proposal to limitjudicial tenure
to nonrenewable eight- or twelve-year terms).
492 See supra notes 422-82 and accompanying text.
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work, which should be "exacting enough to demand the undivided
attention of all its members,"493 when judges serve in executive posts
they may end up passing on issues that will later come before them for
adjudication. If the judges hear those issues, the impartiality of the
courts is lost. If they recuse themselves, workload burdens may be
distributed unfairly. Moreover, on courts with fixed memberships like
the U.S. Supreme Court, recusals can affect the outcome of a closely
divided case. When judges hold executive office, there is an obvious
danger that judicial affinity for the executive department will come to
bias the judges in their adjudication of cases involving the United
States. Finally, as Alexander Hamilton explained in The Federalist,
[b]y being often associated with the executive, Ujudges] might be in-
duced to embark too far in the political views of that magistrate, and
thus a dangerous combination might by degrees be cemented be-
tween the executive and judiciary departments. It is impossible to
keep the judges too distinct from every other avocation than that of
expounding the laws. It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a
situation to be either corrupted or influenced by the executive.494
Somewhat less apparently, the employment of judges in nonjudicial
roles, where they are subject to executive department hierarchy, disci-
pline, and promotion can only have the effect of undermining the
federal courts' "reputation for impartiality and nonpartisanship,"495
which is the vital source of their authority and legitimacy. Where pro-
motion within the executive department is possible, the reality, as well
as the appearance, of judicial independence might well be
threatened. The President's power to promote federal judges already
curtails the independence afforded by Article III's tenure and salary
guarantees. If an additional lode of promotions is suddenly also avail-
able, the reality and appearance of lost independence will be that
much greater.
493 Letter from ChiefJustice Stone to Senator Styles Bridges (August 1, 1941) quoted in
Mason, supra note 422, at 200.
ChiefJustice Stone firmly believed that it was improper for federal judges to engage in
public acts that required them to perform nonjudicial functions. Writing to Senator
Bridges to decline an invitation to attend a testimonial dinner in his honor, Chief Justice
Stone expressed his concern that his colleagues' involving themselves in outside activities
was damaging to the Court's influence and prestige. He wrote:
The Court, as you know, has of late suffered from overmuch publicity. Af-
ter all, its only claim to public confidence is the thoroughness and fidelity
with which it does its daily task .... I am anxious to see the Court removed
more from the public eye except on decision day, as soon as possible-to
imbue its members by example and by precept with the idea that the big
job placed on us by the Constitution is our single intent in life and that, for
the present, public appearances and addresses by the judges and the at-
tendant publicity ought to be avoided.
Id.
494 THE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 1, at 446-47.
495 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 407 (1989).
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Moreover, while Chief Justice Warren's limited service in the ex-
ecutive "unquestionably lent authority, dignity and stature to the
Commission that bears his name,"496 one can only speculate as to the
amount of authority, dignity, and stature he would have stripped from
the Court had he demonstrated incompetence in his executive
role.497 Furthermore, regardless of how well the Chief Justice per-
formed his duties as head of the Warren Commission, the mere fact
that a ChiefJustice of the Supreme Court was so intimately associated
with an investigation that has engendered such lingering controversy
and speculation 498 can only have had the collateral effect of diminish-
ing the public's confidence in the Court. Much the same could be
said of Justice Jackson's involvement in the prosecution of the Nurem-
berg Trials, which Chief Justice Warren ironically admitted had the
additional effect of producing "divisiveness and internal bitterness on
the Court."
499
While one can understand and sympathize with a President's
yearning to draw on the prestige of the federal courts to solve tough
crises, the entanglement of judges in controversial undertakings, no
matter how important, must, in the end, cause harm to the federal
judiciary by stripping it of that appearance of impartial detachment
that sustains judicial legitimacy and effectiveness. 500 For all these rea-
sons, a case can be made for constitutionalizing a strict rule of federal
judicial-executive incompatibility. Such a rule would, at least, protect
federal judges from being placed in the awkward position of having to
refuse presidential requests that they further serve their country.501
496 Robert F. Cushman, Why the Warren Commission?, 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 477, 502 (1965).
497 Cf id. at 502 ("[T] he presence of the Chief Justice would aggravate the already
embarrassing position of the Commission were it to turn up a new suspect or an accom-
plice. Had there been the least suspicion that this could occur it seems inconceivable that
ChiefJustice Warren would have accepted appointment to the Commission.").
498 To this day, charges of conspiracy and cover-up surround the findings of the War-
ren Commission, and the memory of the ChiefJustice's association with this investigation
has not left the public mind. A recent notable example is Oliver Stone's film, JFK
499 WARREN, supra note 458, at 356.
500 As the Justices themselves recognized as early as 1792, in asking Congress to relieve
them of their nonjudicial duties while riding circuit: "The distinction made between the
Supreme Court and itsJudges... is a distinction unfriendly to impartial justice, and to that
confidence in the Supreme Court, which it is so essential to the public Interest should be
reposed in it." Marcus, supra note 425, at 277 (quoting Letter from Justices of the Supreme
Court to Congress (Aug. 9, 1792) (Record Group 46, National Archives)).
501 ChiefJustice Stone was constantly being put in the position of refusing requests to
serve in executive capacities. See Mason, supra note 422, at 199-216. While Stone was firm
in his resolve not to accept any such appointments, Chief Justice Warren found himself
more susceptible to executive pressure. As discussed earlier, Warren initially refused to
accept PresidentJohnson's request that he head the investigation into President Kennedy's
death. His reasoning was threefold:
First, it is not in the spirit of constitutional separation of powers to have a
member of the Supreme Court serve on a presidential commission; second,
it would distract a Justice from the work of the Court, which had a heavy
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Of course, the practical effects of constitutionalizing the rule
would most likely be small. The electoral system already provides a
mechanism for enforcing violations, even of unwritten constitutional
traditions. Moreover, the political costs to any President who would
nominate a Judge to anything more than a temporary executive post,
or to the Senate that would confirm such a nomination, are probably
sufficient to enforce the essential separation of the personnel of these
two great Departments. 50 2 In addition, the Code of Judicial Ethics
purports to limit the ability of judges to accept nonjudicial posts.
50 3
Thus, despite occasional breaches, the convention prohibiting federal
judges from holding executive office does not appear to be in any
great danger of demise. Yet, while we acknowledge that any constitu-
tional reform is unlikely to occur in the absence of crisis, we would
follow the lead of forty-seven of the fifty states and include a judicial-
executive incompatibility clause in any constitution that was being
written from scratch.
Some explicit exceptions could be made to allow forJudicial Con-
ferences,50 4 Councils, and law reform commissions, or for a power on
the part ofjudges to conduct naturalizations and weddings, assuming
one even thinks that the received wisdom that conducting such func-
tions falls within the judicial power is somehow wrong. We think the
key factor is this: Judges should, at a minimum, not be allowed to take
on any executive function, office, or power that is not equally available
to all other Article IIIjudges on the same terms. So long as there is a
rule that no executive office or power can be given to one judge with-
out it also being made available to all other judges at the same time,
docket; and, third, it was impossible to foresee what litigation such a com-
mission might spawn, with resulting disqualification of the Justice from sit-
ting in such cases.
WARREN, supra note 458, at 356. Yet, under pressure fromJohnson, he eventually agreed to
heed the President's request. See id. at 356-58.
The example of ChiefJustice Warren's succumbing to executive pressure may suggest
a need for an incompatibility provision between judicial and executive offices. If executive
pressure is strong enough to persuade the ChiefJustice of the United States to accede to
the President's request for extrajudicial service, despite his better judgment, the effects of
this pressure must be greatly multiplied for all lower federal judges and Associate Justices,
whose chances for promotion rest with the President.
502 Given the holding in Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee To Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 225 (1974), that claims arising under the present Incompatibility Clause are non-
justiciable "generalized grievances," it appears that the political process would likely pro-
vide the sole avenue for redress even if we were to constitutionalize the tradition of
judicial-executive incompatibility. On the other hand, perhaps Schlesingerwill some day be
limited to its facts. See supra note 12.
503 See supra note 377.
504 The role of the Judicial Conference in promulgating the Federal Rules is not in
our view, desirable. See, e.g., the famous dissents of Justice Black and Douglas from the
order of January 21, 1963 altering the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See also Redish,
supra note 17, at 315-17.
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there is no danger, real or in appearance, of presidential or congres-
sional corruption of the courts.
505
The Constitution has very explicit rules that govern the precise
degree to which the three powers of government are separated and
shared.50 6 It would be a better document if it had equally explicit
rules to govern the precise degree to which judicial and executive per-
sonnel must be separated and shared between these two great depart-
ments of government.
B. The Tradition of Federal-State Incompatibility
We turn, finally, to our last topic: The unwritten tradition that
has grown up proscribing the dual holding of federal and state offices.
Section 1 sets forth the original understanding as to this issue; Section
2 describes our actual historical practice over the last two hundred
years; and Section 3 normatively defends the practice that has devel-
oped of a strict bar on dual federal-state office holding.
1. The Original Understanding
a. Text and Context
The constitutional text is totally silent on the subject of the dual
holding of federal and state offices. It is helpful, therefore, to con-
sider initially the Framers' actual practice on this matter under the
Articles of Confederation. This practice helps us to understand the
presuppositions of the Framers and ratifiers of the Constitution as to
the dual holding of federal and state offices.507 It provides the back-
drop against which the silent constitutional text must be read.
The Articles of Confederation plainly contemplated the dual
holding of federal and state offices. Indeed, dual office holding was
almost the rule, rather than the exception. Most federal executive 508
and judicial50 9 functions were performed by state officials, who were
simultaneously federal officials, during the period of the Articles. For
example, all federal adjudications were rendered by special federal
courts appointed from the state bench, for this purpose.510 The
505 We are confident that no President or Congress would surrender any real signifi-
cant executive power to the whole of the federal judiciary. -Pending constitutionalization of
our rule, we would propose it for inclusion in the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges.
506 Compare the vesting clauses with, for example, the Presentment Clause.
507 For a nice discussion of the value of the Articles of Confederation in understanding
constitutional federalism, see Saikrishna Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 U. VA. L. REv.
1957, 1962-71 (1993).
508 There were a few wholly federal executive offices set up under the Articles' govern-
ment but their existence does not affect our analysis here. See id.
509 Id. at 1967-71.
510 Id. at 1969 n.67.
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judges on those courts were for all practical purposes both federal and
state officials. Similarly, the Members of the Continental Congress
during this period were also often state officials. Even when they did
not actually hold simultaneous state offices, the fact that they were
paid for their federal service out of state coffers must have blurred the
line between federal and state loyalties. 51'
Against the backdrop of this experience and practice, the silence
of the Constitution must be assumed not to have disturbed the dual
office holding custom. We can be even more confident of this fact
when we consider that various counter-customary federalism provi-
sions were made quite textually explicit lest confusion occur. For ex-
ample, the Constitution specifically provides for national salaries for
Members of Congress, for the President, and implicitly for the Article
III judiciary.5 12 In addition, the Constitution guarantees the term of
office of all of those national figures, thus protecting them from being
recalled by the states.513 Recall was allowed under the Articles govern-
ment and diminished the independence at that time of federal
officials.
In addition, we can be confident that the original Constitution
contemplated dual federal-state office holding because of the provi-
sion made for the election of U.S. Senators by state legislatures.5 14
This rule of election made U.S. Senators, in effect, "ambassadors"
from the state legislatures to the national government. As a result,
national senatorial office was, to a degree, a state legislative office. In
effect, the Speakers and Presidents Pro Tempore of the state legisla-
tures automatically became national officers and went to Washington.
Once there, they had to remain very active in state legislative matters
if they were to be re-elected. Thus, the original Senate was set up
almost to guarantee a form of dual federal-state office holding.515
Finally, we can be certain that the Constitution permits dual fed-
eral-state office holding because of the explicitness with which it for-
bids the dual holding of any foreign office and a U.S. national or state
office. 516 The existence of this Article I, Section 9 ban on dual for-
eign-U.S. office holding, and the absence of any comparable Article I,
511 We are indebted to Akhil Amar for bringing this point forcefully to our attention
and for stressing to us on many occasions the continued relevance of the Articles of Con-
federation, America's first constitution.
512 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1; U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 1 cl. 7; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl.
2.
513 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 cl. 1;
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 2.
514 U.S. CONST. art I, § 3, cl. 1 (emphasis added) ("The Senate of the United States
shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof, for six
Years .... ").
515 We again thank Akhil Amar for calling this vital point to our attention.
516 U.S. CoNsr. art I, § 9, cl. 8.
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Section 10 ban on joint federal-state office holding, strongly suggests
that joint federal-state office holding is definitely allowed.
517
Luther Martin so informed the general public when the Constitu-
tion was ratified. In his widely read statement of his reasons for not
signing the Constitution,518 Martin explained that the Constitutional
Convention had considered a proposal to create federal-state incom-
patibility but had decided against it. He noted that:
[i] t was said, and in my opinion justly, that no good reason could be
assigned why a senator or representative should be incapacitated to
hold an office in his own government, since it can only bind him
more closely to his State, and attach him the more to its interests,
which, as its representative, he is bound to consult and sacredly
guard, as far as is consistent with the welfare of the union; and
therefore, at most, would only add the additional motive of grati-
tude for discharging his duty; and according to this idea, the clause
which prevented senators or delegates from holding offices in their
own States, was rejected by a considerable majority.519
Accordingly, public utterances contemporary with ratification support
the view that the Constitution was originally understood to create no
incompatibility that would forbid the joint holding of federal and
state office.
b. Private Statements and the Debate at the Convention
As Luther Martin's comments imply, the famous Virginia Plan
had contained a clause that would have barred state office holders
from Congress (although not from the national executive or judici-
ary).520 Nevertheless, the delegates decided to get rid of this provision
with surprisingly little debate.
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney argued against federal-state incom-
patibility by pointing to "the inconveniency to which such a restriction
would expose both the members.., and the States wishing for their
services. '521 Roger Sherman added that by adopting an intergovern-
mental incompatibility provision "[i] t [would] seem that we are erect-
ing a Kingdom at war with itself."522 The only vocal opposition to the
deletion of the federal-state incompatibility rule came from James Wil-
son, who feared that letting M.C.s hold state office would make them
517 Article I, Section 9, of course imposes a series of Bill of Rights-type disabilities on
the national government. Article I, Section 10, incorporates similar, but not identical, disa-
bilities against the states.
518 See 2 COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST, supra note 91, at 52.
519 Id.
520 See 1 REcoRws, supra note 9, at 20-21. See also supra note 101 and accompanying text
(quoting the text of Randolph's fourth and fifth resolutions).




too dependent on the states. "The longer the time," he said, "allotted
to the officer, the more complete will be the dependance."523 With
this scant debate the delegates cut federal-state incompatibility out of
the Randolph Resolutions.
Given the ease with which this was done in the midst of great
controversy over the problem of legislative-executive incompatibility,
we must wonder what the Framers hoped to gain by allowing simulta-
neous federal-state service. As we should by now expect, Republicans
and Federalists probably had divergent motives that in this instance
led them to favor the same outcome., Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
and Pierce Butler, both "traditional Republicans, '524 were staunch de-
fenders of the state governments. Pinckney and Butler were responsi-
ble for the motions to delete federal-state incompatibility from the
original Randolph Resolutions.525 They must have believed that Con-
gress would necessarily respond better to the interests of the states as
states if, for example, various officers of the several states also sat in
the Houses of Congress.
On the other hand, Republican support for eliminating federal-
state incompatibility cannot alone explain matters because the mo-
tions to delete the clause carried by a vote of eight states to three 526
and were vocally opposed by only one Federalist speaker.527 The ab-
sence of serious Federalist resistance to a proposal that so obviously
benefitted the Republican cause suggests that many Federalists also
wanted to allow simultaneous service in federal and state offices.
Although we cannot document this, one plausible explanation
for the lack of Federalist opposition is that many Federalists may have
believed that national power would be augmented if capable men cho-
523 Id. at 428-29 (June 26, 1787).
524 Historians have used various labels to refer to the group of delegates to the Federal
Convention who, although generally agreeing that the national government needed to be
strengthened, nonetheless advocated a strong role for the state governments in the new
constitutional scheme. CalvinJillson, for example, refers to these delegates as "traditional
republicans." See CALVIN C. JILLSON, CONSTITrrlON MAKING: CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS IN
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 49-50 (1988). Forrest McDonald resurrects the
archaic spelling of the term "foederalists" to distinguish those delegates who supported a
federal system of government that would respect state sovereignty from the "Federalists"
who later advocated ratification of the Constitution and became members of the Federalist
party. See McDoNALD, supra note 44, at 201 n.20. Gordon Wood simply uses the term
"Antifederalists," although that label is more commonly applied to those who opposed
ratification of the Constitution after the completion of the Federal Convention. SeeWooD,
supra note 22, at 499.
525 General Pinckney and Pierce Butier, both of South Carolina, actually made sepa-
rate motions to strike the provisions that would have rendered members of each House of
Congress ineligible for appointment to state offices. 1 RECORDS, supra note 9, at 386 (June
23, 1787); id at 428 (June 26, 1787).
526 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 386 (June 23, 1787) (Pinckney's motion); id. at 429 (June
26, 1787) (Butler's motion).
527 See remarks ofJames Wilson, quoted supra text accompanying note 523.
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sen to hold state office were also allowed to serve in national office.528
Similar concerns about the need to attract the best politicians for na-
tional service had led prominent Federalists to oppose even federal
legislative-executive incompatibility. 529 The nation-building concerns
that caused many Federalists to accept dual legislative-executive office
holding as a way to attract the brightest and best 530 may have also
convinced them to forgo a major attack on dual federal-state office
holding. Thus, federal-state incompatibility may have been so easily
defeated because its demise furthered both Federalist and Republican
ends.
2. Our Actual Practice, Historically and Today
From the beginning of our constitutional history down to the
present time, it is widely known that state officials have been relied
upon to carry out many national functions. Thus, state judges have
been asked to adjudicate cases involving federal questions, and state
executives to a much lesser degree have been asked to execute and
implement federal law. Saikrishna Prakash, in his thoughtful article
entitled Field Office Federalism, persuasively explains how state officials
can constitutionally be asked or even forced to carry out these federal
tasks.531 He also explains persuasively why State Legislatures cannot
be conscripted by Congress even though state executives and courts
can be.
532
The issue to which we now turn, however, is not whether state
officials have historically carried out federal functions, but rather
whether they have also chosen jointly to hold federal and state offices.
The answer of course is generally no. There have been a few exam-
ples of state officers simultaneously holding seats in Congress. Sena-
tor Robert LaFollete of Wisconsin, for example, retained his position
as Governor of that State untilJanuary, 1906, even though he partici-
pated as a U.S. Senator in a special session of the Senate that had met
in March, 1905. 533 But, these exceptions are real rarities, and they
tend to prove rather than disprove the rule we suggest. Likewise, the
Seventeenth Amendment's abolition of state legislative election of
U.S. Senators5 34 reveals a powerful trend away from dually held fed-
528 General Pinckney, the Republican proponent of the motion to strike out the state
office incompatibility clause, actually argued this point. 1 REcoRDs, supra note 9, at 429
(June 26, 1787) ("Such a restriction would also discourage the ablest men from going into
the Senate.").
529 See supra notes 131-42 and accompanying text.
530 Id.
531 Prakash, supra note 507, at 1990-2032.
532 Id. at 1971-89.
533 See I WILLOUGHBY, THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED STATES 606 (2d ed. 1929).
534 U.S. CONsT. amend. XVII ("The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof. .. ").
1150 [Vol. 79:1045
1994] SEPARATION OF PERSONNEL 1151
eral-state governmental offices. Today, it seems almost unimaginable
for one individual simultaneously to hold salaried, full-time federal
and state offices.53 5 We just assume that if a state Governor, legislator,
or judge attains national office, she will naturally (and ought to) re-
sign her state office.
Why is it that we make this assumption? The answer is because a
rule of one person, one office federal-state incompatibility is virtually
mandated in most instances by state constitutional law. Thus, forty-
seven out of fifty states have clauses in their state constitutions render-
ing individuals holding federal office ineligible to serve in their state
legislatures. 536 At least twenty-six states forbid persons to serve in the
executive department of the federal government while serving in
some offices of the executive department of their state government.
53 7
At least twenty states specifically preclude their Governor from simul-
taneously serving in the federal executive department.538 And, forty-
535 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9 (1985) (Powell,
J., dissenting) ("The adoption of the Seventeenth amendment (providing for direct elec-
tion of senators), the weakening of political parties on the local level, and the rise of na-
tional media, among other things, have made Congress increasingly less representative of
state and local interests, and more likely to be responsive to the demands of various na-
tional constituencies.").
536 ALA. CONsT. art. 17, § 280; ALASKA CONST. art. 2, § 5; ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 4;
Am. CONST. art. 5, § 7; CAL. CONST. art. 7, § 7; COLO. CO~sT. art. 5, § 8; CONN. CONST. art.
3, § 11; DEL- CONsr. art. 2, § 14; FLA- CONST. art. 2, § 5(a); GA. CONST. art. 3, § 2, para.
4(b); ILL. CONST. art. 4 § 2(e); IND. CONST. art. 2, § 9; IOWA CONST. art. 3, § 22; KA. CONST.
art. 2, § 5; Ky. CONST. § 237; LA. CONsT. art. 10, § 22; LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:63(A) (West
1991); ME. CONST. art. 4, pt. 3, § 11; MD. CONsT. art. 3, § 10; MAss. CONST. amend., art. 8;
MICH. CONST. art. 4, § 8; MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 5; Miss. CONST. art. 14, § 266; Mo. CONST.
art. 3, § 12; Mo. CONsT. art. 7, § 9; MONT. CONST. art. 5, § 9; NEB. CONST. art. 3, § 9; NEv.
CONST. art. 4, § 9; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 95; NJ. CONST. art. 4, § 5, para. 3; NJ. CONST. art.
4, § 5, pam. 4; N.M CONsr. art. 4, § 3(A); N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 7; N. C. CONSr. art. 6, § 9(1);
OHIO CoNsr. art. 2, § 4; OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 12; OKLA. art. 5, § 18; OR. CONST. art. 2,
§ 10; PA. CONST. art. 2, § 6; PA. CONST. art. 6, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. 3, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. 3,
§ 24; S.C. CONST. art. 6, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 26; TEx. CONST.
art. 3, § 19; Tax. CONST. art. 16, § 12; Tax. CONST. art. 16, § 40; UTAH CONST. art. 6, § 6;
UTAH CONsT. art. 7, § 21; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 54; VA. CONST. art. 4, § 4; WASH. CONST. art. 2,
§ 14; W. VA. CONsT. art. 6, § 13; Wis. CoNs'r. art. 4, § 13; Wvo. CONST. art. 3, § 8; Wyo.
CONST. art. 6, § 19.
537 ALA. CONsT. art. 17, § 280; ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 22; CAL. CONST. art. 7, § 7; DEL.
CONST. art. 3, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 5(a); IND. CONST. art. 2, § 9; Ky. CONST. § 237; LA.
CONsT. art. 4, § 2; LA. CONST. art. 10, § 22; LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 42:63(A) (West 1991);
MAss. CONST. amend., art. 8; Miss. CONST. art. 14, § 266; Mo. CONST. art. 7, § 9; MoNT.
CONST. art. 6, § 5(2); NEV. CONST. art. 4, § 9; N.C. CONST. art. 6, § 9(1); OKLA. CONSr. art.
2, § 12; OR. CONST. art. 2, § 10; PA. CONST. art. 6, § 2; R.I. CONST. art. 3, § 6; S.C. CONST.
art. 6, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. 2, § 26; TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 12; TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 40;
UTAH CONST. art 7, § 21; VT. CONsr. ch. 2, § 54; W. VA. CONST. art. 7, § 4; Wis. CONsT. art.
13, § 3; Wvo. CONsT. art 6, § 19.
538 ALA. CONST. art. 5, § 130; ALAsKA CONST. art. 3, § 6; ARita CONST. art. 6, § 11; CAL.
CONST. art. 5, § 2; CAL. CONsr. art. 5, § 12; HAw. CONST. art. 5, § 1; INn. CONST. art. 5, § 8;
IND. CONST. art. 5, § 24; IOWA CONsT. art. 4, § 14; ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 1, § 5; MAss. CONST.
pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 2; NEv. CONST. art. 5, § 12; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 93; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
95; NJ. CONsT. art. 5, § 1, para. 3; N.D. CONST. art. 5, § 3; OHIo CONsr. art. 3, § 14; OR.
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one states forbid members of their state judiciaries from holding of-
fice in the federal government.
53 9
Thus, we can see that the original position of the Randolph Reso-
lutions that there ought to be a constitutional ban on simultaneous
federal-state office holding, has won out in America. Ironically, how-
ever, the ban exists as a matter of state rather than federal constitu-
tional law. Why would so many states, acting individually, choose to
enact such a ban? Maybe in part to secure the full-time service and
attention of their office holders from excessive national loyalties. The
fact is that at the point when the national government's power finally
outstripped the power of the states, simultaneous dual office holding
must have become more threatening to the states than it was to the
national government. The states protected themselves with the only
tool at their disposal. They enacted into state constitutional law a fed-
eral-state incompatibility rule virtually identical to the one that advo-
cates of state power had defeated in 1787.
3. A Normative Defense of Federal-State Incompatibility
We believe there are a number of reasons to think strict federal-
state incompatibility is generally a good idea. First, the enormous
growth in the power of the federal government does make it danger-
ous for the states to allow simultaneous federal-state service. The fed-
eral office in any dual office holding arrangement is likely to seem
disproportionately important to the office holder. As a result, it is
likely to command more of the office holder's time, energies, and at-
tention. This may be especially likely if a prospect exists of promotion
to a higher federal office (or of removal from the present one). A
CONST. art. 5, § 3; PA. CONST. art. 4, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. 4, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. 3, § 13;
TEX. CONSr. art. 4, § 6; VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1.
539 ALA. CONST. amend. 328, § 6.08(b); ALA. CONsT. art. 17, § 280; ALASKA CONsr. art.
4, § 14; ARIz. CONST. art. 6, § 28; ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 10; ARK. CONST. art. 7, § 18; CAL.
CONST. art. 6, § 18; COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 18; DEL. CONST. art. 4, § 4; FLA. CONsr. art. 2,
§ 5; FLA. CoNsr. art. 5, § 13; HAw. CONST. art. 6, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 13(b); IND.
CONST. art. 2, § 9; KAN. CONST. art. 3, § 13; Ky. CONST. § 237; LA. CONSr. art 10, § 22; LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 42:63(A) (West 1991); ME. CONST. art. 6, § 5; ME. CONSr. art. 9, § 2; MD.
CONST. art. 4, § 41C; MD. CONST. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. 33; MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 2;
MASS. CONST. amend., art. 8; MINN. CONST. art. 6, § 6; Miss. CONSr. art. 14, § 266; Mo.
CONST. art. 7, § 9; MONT. CONST. art. 7, § 9(3); NJ. CONST. art. 6, § 6, para. 7; N.Y. CONST.
art. 6, § 20, para. b(1); N.C. CONST. art 6, § 9(1); N.D. CONsr. art. 6, § 10; OHIO CONST.
art. 4, § 6(B); OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 12; OKLA. CONST. art. 7, § 11(b); OR. CONSr. art. 2,
§ 10; PA. CONST. art. 5, § 17(a); PA. CONST. art. 6, § 2; I. CONST. art. 3, § 6; S.C. CONST.
art. 5, § 16; S.C. CONST. art. 6, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. 5, § 10; TENN. CONsr. art- 2, § 26; TEx.
CONST. art. 16, § 12; TEX. CONST. art. 16, § 40; UTAH CONST. art 7, § 21; UTAH CONST. art.
8, § 10; VT. CoNsT. ch. 2, § 54; VA. CONST. art. 6, § 11; WASH. CONSr. art. 4, § 15; W. VA.
CONsT. art. 8, § 7; Wis. CONST. art. 7, § 10(1); WIs. CONST. art. 13, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art. 5,
§ 27; Wyo. CONsT. art. 6, § 19.
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sensible state, desiring the full loyalty of its office holders, might thus
well prefer a strict incompatibility rule.
Even when the federal office in any dual arrangement is a minor
one, problems remain. Various conflicts of interest may arise as to
vital policy matters. More subtle conflicts of interest are possible too.
Office holders may find it difficult fairly to allocate their time and
energy if they are in effect holding down two jobs. If the two offices
are both elective, it may prove impossible to satisfy fairly different elec-
toral constituencies with different interests. If the two offices are ap-
pointive or judicial, the same conflict would ensue. No person can
well serve two masters at the same time. Federal-state incompatibility
is a vital protection against conflicts of interest.
Finally, there is the problem of the threat of preferment that is
created just by the possibility of simultaneous dual federal-state office
holding, even when no one is actually then engaging in it. The mere
legality of such dual office holding could cause state officials to jockey
with one another for federal jobs.540 In the process, they might be
tempted collectively to sell-out vital state interests with each official
thus hoping to win federal favor and office. The status quo rule of
federal-state incompatibility frees state officials from this prisoner's di-
lemma.541 It eliminates the possibility of entering into an unequal
bargain, thus preventing unseemly and undesirable competition
among state officers for federal good will.
542
CONCLUSION: SEPARATION OF POWERS, SEPARATION OF INSTITUTIONS,
OR SEPARATION OF PERSONNEL?
We come now to the end of our story, having defended in iso-
lated discussion thus far: 1) the Incompatibility Clause of Article II,
Section 6; 2) the unwritten federal tradition of judicial-executive in-
compatibility; and, 3) the tradition, codified in state constitutional
540 See supra notes 495-96 and accompanying text (identifying a similar prisoner's di-
lemma preferment problem for federal judges, absent a federal judicial executive incom-
patibility rule).
541 Another way to free state officials from this dilemma would be to require that no
state officer be given any type of federal office or power unless all other state officers in the
category also received the same federal office or power. Such a generality-of-preferment
rule would be analogous to the rule proposed above wherein we defend the practice of
giving judges the arguably executive powers to conduct naturalizations and weddings on
the ground that all judges are being treated alike. See supra note 505.
542 It is no longer possible to argue, as it was in 1787, that a rule of federal-state incom-
patibility would prevent the "best and the brightest" from going to Washington to work for
the national government. Indeed, a more realistic concern might be that such a rule
would keep too many of the "best and the brightest" from working for state governments.
While we find this concern telling, we nonetheless conclude that it is overcome by: 1) the
tendency, now well-established, for most politicians to begin their careers in state politics,
only later seeking national office; and 2) by the dangerous conflicts of interest that dual
federal-state office-holding would create.
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law, of federal-state incompatibility. Consider now whether there are
any common themes.
A first theme, it seems to us, is the steady growth over the last two
hundred years of support for the one person, one office principle.
This growth in support is plainly evident in the Framer's decision to
depart from British practice by including an Incompatibility Clause in
the federal Constitution. It is also evident in the growth over two hun-
dred years of the by now vibrant judicial-executive and federal-state
543
incompatibility traditions.
But various aspects of our constitutional law suggest growing pub-
lic support for constitutionalizing the one person, one office rule in
other contexts as well. For example, the states, our laboratories of
democracy and constitutionalism, have experimented with even more
sweeping constitutional incompatibilities than those hitherto dis-
cussed. Thus, at least seventeen states disallow some forms of dual
service in more than one position within the executive department of
a state's government,544 and at least twenty states specifically preclude
the Governor from simultaneously holding another executive office
within that state's government.5 45 At least nineteen states forbid the
dual holding of state and local governmental offices, and twenty-eight
states forbid judges from practicing law.
5 46
543 It should be remembered that federal-state incompatibility provisions in state con-
stitutional law can only have the effect of forcing the vacation of the state office. A state
constitutional prohibition on dual office holding cannot force a state officer to give up her
seat in Congress because the United States Constitution declares that "[e]ach House shall
be theJudge of the... Qualifications of its own Members." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1. See
State ex rel. Wettengel v. Zimmerman, 24 N.W.2d 504 (Wis. 1946) (refusing to enjoin Wis-
consin State judge from seeking Republican nomination for the United States Senate on
ground that the United States Constitution grants Senate the sole power to judge the quali-
fications of its members).
544 ALA. CONST. art. 17, § 280; Asx. CONST. art. 6, § 22; DEL. CONST. art. 3, § 11; FLA.
CONST. art. 2, § 5; IND. CONST. art. 2, § 9; LA. CONST. art. 4, § 2; ME. CONST. art. 9, § 2;
MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 2; MONT. CONST. art. 6, § 5; NEB. CONSr. art. 4, § 2; N.C.
CONST. art. 6, § 9(1); OR. CONST. art. 2, § 10; S.C. CONST. art. 6, § 3; TENN. CONST. art. 2,
§ 26; TEx. CONST. art. 16, § 40; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 54; W. VA. CONST. art. 7, § 4.
545 ALA. CONST. art. 5, § 130; ALAsKA CONST. art. 3, § 6; Amu. CONST. art. 6, § 11; CAL.
CONST. art. 5, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. 5, § 12; HAw. CONST. art. 5, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 5, § 8;
IND. CONST. art. 5, § 24; IOWA CONST. art. 4, § 14; ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 1, § 5; MASS. CONST.
pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 2; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 93; N.J. CONST. art. 5, § 1, para. 3; N.C. CONST. art.
6, § 9(1); N.D. CONST. art. 5, § 3; OHIO CONST. art. 3, § 14; OR. CONST. art. 5, § 3; PA.
CONST. art. 4, § 6; S.C. CONST. art. 4, § 2; TENN. CONST. art. 3, § 13; TEx. CONST. art. 4, § 6;
VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1.
546 State laws forbidding dual holding of state and local governmental offices include:
ALAsKA CONST. art. 3, § 6; ALAsKA CONST. art. 4, § 14; ARIz. CONST. art. 4, pt. 2, § 5;
ARK. CONST. art. 6, § 22; CONN. CONST. art. 3, § 11; FLA. CONST. art. 2, § 5; HAW. CoNST. art.
6, § 3; ILL. CONST. art. 4, § 2(e); Ky. CONST. § 165; ME. CONST. art. 5, pt. 1, § 5; ME. CONST.
art. 9, § 2; MAss. CONST. pt. 2, ch. 6, art. 2; MicH. CONST. art. 4, § 8; Mo. CONST. art. 3, § 12;
MONT. CONST. art. 6, § 5; N.M. CONSr. art. 4, § 3(A); N.Y. CONST. art. 13, § 13(a); OHIO
CONST. art. 2, § 4; PA. CONST. art. 5, § 17(a); S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 24; S.C. CONST. art. 4, § 2;
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These facts make clear that the rule of one person, one office is
fast becoming the constitutional norm in America., Another way of
putting this point is that we Americans have come to understand the
"separation of powers" as entailing also a separation of personnel.
Thus, of the forty states that now have a general separation-of-powers
clause or provision in their state constitutions, eleven provide only
that the powers of one branch of the government may not be exer-
cised by either of the other branches, 547 while the other twenty-nine
also prevent individuals from exercising the power of more than one
branch at the same time.5 48 The rule of one person, one office is here
to stay at the level of state constitutional law. America has progressed
from a separation of powers to a separation of institutions to a separa-
tion of personnel.
A second general theme is the close connection between ethics
rules and the separation of powers. Both, obviously, are concerned
with preventing corruption and the abuse of concentrated power.
Less obviously, both are concerned with the problem of conflicts of
interest as well. We have seen how the threat of conflicts of interest
runs like a thread through all three of the major constitutional separa-
tion-of-personnel issues discussed above. The Incompatibility Clause
protects against Cabinet members with differing national and state
electoral loyalties. The judicial-executive incompatibility tradition
protects against presidential preferment of pliant, ambitious judges
for simultaneous executive office. The federal-state bar in the state
constitutions protects against the related threat of federal preferment
of disloyal state officials for simultaneous national office.
In all of these instances, the Incompatibility Principle forbids gov-
ernment officers from trying to serve two masters at the same time.
W. VA. CONST. art. 6, § 13; see supra note 474 for state laws forbidding judges from practic-
ing law.
Finally, Tennessee purports to create an incompatibility between service as a Minister of
the Clergy and the holding of public office. TENN. CONST. art. 9, § 1. Several states also
purport to make it unconstitutional for atheists to hold public office. See, e.g., ARn. CONST.
art. 19, § 1; Miss. CONST. art. 14, § 265; N.C. CONST. art. 6, § 8; S.C. CoNST. art. 4, § 2; S.C.
CONSr. art 6, § 2; S.C. CONST. art. 17, § 4; TENN. CONST. art. 9, § 2. But see McDaniel v. Paty,
435 U.S. 618 (1978) (invalidating such state constitutional restrictions on federal constitu-
tional grounds).
547 ALAsKA CONsT. art. 3, § 43; ARiz. CONST. art. 3; CONN. CONST. art. 2; ILL. CONsr. art.
2, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. 30; N.H. CONST. pt. 1, art. 37; N.C. CONST. art. 1, § 6; OKLA.
CONST. art. 4, § 1; R.I. CONS?. art. 5; S.D. CONST. art. 2; VT. CONST. ch. 2, § 5.
548 Amu. CONST. art. 4, § 2; CAL. CONST. art. 3, § 3; COLO. CONST. art 3; FLA. CONS?. art.
2, § 3; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2, para. 3; IDAHO CONST. art. 2, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1; IOWA
CONST. art. 3, § 1; Ky. CONS?. § 28; LA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1, 2; ME. CONST. art. 3, §§ 1, 2; MD.
CONS?. DEC. OF RIGHTS, art. 8; MICH. CONS?, art. 3, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 3, § 1; Miss.
CONsr. art. 1, §§ 1, 2; Mo. CONs?. art. 2, § 1; MONT. CONsT. art. 3, § 1; NEB. CONsT. art. 2,
§ 1; NEv. CONs?. art. 3, § 1; N.J. CONs?. art. 3, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OR. CONS?. art. 3,
§ 1; S.C. CONs?. art. 1, § 8; TENN. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1, 2; TEx. CONs?. art. 2, § 1; UTAH
CONST. art. 5, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 3, § 1; W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; WYo. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
1994] 1155
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
The rule is: Whatever your constituency, electoral or otherwise, serve
it and it alone, while renouncing all others.
This brings us to a third general normative theme, which is the
way in which the rule of the separation of personnel fosters competi-
tion and deconcentrates power. By guaranteeing a multiplicity of gov-
ernment actors as well as institutions, the separation of personnel
prevents any one actor from monopolizing government power. In-
stead, a competitive, adversarial dialogue is set up out of which policy
must emerge. For those who believe, as we do, in the inherent value
of competition 549 and constitutional dialogue,550 this consequence of
the separation of personnel is a happy one indeed.
Fourth, the story we have told of the growth of two incompatibil-
ity traditions interestingly illustrates the complex interplay between
"real world" practice and both federal and state constitutional law.
This interplay has also been shown to be at work in the growth of the
congressional committee system, America's Incompatibility Clause-in-
duced alternative to parliamentary government.
5 51
Fifth, the three separation-of-personnel problems we have consid-
ered all reveal the relevance to incompatibility of inequalities of bar-
gaining power. In each instance, constitutional incompatibility rules
were defended normatively in part because of inequalities of bargain-
ing power. Thus, we defended the Incompatibility Clause because we
thought it essential to protect the President, and the national constitu-
ency which he represents,552 from Congress, the most dangerous (and
powerful) branch of government. Similarly, we normatively defended
judicial-executive incompatibility as being necessary to protect the ju-
diciary, the least dangerous branch, from the reality and the appear-
ance of being "corrupted" by the hope of executive preferment for
office. Finally, we normatively defended federal-state incompatibility
as being necessary to prevent the officers of the once-sovereign states
from being "corrupted" by preferment for office in the powerful and
549 See ROBERT H. BoR, THE ANTrrRusT PARADOx (1978); ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannan ed., 5th ed.
1930).
550 Steven G. Calabresi, Thayer's Clear Mistake, 88 Nw. U. L. REv. 269, 275 (1993) (de-
fending American-style dialogic judicial review over European-style Constitutional Court
judicial review).
551 Another "jurisprudential" lesson to be drawn may be the underappreciated value of
simple, clear-cut constitutional rules. The constitutional provisions that are most often the
focus of our attention are those whose meanings are so obscure that they produce a great
deal of litigation and scholarly discussion. Yet, the most effective constitutional commands
are often those, like the Incompatibility Clause, whose directives are so clear that even the
most clever dare not try to avoid them.
552 Technically, the Vice President also represents the same national constituency, but
those of us who have worked for a U.S. Vice President know that, in many respects, they
represent a constituency of one. See Akhil Reed Amar & Vik Arnar, President Quayle?, 78 VA.
L. RExv. 913 (1992).
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now dominant national government. In each of these instances, an
incompatibility rule was essential to overcoming deep-rooted inequali-
ties of power among the departments and levels of our government.
Finally, we have seen throughout our study of the problems ad-
dressed by this Article a truly astounding array of unintended conse-
quences. The Framers wrote an ethics-rule Incompatibility Clause
into the Constitution with the purpose of stopping corruption, and
they ended up foreclosing the emergence of parliamentary govern-
ment in America, leaving us instead with the congressional committee
system. The Framers thought constitutional judicial-executive incom-
patibility was unnecessary, and it turned out, painfully, to be quite
necessary after all. The Framers declined to constitutionalize federal-
state incompatibility because they wanted to give the states a break,
with the result that the states have now constitutionalized it them-
selves, most likely to protect their power.
What, then, will be the next unanticipated consequence of legal
change in this area? Only one prediction seems safe. Today, the In-
compatibility Clause, and the principle it embodies, seems to be the
cornerstone of the entire American constitutional structure. If the
CCS and other advocates of repealing the Clause succeed in pulling
out that stone, we must expect that the entire glorious structure will
come crashing down.
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